The Long Explanation of the Noble Perfection of Wisdom in One Hundred Thousand, Twenty-Five Thousand, and Eighteen Thousand Lines
Explanation of the Intermediate Teaching

In regard to those [five], the “three knowledges” are the knowledge of all aspects, the knowledge of path aspects, and all-knowledge.

Among them, the extraordinary, nonconceptual knowledge included in the vajra-like meditative stabilization when there is a lord buddha’s transformation of the basis is called

Knowledge in the form of the bodhisattva’s path‍—the practice of the perfections and so on‍—that emerges in a series of ten levels, bringing the bodhisattvas to accomplishment, is called

The extraordinary path knowledge of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas that is caused by meditating on “everything compounded is impermanent,” “everything with outflows is suffering,” and “every dharma is selfless,” engaged with the aspects of impermanence and so on, is called

The statement “who want to fully awaken to the knowledge, furnished with the best of all aspects, of a knower of all” teaches that they want to fully awaken to the knowledge of all aspects;

teaches its result.

Qualm: But just that “want to fully awaken to all dharmas in all forms” has already taught the knowledge of all aspects, so why is it teaching it again?

There is no fault, because the earlier “want to fully awaken to all dharmas” was teaching all the dharmas that have to be realized, but here, with “want to fully awaken to the knowledge of a knower of all,” it is teaching the full awakening to just that knowledge of a knower of all.

Qualm: What is its purpose in qualifying it with “furnished with the best of all aspects”?

There, the knowledge of a knower of all is threefold: the all-knowledge of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, and the all-knowing knowledge of buddhas with all dharmas as its objective support. The nonconceptual all-knowing knowledge of buddhas is also called “the knowledge of a knower of all.” Were it just to have said “wants to fully awaken to the knowledge of a knower of all,” there would have been uncertainty about which knowledge it is referring to. Hence, it qualifies it with “furnished with the best of all aspects.” With that it teaches the “knowledge of a knower of all aspects.”

As for all the aspects, they are the nonarising unproduced aspect, the unceasing, the primordially calm, the naturally in nirvāṇa, the nonexistence of an intrinsic nature, emptiness, signlessness, wishlessness, and so on. The best of all of those aspects, the principal one, is the emptiness aspect because it is the root of the other aspects. Therefore, it is taught that the entry into the sameness where the entities of apprehended and apprehender are the same, furnished with the best of all aspects and without conceptualization, [F.51.a] is the knowledge of a knower of all aspects.

Alternatively, the knowledge of a knower of all itself is being taught. All the aspects are then those aspects included in the collection of the wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral, as well as those included in the collection of those destined for what is right, destined for error, and those of uncertain destiny.295 In this case, a buddha’s knowledge of a knower of all is furnished with all aspects because it comprehends what is included in the collections of the unwholesome and neutral, as well as those destined for error and those of uncertain destiny. It is said to be “furnished with the best of all aspects” because it comprehends what is included in the collections of the wholesome and those destined for what is right. Those who want such an awakening are said to “want to fully awaken to the knowledge, furnished with the best of all aspects, of a knower of all”;

teaches its result. Residual impressions of action, residual impressions of affliction, and residual impressions of birth are the three sorts of residual impressions; connections of action, connections of affliction, and connections of birth are the three sorts of connections, because the connections of dependent origination are three. The meaning is that they “want to destroy” all “residual impressions,” all “connections, and all “afflictions.”

Then the two‍—

and

teach the knowledge of path aspects and its result, [F.51.b] because bodhisattvas perfect the knowledge of the aspects of the paths and realize the thought and activity of beings, whereby they accomplish the welfare of beings.

Then, “[they] want to perfect all-knowledge” teaches the knowledge of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, because, even though bodhisattvas have not actualized all-knowledge, for the sake of beings they know the nature of all-knowledge and the causes for attaining all-knowledge, and they establish beings in their respective results of stream enterer and so on. With that, therefore, they will have perfected all-knowledge. The conditions that aid all-knowledge are not taught because bodhisattvas will know what they are from just this, so it is unnecessary.

[B5]

Then,

and so on teaches the desire for the greatnesses of bodhisattvas. Furthermore, it teaches four qualities of bodhisattvas: qualities of the impure levels, qualities of the pure levels, qualities of the level of detailed and thorough knowledge, and qualities when standing on the final level.

From the first to the seventh level are the impure levels because bodhisattvas make an active effort to pay attention there. There you should know their qualities are from “want to enter into the secure state of a bodhisattva” up to298

The qualities of the eighth level are from “want to thoroughly establish a buddha’s body” up to299

The qualities of the level of detailed and thorough knowledge, on the ninth level, are from

up to the perfecting of the six perfections,300 [F.52.a] and the qualities when standing on the final tenth level are from

up to301 the establishing of beings in their respective results of stream enterer and so on.

Among these is

turning away from the state of a śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha is called “the secure state of a bodhisattva.” Others say to take “flawlessness”302 as the tathāgata­garbha. In regard to that303 there are three periods: flawlessness that is the absence of defilement, the secure state of a bodhisattva, and the certification of dharmas. As for the tathāgata­garbha, there are also three periods for that tathatā (“suchness”): the impure period in ordinary foolish beings, the period on the pure and impure bodhisattva levels, and the pure period on the Tathāgata level. There, the impure suchness is called “a being” (sattva). It is also called “the fixed state of defilement.” In the pure and impure period it is called “awakening and being” (bodhisattva) because the awakening (bodhi) period is pure, and the being (sattva) period impure. Just that is called “the secure state of a bodhisattva.” In the pure period it is called the tathāgata because it said,304

Just that is called “the certification of dharmas.”305

The period when a bodhisattva has forsaken the impure, fixed state of defilement period (when the tathāgata­garbha is called “being”), and reached the pure and impure [F.52.b] “secure state of a bodhisattva” period (when it is called “awakening and being”), is “the secure state of a bodhisattva.” Hence it means they “want” to reach the period of “the secure state of” reality called bodhisattva (“awakening and being”).306

this is because the qualities are superior, because a bodhisattva who has set out for the knowledge on the bodhisattva levels passes beyond the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha levels on account of four qualities: special faculties, special accomplishment, special knowledge, and special result.

There a śrāvaka has naturally dull faculties, a pratyekabuddha middling faculties, and a bodhisattva sharp faculties. Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas naturally seek their own welfare, accomplish their own welfare, and complete benefits only for themselves. Bodhisattvas naturally seek their own and others’ welfare, accomplish their own and others’ welfare, and complete benefits for themselves and others. Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realize that dharmas are impermanent, suffering, empty, and selfless, while bodhisattvas who have set out to benefit themselves and others are skilled in all fields of knowledge, and, having established the many dispositions, aims, and mental states of beings, make them realize that all dharmas are characterized by being unfindable. Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas gain the purification of afflicted obscurations and reach a nirvāṇa with no remaining aggregates, while bodhisattvas eliminate both afflicted obscurations and knowledge obscurations and establish themselves in a nonabiding nirvāṇa, looking after the welfare of beings until the end of saṃsāra. [F.53.a]

there are four reasons why those who have produced the thought of awakening later turn back from the thought of awakening: because they are no longer in the lineage, or have gotten into the clutches of bad friends, or have weak compassion, or are scared of the extremely long and unbearable sufferings of saṃsāra. All four of those causes, furthermore, are absent from bodhisattvas who have entered onto the bodhisattva levels. Therefore, the levels of Pramuditā and so on are called the irreversible levels.

the thought of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas when engaged in charity is not pure because it has craving, has conceptualization, and results in existence or in functioning for one’s own welfare. The bodhisattvas’ rejoicing thought is without craving, without conceptualization, does not have causal signs within its range, and is of benefit to self and others, so it is superior because of those qualities and hence is surpassing.

Construe

and so on in the same way as well.

In

“for the sake of all beings” says that it is for all beings; “a little gift” is because of not having many things. It becomes immeasurable and incalculable because of turning it over for the sake of all beings, because of turning it over to all-knowledge, and because of the purity of the three spheres.

giving and so on without having trained in the Great Vehicle achievement is not the ultimate perfection.

on the seventh level [F.53.b] they know the form of the body of a buddha but at that time cannot achieve it. Having understood the form of the body of a buddha on that level they generate the desire to achieve it. Thus, it is saying307 that they enter into the intrinsic nature dharma body of all the buddhas from the tenth level; they also achieve the fine ornaments (the major marks and minor signs adorning the form body); and they cause the admiration of the tathāgata who is separated from speech, sound, and language, inexpressible, and naturally calm. Hence it308 teaches the three bodies.

here, take the tathāgata’s lineage to be the thoroughly established suchness, because at the eighth level all conceptualization, all exertion, and all causal signs are cut off, and there has been the transformation into the nature of purified suchness. This is called being “born in the tathāgata’s lineage.”

is just that very eighth level. Thus it says,309 “because it is totally without basic immorality it is called the heir apparent’s level.”

Take310

as the world in the sense of beings, because the world as beings is also without an end. It has the tathāgata­garbha as its terminus. The world that is

is the world as container.

it is inexhaustible just like a single drop of water poured into the ocean that does not run out because, dedicated to the knowledge of all aspects, it works for the welfare of beings until the end of saṃsāra. Also understand the inexhaustible as it is explained in The Teaching of Akṣayamati.311

means to ensure the progeny necessary to continue the unbroken line, so that the line of buddhas [F.54.a] will remain unbroken.

and so on teaches the sixteen emptinesses. It is true that emptiness, as an entity, is simply one. Nevertheless, it is divided into many types because of the different minds and interests of bodhisattvas.

Here, when bodhisattvas endeavor to pay attention to emptiness, they think, “If all dharmas are empty‍—that is, unreal‍—how does the ‘self’ in ‘Monks, I am my own master’;312 ‘The actions I did myself ripen in me’; ‘Stay by yourself in the form of an island’ and so on exist?” Having reflected on that, when they first take up in their mind these forms, feelings, and so on that are their own self’s inner dharmas and reflect on them, they perfectly review the fact that there is nothing that can be set forth as a “self” that ultimately exists. These are simply things set forth just conventionally; they are names plucked out of thin air. Hence, it says “inner emptiness.” This is teaching the aggregates as emptiness.

Then the bodhisattvas reflect, “If there is no self, does anything else exist or not?” They do not see any other things that can be set forth as “something else,” but see them simply as mere sense fields. Hence, it says

This teaches that the sense fields are emptiness.

Then, again in order to determine just that meaning well, they take up in their mind the inner and outer dharmas as one and meditate on them, viewing them simply as just the eighteen constituents. Therefore, it says

which teaches that the constituents are emptiness.

Alternatively, tīrthikas say, “The enjoyer is the soul,” so it is necessary to teach the absence of a self of persons. And still those who have set out in this Dharma say, “The enjoyer is the inner sense fields,” [F.54.b] so it is necessary to teach that the sense fields are not real things. Hence it makes a presentation of inner and outer emptiness for both of those.

There it teaches inner emptiness based on the person not having a self, with “the eyes are empty of self and what belongs to self, and the ears… are empty of self and what belongs to self,” and so on;313 and it teaches inner emptiness based on the selflessness of dharmas with “the eyes are empty of eyes…, the ears are empty of ears,” and so on.314 Both explanations are given.

In this regard, there are also four possibilities to do with the eye: “my eyes are me”; “I have eyes”; “I am where my eyes are”; “my eyes are where I am.” This is similar to considering, “form is me”; “I have form”; “I am where form is”; and “form is where I am.” Among these, “my eyes are me” is grasping at the eyes as the self. “I have eyes”; “I am where my eyes are”; and “my eyes are where I am” is grasping at the eyes as belonging to the self. There, the understanding in accord with the reality of the eyes in a form that cannot be apprehended eliminates those four ways of grasping and perfectly sees in accord with the reality that the eyes are empty of self and what belongs to self. Similarly, connect this with the ears and so on as well. This is instruction in emptiness based on the selflessness of persons.

Based on the selflessness of dharmas, eyes have the three aspects of the falsely imagined eyes, the conceptualized eyes, and the true dharmic nature of the eyes.315 Among these, the falsely imagined eyes are the things taken to be the eyes that are in the form of expressed and expressor. The conceptualized eyes are the appearance of eyes in the specific form in which they exist as a subject and object entity. [F.55.a] The true dharmic nature of the eyes is the nature free from expressed and expressor, that is inexpressible, that is free from becoming something with an appearance, and is a thoroughly established private introspective knowledge.

There, in “the eyes are empty of eyes,” “the eyes” are the true dharmic nature of the eyes; they are “empty,” separated from “eyes,” the falsely imagined and the conceptualized eyes.316 That is the meaning. Similarly, connect this with “the ears are empty of ears” and so on.

Qualm: The inexpressible ultimate is not an intrinsic nature of the eyes. Were it an intrinsic nature of the eyes it would be expressible, so why is it called the “true dharmic nature of the eyes”?

That is true, but still, even though any compounded phenomena whatsoever‍—eyes and so on, a shape or a sound and so on‍—in the way they are when transformed, in their thoroughly established form, are not differentiated as separate and are in the same form, nevertheless, when you want to talk about them you have no choice except to make distinctions in order to give an explanation. They are merely indicated by specifically distinguishing them with words like “the shape’s suchness,” “the sound’s suchness,” “the smell’s suchness,” and so on. But that suchness is not in those forms and does not become expressible as them. Thus, all the true dharmic natures of the eyes and so on are devoid of intrinsic natures of the inner eye sense field and so on, and hence it says “inner emptiness.”

Having thus stopped grasping at an inner entity as an enjoyer, to stop grasping at outer entities as the enjoyed there is a presentation of outer emptiness. Tīrthikas grasp shapes and so on as the enjoyed, viewing them as what belongs to self; followers of this Dharma grasp them conceptually as just objects. To stop the former of these it says317 “a form is empty of self and what belongs to self,” “a sound is empty of self and what belongs to self,” and so on. [F.55.b] To stop the other of the two it says318 “a form is empty of a form,” “a sound is empty of a sound,” and so on. Again, you should construe that as above. Similarly, about outer objects devoid of self and what belongs to self, devoid of those falsely imagined dharma aspects, it says “outer emptiness.”

Having thus given an explanation of the conceptualizations of inner and outer enjoyer and enjoyed, now, to eliminate from the bodies of assembled inner and outer sense fields the view of “I” and “mine,” and the conceptualization of them as a body, it collects them both together and teaches

In order to eliminate views, bodhisattvas correctly view those assemblages of inner and outer sense fields as empty of a real “I” and “mine.” The presentation of the elimination of the conceptualization, furthermore, is based on there being no collections of the assemblages, because, contingent one on the other, they are empty of functioning.319 This means that the eyes are empty of a shape, so ultimately they do not perform the action of seeing and so on, having connected with it. Similarly, a shape is empty of the eyes in the sense that it does not perform a function together with them. Similarly, the ears are empty of a sound, and a sound is empty of the ears. Therefore, because the collection does not function, the conceptualization of the assemblage as a body is eliminated.

In the section explaining the emptinesses, therefore, the inner dharmas are empty of the outer dharmas, and the outer dharmas are empty of the inner dharmas.

What does inner dharmas empty of outer dharmas mean? It means that the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, the body, and the thinking mind are empty of shapes, sounds, smells, tastes, feelings, and dharmas. Thus there is no “I” and “mine” in the assemblage of inner and outer dharmas. And the inner dharmas are devoid of the outer dharmas, [F.56.a] and the outer dharmas are devoid of the inner dharmas, so, because in the absence of an assemblage they are ultimately empty of functioning, it says “inner and outer emptiness.”

After perfectly setting forth the three emptinesses, bodhisattvas reflect, “Does ‘emptiness’ exist as an aspect of a phenomenon or not? If an ‘emptiness’ exists then emptiness exists, and the state of not being empty will come to exist as well, because the existence of an antidote without the existence of its opposition is untenable. And if there is a nonempty state, then that will be the nonempty state that all dharmas are in.” Having reflected thus, bodhisattvas then decide, “There is no ‘emptiness’ at all. Were some other ‘empty’ dharma to exist, then a nonempty dharma would exist, so there is no other ‘empty’ dharma at all.”

To illustrate, someone “sees” the city of the gandharvas and thinks they have seen it.320 Then, afterward, when they have really explored and looked for just that city and do not see it, they no longer think that they have seen it. But it is not suitable to say, when they see its emptiness, because they think it is empty that there is some other, different entity‍—the “emptiness” of the city they were thinking about. Similarly, taking a falsely imagined shape and so on as a real shape, they think they have seen a constituent element of reality. Then when they look into what it really is, because the knowledge of it as it really is does not see that constituent of reality when it is looked for, it is simply that the nonexistence of the intellectually active awareness of the constituent of reality and an intellectually active awareness of the empty is born. But it is not suitable to say that when they see it is empty that there is some other, different constituent of reality‍—“the empty”‍—there. Therefore, because emptiness does not exist, the nonempty state does not exist either; because the nonempty state does not exist, emptiness does not exist either. This is the correct explanation here.321 What you should not say is, “There is no emptiness,” [F.56.b] because all dharmas are empty. And you should not say, “Emptiness exists!” because when you investigate, there is no other dharma‍—“emptiness”‍—at all. So this is the

Again, bodhisattvas think,322 “If all dharmas are empty, why are all these moving and unmoving states of existence called ‘dependent origination.’ If they do not exist, they cannot be a dependent origination. And if a dependently originated phenomenon does exist, in that case all the moving and unmoving states of existence exist.” Having thought that, they determine there are no “dependently originated phenomena” at all, but even though they are thus totally nonexistent, still, from a time without beginning, for as long as they are not perfectly seen and directly realized323 they remain as existent causes and effects in the form of action, affliction, and maturation. And yet those actions, afflictions and maturations are emptinesses in each and every way. Those empty phenomena that exist as emptinesses in the form of causes and effects are dependent originations.

To illustrate, a certain magician, having deceived the eyes of beings with an abracadabra,324 conjures up the appearance of a real elephant, horse, chariot, small troop of soldiers, mountain, waterfall, ocean, and so on.

That becomes the condition that produces in a being whose eyes have been deceived by the abracadabra a consciousness of an elephant and so on appearing as that object, and those with those consciousnesses see those magically produced elephants and so on. Such a cause-and-effect reality existing as the magically produced elephant and so on, along with the consciousness, [F.57.a] is the dependent origination. The dependent origination that is those magically produced elephants and so on, and those consciousnesses, cannot possibly exist ultimately.

Similarly, all fools whose sight has been deceived by ignorance see karmically constructed, falsely imagined phenomena that are like the magically produced elephants and so on. Those falsely imagined phenomena become the condition that generates a consciousness that they are appearing as they are, and those with those consciousnesses see those phenomena. Those grasped-object phenomena and grasper-subject phenomena imagined like that, existing in the form of causes and effects, are dependent originations. Those grasped-grasper dependent originations cannot possibly exist ultimately, therefore

Were phenomena to have any unfabricated essential identity in the form of an intrinsic nature, they would not come forth, contingent on something else, in a form that arises under the power of causes and conditions. But phenomena do come forth as dependent phenomena, dependent on other conditions; they do not come forth through an intrinsic nature that is their own unfabricated being. Hence it should be known that they are not things with their own intrinsic nature. Because their own intrinsic nature is thus nonexistent, therefore they326 “lack an intrinsic nature.” Just because they lack an intrinsic nature, they are emptiness. Hence, “the meaning of no intrinsic nature is the meaning of dependent origination, and the meaning of emptiness is the meaning of dependent origination.”

When the perfect sight of reality has been produced and has overcome the force of abracadabra-like ignorance, falsely imagined dharmas like the magically produced elephant and so on, and the consciousness-dharmas that grasp them [F.57.b] in the form of a dependent origination marked as a cause-and-effect reality, stop appearing and disappear. This is the

Again, the bodhisattvas think, “If all dharmas are empty, the ultimate dharma is empty too. If it is empty, how327 is it ultimate? How does the vajropama meditative stabilization of the buddhas apprehend it? If that dharma does exist, then all dharmas will similarly exist as well.” They then determine as follows: No “ultimate” dharma exists at all. The tathāgata­garbha in its established state is not the nature of the dharmas, because you cannot say it “exists” or “does not exist.” You cannot say this thoroughly established state “exists” because it is presented as being characterized by the nonexistence of both the falsely imagined grasped-object and grasper-subject, and you cannot say of something characterized by nonexistence that it “exists.” You cannot say it is “nonexistent” either, because it exists as an intrinsic nature separated from duality. If you say that in such a form it “exists,” it comes to exist as a real thing and becomes the extreme of over-reification; and if you say it does not exist as a substantial reality, it becomes nonexistent like a rabbit’s horns and so on and becomes the extreme of over-negation. So, since it is inexpressible as either, it should not be conceived of like that.

And the statement that the vajropama meditative stabilization apprehends it is an ill-considered statement, because the extraordinary nonconceptual knowledge of the buddhas does not apprehend anything. At that time it has no grasped-object and grasper-subject aspects, so there has been a transformation into an absolutely pure state and hence it does not apprehend anything. But still, because of the earlier [F.58.a] habituation to being a grasper-subject in a saṃsāra that has no beginning, even though at that time it is not in the nature of a consciousness and has no grasped-object of its own,328 still it is labeled as itself operating like a grasper-subject. It is said to be “equal” because it is equally an apprehended and apprehender entity. It is said to be “equal to the equal” because it is just that apprehended and apprehender as well. Ultimate reality in such a form, not existing in the form of some other phenomenon, is the

Again, the bodhisattvas think, “If all phenomena are emptiness, compounded phenomena and uncompounded phenomena would not exist, but it is not right to say that they ‘do not exist’ because they are expressed as the compounded and uncompounded, and also from time to time in the scriptures they are impure appearance.” They then determine as follows: No transformed “compounded” phenomenon exists at all. Were it to exist, it would not be correct that it is in fact “compounded,” because the compounded is taken to be something made from a collection of causes and conditions that come together. If some compounded phenomenon were to exist ultimately, it would have been made by something else, and nothing can make an ultimate dharma. Since such a “compounded” phenomenon does not exist at all, it is fools using such names, because of a falsely imagined transformation. The arising, lasting, and perishing that are the characteristic marks of compounded things also have an imagined329 existence. Since the characteristic marks are said to have an imagined existence, the bearer of the marks definitely has to be taken as having an imagined existence as well. It is not right to characterize an ultimate dharma as imaginary. And even if a “compounded phenomenon” ultimately exists, it is not right for one phenomenon to have the three characteristic marks. Therefore [F.58.b] this is the

Again, the bodhisattvas think, “Those uncompounded phenomena that are empty on account of the compounded being compounded are not compounded things. They are therefore the ultimate nature.” They then determine as follows: No transformed “uncompounded” phenomenon exists at all. The “uncompounded” is taken to be the nonexistence of something compounded. It does not ultimately exist. It is similar to space, which is taken to be marked by the nonexistence of anything compounded. It does not exist marked as a discrete entity absolutely other than that. An analytic cessation is also marked just by the nonexistence of any compounded phenomenon. Similarly, a nonanalytic cessation is also marked by the destruction of compounded phenomena. If even in the śrāvaka system they do not ultimately exist, it goes without saying that they do not do so in the emptiness system. This realization that they are emptiness is the

Again, the bodhisattvas think, “If all dharmas are empty, is it right that we find in the scriptures statements that the lord buddhas are omniscient because they know those ‘past dharmas’ at the prior limit, ‘future dharmas’ at the later limit, and ‘present dharmas’ at the midpoint; that those lord buddhas’ knowledge of ‘the past free from unobstruction’ and so on is ‘a distinct attribute of a buddha’;330 and that the ‘divine eye’ and so on cover the three time periods?”331 They then determine as follows: It is not right that “prior limit, later limit, and the midpoint” dharmas exist at all, because [F.59.a] one single dharma cannot be said to be three, “future, present, and past.” If it is an ultimate dharma it is said to be just one. How could it be tenable that it is also at three times? The description of it in terms of three times is not right because then, whereas it is just one, at the later limit it would have to be the future, in between it would be the present, and at the prior limit it would be the past. So, since that is the case, it is just one.

To illustrate, the first month Citrā, which has gone into a mansion and has emerged from a mansion, is still one.332 This happens without it changing.

Furthermore, is this time contingently established or is it established in and of itself?

It is not right to say that it is established in and of itself, because it is feasible that things that stand still are established in and of themselves, but it is not feasible if they do not stand still. Time does not stand still. Its mode of operating is as something that is an instant, half a second, a second, a day and night, a fortnight, a month, the days in a month marking changes in constellation, a season, a yearly cycle, a time period, and so on. So time does not stand still even for an instant. It is labeled a half second when a bit of the past and a bit of the future are combined into one. Similarly, past and future combined together into one are labeled a day and a night. Therefore, a time “established in and of itself” does not exist in the past, the future, or the present, which are things that do not stand still.

Even if you say that time is contingently established, and contingent on the past there is a future and present, and similarly, contingent on the present there are the other two times, and so on, if the two times‍—the present and the future‍—exist contingent on the past, then, when it is the past, the present and the future will be there as well. [F.59.b] If both the present and the future are not there in the past, they are not contingent on it. If both present and future are there in the past, since they are both there, they are both the past. Similarly, if the two‍—the present and the past‍—are contingent on the future, both the present and the past will be there in the future, and if they are not there they will not be contingent on it. If those two are there in the future, then they both become the future as well. Similarly, if the two‍—the past and the future‍—are contingent on the present, both the past and the future will be here in the present, and if they are not here, they will not be contingent on it. And if those two, the past and the future, are here at the present time, then they are both here and are therefore both the present as well.

Therefore, time is still just one.

So, they think in these and other ways that ultimately no “prior limit, later limit, or the midpoint” dharmas exist at all. The Lord teaches that they are ordinary conventions. This is the

Again, the bodhisattvas think, “If all dharmas are empty, how could the Lord have said saṃsāra does exist: ‘Saṃsāra is long for fools’;333 ‘Bhikṣus, this saṃsāra has no beginning or end’?334 Thus, he did say it exists, and since it does, those who are in saṃsāra exist, and based on that, therefore, all dharmas exist as well.” They then determine as follows: There is no dharma called saṃsāra at all. And why? Because it “has no beginning or end.” Were there to be a dharma called saṃsāra, its beginning [F.60.a] would exist and its end would exist. No dharma with a beginning and end is to be seen at all. And the lord has said, “No prior limit appears.”335

If you say both a beginning and an end have been refuted but a middle has not been refuted, so a middle exists, that is not right, because how could there be a middle of something that does not have a beginning or an end? A “middle” exists contingent on a beginning and an end.

But why, if there is no dharma called saṃsāra in some other form in which beings are going through life after life, did the Lord say, “Bhikṣus! This saṃsāra has no beginning and no end because no beginning limit appears. Beings obscured by ignorance and bound by craving wander in saṃsāra”?

Again, the response is as follows: Being in saṃsāra is itself ultimately not tenable. If somebody is in saṃsāra, is the saṃsāra to be counted as permanent or impermanent? If it is permanent, it is not feasible that somebody is in saṃsāra, because it would be unchanging. Even if it is impermanent, it is not feasible that somebody is in saṃsāra, because each of the instants have perished and are no longer what they were, and the second instant arises as something quite other, so how could there be a saṃsāra there? Hence saṃsāra is the label given to the unbroken flow of compounded phenomena existing as an extended series of productions and cessations. This is the

Again, the bodhisattvas think, “Even though saṃsāra cannot be apprehended, when dharmas have been transformed, ‘nirvāṇa’ exists. You cannot say the truth of cessation does not exist because the Lord has explicitly taught it with, ‘Bhikṣus, the unproduced, unmade, unoriginated, uncompounded exists,’336 and so on. Hence nonrepudiation337 exists.” Take “the repudiated” [F.60.b] as the five aggregates, because they are to be repudiated and they are to be made nonexistent. In the sacred words of the Tathāgata Kāśyapa338 the label the repudiated is given to the five aggregates. And now339 as well “the one suffering existence to be repudiated” and “the five suffering existences to be repudiated” are explained. The thing to be repudiated not being there is called nonrepudiation. Where the aggregates will have stopped is called nonrepudiation. Hence it is cessation.

The bodhisattvas then determine as follows: It is not correct that there is any “nonrepudiation” phenomenon at all. The nonexistence of the aggregates is nonrepudiation, and that nonexistence of the aggregates is the nirvāṇa without any aggregates remaining, characterized as the nonexistence of everything. So you cannot make a presentation of it in any way in the form of some other phenomenon. Hence the expression nonexistent thing is an expression synonymous with nirvāṇa, cessation, all compounded phenomena at peace, nonrepudiation, and so on.

But if nirvāṇa does not exist how will compounded phenomena not arise? Therefore, the dharma that counteracts the recurrence of compounded phenomena is nirvāṇa.

That is not tenable either. How could there ever be compounded phenomena that have passed into nirvāṇa? If compounded phenomena do pass into nirvāṇa, it must be reckoned some permanent or impermanent thing is passing into nirvāṇa. If you say “something permanent is passing into nirvāṇa,” that is untenable. Something permanent never changes, and there is no need for it to pass into nirvāṇa.

If you say “something impermanent340 is passing into nirvāṇa,” it would be impermanent; therefore, since it would have been destroyed it would not arise again. And passing into nirvāṇa does nothing to an entity that does not arise. And even if you say that nirvāṇa acts to counteract the other compounded phenomena that are the cause of its arising, they are also not there. [F.61.a] It is the fire of the extraordinary path that burns the seed of the tree of ignorance into an entity that will not arise again. Not arising in its nature‍—that is labeled nirvāṇa. And if even in the śrāvaka system there is no “nirvāṇa” at all in the form of some other dharma, it goes without saying there is none in the emptiness system. This realization is the

Again, the bodhisattvas think, “If all attributes341 are empty it is untenable that, based on the behaviors and thoughts, instincts, interests, dispositions, and personality types‍— needy and so on‍—constituting the basic nature of beings,342 the knowledge of various dispositions, the knowledge of various interests, the knowledge of various basic personalities and so on that are the special attributes of a buddha become operational attributes. Therefore, those attributes of a basic nature ultimately exist.”

The bodhisattvas then determine as follows: It is not right to describe them as attributes like that in the form of something quite other, because they are particular periods in a being’s continuum. They cannot be established as different or not different from the beings. Therefore this‍—thinking that such hypostatized attributes do not exist‍—is the

Again, the bodhisattvas think, “If all things343 are nonexistent, how can those attributes of them‍—impermanence, suffering, selflessness, and so on‍—exist? It is impossible to have an attribute without an attribute possessor. Thus, all compounded things are impermanent; all things with outflows are suffering; all things are selfless, and when that perfect knowledge of reality is seen and attained, [F.61.b] freedom from the suffering of all existences is established.”

The bodhisattvas then determine as follows: The impermanence attribute and so on cannot be the ultimate attribute. How could an ultimate attribute be impermanent, arise, and be destroyed? An attribute that changes and transforms cannot be an “ultimate.” Just that which is true, that which is unmistaken, is their ultimate.344 Therefore the ultimate does not change and nothing inheres in it.

Similarly, if an attribute in the form of suffering that serves as an ultimate were to exist then suffering would be permanent. And in that case, because the permanent suffering would always be there, ordinary or extraordinary happiness would never arise again.

Similarly, if a “selfless” attribute existed as the ultimate then selflessness would inhere in all things and they would become permanent. And were they to have become so, “liberation” would not be a state to be accomplished. Therefore, these basic natures of imaginary phenomena are just imaginary. The emptiness of all dharmas is not something that can be examined. Hence this is the

Again, the bodhisattvas think,345 “Even if, for the time being, impermanence and so on do not, as general characterizing marks, exist, still those marks particular to something‍—‘easily breakable,’ ‘seeable’ that is the mark346 of a form or physical object, ‘experience’ that is the mark of feeling, and so on‍—do exist. Since they exist, form and so on also exist.”

They then determine as follows: Are these marks different from the bases of the marks or not different? If they are not different, it is not correct that “just that is the mark, and just that is the basis of the marks,” because if the basis of a mark is not established, [F.62.a] the mark is not different than that and hence is not established. How could it be established as its mark?

If they are different, then the following investigation has to be pursued: Does the mark exist before the basis of the mark, or does it come about afterward, or are they there at the same time?

If the mark is there before the basis of the mark, then of what, in the absence of the basis of the mark, is it the mark? If just a mark without a basis exists there before, then later on it will be without a basis as well.

If the basis of the mark is there before and the mark comes about later, in that case the basis of the mark comes about without a mark before the mark is there, so why would it not be without a mark afterward as well? If the basis of the mark without a mark is already there before, later when it gets the mark, having come about without cause that mark will serve no function at all.

If the basis of the mark and the mark have come about at the same time, then that is a new discovery indeed‍—a basis of the mark that is different from the mark, and a mark that is different from the basis of the mark. So how could the bifurcation “this is the mark; this is the basis of the mark” be right? Therefore, the marks of imaginary dharmas are just falsely imagined, and hence unable to bear ultimate scrutiny. This is the

Again, the bodhisattvas think, “If all attributes cannot be apprehended, in that case an attribute that cannot be apprehended in the form of something quite other would exist. If that which cannot be apprehended is taken to be nonexistent then all attributes can be apprehended. Therefore, what cannot be apprehended does exist.”

They then determine as follows: It is not correct that an attribute that cannot be apprehended in the form of something quite other exists. If the attribute called “cannot be apprehended” in the form of something quite other exists, [F.62.b] an apprehending apart from that which cannot be apprehended would also exist. On account of that, that which cannot be apprehended would become an apprehended entity. And that is unsuitable because it stands negated‍—to be itself apprehended and to be itself something that cannot be apprehended is a contradiction. And even if it is thought, in regard to what cannot be apprehended, that apprehending is not there, in that case what cannot be apprehended also, because it cannot be apprehended, is just nonexistent. Therefore there is no apprehending of “an attribute that ‘cannot be apprehended’ in the form of something quite other exists”; rather, given the fact that attributes cannot be apprehended, that is merely labeling “it cannot be apprehended” onto this or that. Therefore, this is the

Again, the bodhisattvas think, “It has been explained that347

so the intrinsic nature of a ‘nonexistent thing’ as it pertains to every dharma has to be searched for. Therefore, because it is established as being in its intrinsic nature a nonexistent thing,349 a dharma ‘in its intrinsic nature a nonexistent thing’ exists. But if it is thought, ‘If dharmas are things that are nonexistent in their nature, then one would be saying “dharmas do not exist,” and what gain would there be in that?’ it is not so. There is a great gain because, when it has been accepted that ‘all falsely imagined dharmas are nonexistent in each and every way,’ it is being said that just those falsely imagined dharmas are there as the intrinsic nature of nonexistent things, so it becomes an explanation of the existence of one side of dharmas.”

They then determine as follows: What is the meaning of this statement, “all dharmas are in their intrinsic nature nonexistent things”P18k ? This “all dharmas” teaches falsely imagined dharmas and thoroughly established dharmas. Among these, falsely imagined dharmas do not exist, so it is said they are “in their intrinsic nature absolutely nonexistent things.” [F.63.a] Thoroughly established dharmas are suchness in the aspect of existent things when they have been stopped.350 So, taking “nonexistent thing” in this sense,351 it says “in its intrinsic nature a nonexistent thing.”

An “existent thing” is so called because it has come into being. Hence a compounded phenomenon is called an “existent thing.” When it has stopped, that which is the inexpressible aspect of private self-awareness is called “the intrinsic nature when there is no existent thing,”352 taught as “suchness.”

In that way, with just this, the existence and the nonexistence of all dharmas have been explained. And because the Lord has said,353

therefore the characteristic mark of all dharmas‍—that they are in their intrinsic nature nonexistent‍—is absolutely not realized.354 This is

it is true that suchness is always one. Nevertheless, it is presented as three in reference to its different bases: at the level of the knowledge of path aspects, at the level of the knowledge of all aspects, and at the all-knowledge level. The thoroughly established nature of any outer or inner dharma is “the suchness of all dharmas,” for example the suchness of a shape, the suchness of a sound, the suchness of a smell, and so on. The dharma body of all buddhas, the transformed tathāgata­garbha, is the second “suchness of the dharma-constituent” because it is the basis of all the buddhadharmas. The śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha nirvāṇa without remaining aggregates is “the suchness that is the very limit of reality.” That is what is being talked about where it says [F.63.b]

and

Furthermore, it speaks about the earlier “suchness of all dharmas” to teach that it is comprehended at the eighth level as effortlessly without conceptualization. As for this, it should be understood as being spoken about to teach the level when the end has been reached.

teaches, according to The Ten Bhūmis, the special qualities of the operation of knowledge on the tiny particles and so on.356

just like walls and so on that have blunted the force of the wind, the single tip of a finger blunts the shaking wind that pervades all world regions as does a wall and so on.

they want their posture to cover space, expanding into it and filling it up.

means with what they eat at one time, with what they eat at the proper time.

“How do they complete the six perfections with the perfection of giving alone?”

because they are not distracted when they give a gift and then do not construct any idea about it they therefore complete the perfection of concentration.

is saying that they know all phenomena with wisdom so they do not apprehend.

and so on‍—the flesh eye is the form body eye. The divine eye knows all meditative stabilizations, absorptions, and clairvoyances. [F.64.a] The wisdom eye knows the knowledge of a knower of all. The Dharma eye knows the path wherever it goes, higher and lower faculties, various dispositions, and various constituents.357 The knowledge of a worthy one’s path included in the vajropama meditative stabilization is the buddha eye.

This passage is self-explanatory.

the regions between worlds are “blinding.”358

it says this because the secrets of the body359 are within the range of those who have attained the tenth level.

this is the gaze of holy beings. They do not look up at360 what is above, look down at what is below, look to the sides361 at what is to the right or left, twist their neck362 to look at what is behind, concentrate to look at what is far off, or look without concentrating at what is close by. This says that however they are carrying themselves and however they are looking, they “look down as an elephant looks” because they look at all beings and all dharmas in all world systems.363

It is said that

are the three ways they carry themselves when at the site of awakening; and

is when they pass into the great complete nirvāṇa. At both those times the ordinary earth cannot shake.

What would the fault be if all the earth [F.64.b] on which the Tathāgata trod were to have

It is because the five sorts of sense objects would not come about:

It is true that bodhisattvas on the eighth level, like worthy ones, are totally

and hence without even the faintest habituation to afflictive emotion, so they could never

the five sorts of sense objects. Nevertheless, our Bodhisattva,

in the ways of gathering a retinue,366 in order to gather beings through the consistency between his words and deeds magically produces duplicates of himself for each of twenty-four thousand women and thrills them all. Hence, he made a show of Yaśodharā and the other twenty-four thousand women and the nine thousand dancers together with their many attendants, and he made a show of old age, sickness, and death‍—there is nothing he did not do among the gods and Brahmās, bringing them to maturity in the three vehicles. Therefore, he made a show of using sense objects in order to bring beings to maturity. Thus, it says,367

Qualm: If his enjoyment of sexual pleasure is not true, then it is a lie to say Rāhula is his son.

It is not a lie, because “son” is said not only of someone born from a womb on account of the enjoyment of sexual pleasure. There are also those born miraculously. Holy Rāhula, furthermore, was a bodhisattva great being who made a show of gestating in the womb because there was a purpose in doing so.

The “thought” here should be taken as wanting. It says “Production of the Thought chapter” to teach that wanting has arisen for all the qualities of a bodhisattva and all the qualities of a buddha.373

[B6]

“Because they do not see form as qualified by production or qualified by stopping” means “has production as its intrinsic nature or has stopping as its intrinsic nature.” If form had production as its intrinsic nature, it would not have stopping as its intrinsic nature; if it had stopping as its intrinsic nature, it would not have production as its intrinsic nature, because the existence of two intrinsic natures in one thing is a complete contradiction.

Were a form to have the dharma called production, [F.73.b] there would be four ways to conceive of it: as being produced from itself, produced from other, produced from both, or produced without a cause. Of these, it is not logical that it is produced from itself because at that time it is a dharma that has not been produced, and a nonexistent entity is not suitable to be the cause of production. Were that dharma to exist prior to production that also would be illogical, because the production again of something that already exists is illogical. When you investigate a production from something that exists, the production would happen at all times and there would never be nonproduction. Hence production from self is illogical.

Production from other is illogical too, because if other things were produced from something other, then everything would be produced from everything.

And production from both does not escape those two faults either.

Production without a cause is also illogical because everything would be produced everywhere. When you analyze like that, ultimately there is no production. As it is said,395

It is not logical that it has the dharma of stopping either, because it has no production. Thus, something produced stops, and something not produced does not stop. Furthermore, if there were a dharma called stopped, would it be categorized as a dharma that exists or that does not exist? Of these, if it does exist it is not feasible that it stops because both existing and not existing are impossible in one thing. If it does not exist, it is not tenable that it stops because it is nonexistent. Thus, like a rabbit’s horn, to say “it stops” is unsuitable. Again, it is said,396

Thus production and stopping are imaginary phenomena, simply just conventions. They do not ultimately exist. Thus, it says, “Because they do not see form as qualified by production or qualified by stopping…”

Similarly, “defilement” or “purification” of form and so on is not feasible. Were something to be defilement in its intrinsic nature, purification would never happen because an intrinsic nature is not something that can be given up. If it were to be qualified by purification, thoroughly pure in its intrinsic nature, defilement would never happen. Furthermore, if dharmas have become a defilement you can suppose it happens to what was a defilement or was pure. If what were defilement became defiled, defilement would be meaningless because you do not have to produce defilement in what is already defiled. And as long as that is the case,397 defilement would be produced again and again, and purification would never happen.

And it is also not feasible that that which is pure are the defilements because that entails a contradiction.

Similarly, with purification, you can suppose it happens to what was a defilement or was pure. There could be no purification of what was a defilement because those two things exclude each other. And it is also illogical that purification is of that which is pure, because it is pure, so that would be meaningless.

Hence, defilement and purification are ultimately not there, but still, onto the suchness that is pure in its intrinsic nature, during the ordinary person phase, defilement that is just plucked out of thin air is merely labeled as defilement, [F.74.b] and during the pure phase the nonexistence of the defilement that is plucked out of thin air is merely labeled as purification. It is not feasible that they are the true dharmic nature of form and so on. Thus it says,

Thus, how form and so on have no intrinsic nature has been explained. Now, they

and so on, teaches that a collection does not have the defining mark of an aggregate. An aggregate means they have aggregated. It would exist were it possible that those that have aggregated are a confluence, but there is no confluence of dharmas.398 Hence it has taught that “there is not even the defining mark of an aggregate.”399

Suppose there were a confluence of dharmas‍—still it would be unmistaken,400 or it would have one defining mark. As for form, it is not together with feeling and so on and unmistaken. They have different defining marks. Similarly, it is not feasible that feeling and so on is together in a confluence with form. And so too with feeling, perception, volitional factors, and consciousness‍—each has its own particular defining mark, so how could those things that have their own marks and are completely different be in a confluence in an aggregate with a single intrinsic nature?

Furthermore, beside form, feeling and so on, those phenomena that are constituted of form and feeling and so on are imaginary, are like an illusion, empty of a basic nature. Just as things like illusory horses and elephants and so on are not ultimately collected into one, similarly imaginary form and so on are also not collected into one.

Those that are constituted of the suchnesses of form and so on are also just empty of a basic nature. There,

teaches [F.75.a] that just as space is not collected together with space, so too with the true dharmic natures of form and so on.

This just teaches the heading. Thus connect this with: form is not collected together with feeling, and feeling and so on are not collected together with form; feeling is not collected together with perception and so on, and perception and so on are not collected together with feeling; perception is not collected together with volitional factors and so on, and volitional factors and so on are not collected together with perception; and volitional factors are not collected together with consciousness, and consciousness is not collected together with volitional factors.

[B7]

Now, to eliminate those specific defining marks of form and so on, it teaches

and so on. Thus, it teaches that when they have engaged in the correct practice of emptiness, and imaginary form, and so on not appearing as the mark of form and so on, but appearing as the mark of emptiness,401 at that time “that emptiness of form is not form.”

Thinking,

it says,

Form is the word used when there is the defining mark seeable. Thus, in emptiness there is nothing that shows itself, so it is not form; thus there is no

so it is not feeling; thus there is no

so it is not perception; thus there is no

so it is not volitional factors; thus, in that emptiness there is no

so it is not consciousness.

Thus, those specific defining marks of form and so on are eliminated. Having said that, [F.75.b] entertaining the doubt that if the defining mark that is being seeable and so on is not there, the words for form and so on will not refer to anything, it says,

and with,

it teaches that the words for form and so on should be taken to refer to the form and so on that is its true dharmic nature, that emptiness and form and so on are not different.

Therefore, with

it teaches that all dharmas as a totality, as well as the words for form and so on, should be taken to refer to emptiness, and the word for emptiness should be taken to refer to the form and so on that is its true dharmic nature. The emptiness spoken of earlier teaches all aspects.404

As for,

and so on, because of being produced and stopping, it

so it

Because the mark of form and so on does not exist, the totality of dharmas cannot be apprehended in that, and therefore it teaches,

where the totality of dharmas cannot be apprehended,

up to

Having thus taught elevenfold405 the marks of the endeavor,406 it then teaches that

Thus, when they train in the practice of emptiness they endeavor at the perfection of wisdom in sixteen ways.

Among those,

because they do not entertain the idea that the self is an agent and so on, so grasping at “I” is not operating.

were they, when they cultivate the emptiness meditative stabilization,410 to have cultivated it while thinking there is some other dharma “emptiness,” then an emptiness411 would be joining to an intrinsic nature of emptiness. Since that is the case, even a meditation on the emptiness aspect that is that totality of dharmas that cannot be apprehended is aspectless.

Hence it says they “neither cause emptiness to engage with emptiness.”

In

the yogic practice of emptiness is the emptiness meditation stabilization. This means they do not join the yogic practice of emptiness to another inherently existing yogic practice of emptiness.

Similarly connect this with: because they do not entertain the idea of some other dharma,

and because they do not entertain the idea there is some other dharma,

Therefore, it says

Because emptiness [F.76.b] is separated from the cognitive dimension413 of a yogic practice of any other imaginary phenomena such as form and so on, it is, therefore, not a yogic practice; and because it is in its nature inexpressible and the intrinsic nature of the signlessness meditative stabilization, it is, therefore, not not a yogic practice.

As for

they do not engage because they do not see in the true dharmic nature of form and so on their defining marks‍—being seeable and so on‍—because they are empty of their own defining marks. Therefore, it says they

It says

and then states as the reason for that:

They do not see the three time periods such as the prior limit and so on, so how, given that they do not see them, could they be engaged with them?

when they practice by way of apprehending consequences416‍—that this is the sort of later maturation417 experienced on account of that earlier action‍—it is said that they

When they practice with the idea that this, the maturation of that earlier action, is in the present, it is said that they join the present with the prior limit, and join the prior limit with the present. When they practice with the idea that this action that has been done in the present will mature in the future, it is said that they join the present to the future, and join the future to the present.

For those seeing the three periods of time as a sameness, there are no different times, because time cannot be apprehended in any form. Therefore, it says

It has said “they do not join form with the past,” and with “because they do not even see the past,” has stated the reason for that. [F.77.a] Joining, such as “this sort of form was in the past; this sort of form will be in the future; form is here in the present,” is joining form with the three periods of time.

when there is the idea that “this form is an object of the knowledge of all aspects,” that it is a real thing that can be apprehended, or thinking, “Giving this form, and so on, transformed into a basis of meritorious action becomes the result, the knowledge of all aspects,” when there is the idea that it is a real cause, it is said that it is joined with the knowledge of all aspects.

“the knowledge of all aspects is the cause of a buddha,” and “awakening is by comprehending all dharmas with the knowledge of all aspects”‍—they “do not join” them like that because buddha, awakening, and the knowledge of all aspects have the same characteristic mark and in the form of the dharma body are not different. Therefore, it says

and so on.

Where it says,

the view of origination and the view of perishing are the view that it is permanent and the view that it is annihilated‍—they do not entertain those.

based on a view, nor

based on conceptualization. Construe the others420 like this as well.

because imaginary form and so on do not have the mark of nirvāṇa.

because the true dharmic nature of form does not have the mark of saṃsāra.

because such an idea is not applicable. Similarly, [F.77.b] the idea of emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness does not apply either. Construe the alternatives of

and so on like this as well.422

all dharmas, in their true dharmic nature, are not different, since it is not possible to grasp them as different. All, in the intrinsic nature of the perfection of wisdom, are not different either. Therefore, it says, they

They

It says that, because the clairvoyances are in their intrinsic nature imaginary phenomena and are imaginary phenomena apprehending things. Construe the connected sections on the objects of the clairvoyances and the attainment of benefits like that as well.

A defining mark of the endeavor423 is the attainment of a benefit of it, so it teaches that with,

and so on.

teaches saṃsāra, and

teaches nirvāṇa.

teaches something other than those two.424

suchness does not cause suchness to fully awaken.

They

they do not join form with its intrinsic nature, emptiness, and they do not join the name form to the name emptiness‍—

they do not join emptiness with the intrinsic nature of form, and they do not join them thinking emptiness is the name of form.

Alternatively, they “do not join form to emptiness” means they do not join them thinking, ‘form is empty’; [F.78.a] they do not break form and emptiness apart.

because they have reached the eighth level they have been prophesied,

because they are worthy of a prophesy.

Forbearance for dharmas that are not produced is attained at the eighth level, and the matured perfections emerge. With the emergence of the matured perfections, they practice the six perfections without having to exert themselves to bring beings to maturity, purify a buddhafield, and, having fully awakened, turn the wheel of the Dharma‍—they accomplish them all effortlessly. Thus it teaches that matured practice works effortlessly

and so on. And it states the reason why they stand there effortlessly, with

From that point on425 they do not apply themselves to apprehending anything not included in the dharma-constituent. They do not even make that dharma-constituent itself into a causal sign and apprehend it.

Then it teaches the benefits of the forbearance for dharmas that are not produced, with,

teaches that from that point on their practice does not apprehend a being. [F.78.b] Even though conventionally through the force of compassion a consciousness arises, which is to say at that time they complete giving and so on for the welfare of beings, nevertheless they still abide doing everything as beings who are “unproduced and unceasing,” who are

and are

Then, in order to teach that their abiding is an extremely special one, it says so with,

and so on.

Then, even though beings cannot be apprehended, the classifications of the activities for the welfare of beings‍—love and compassion and so on, and giving and morality and so on‍—are taught with

and so on. The six statements‍—

and so on‍—teach the absence of the factors opposed to all six perfections.