co.

Table of Contents

s.

Summary

s.­1

The Perfection of Wisdom in Twenty-Five Thousand Lines is among the most important scriptures underlying both the “vast” and the “profound” approaches to Buddhist thought and practice. Known as the “middle-length” version, being the second longest of the three long Perfection of Wisdom sūtras, it fills three volumes of the Kangyur. Like the two other long sūtras, it records the major teaching on the perfection of wisdom given by the Buddha Śākyamuni on Vulture Peak, detailing all aspects of the path to enlightenment while at the same time emphasizing how bodhisattvas must put them into practice without taking them‍—or any aspects of enlightenment itself‍—as having even the slightest true existence.

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Acknowledgements

ac.­1

Translation by the Padmakara Translation Group. A complete draft by Gyurme Dorje was first edited by Charles Hastings, then revised and further edited by John Canti. The introduction was written by John Canti. We are grateful for the advice and help received from Gareth Sparham, Greg Seton, and Nathaniel Rich.

This translation is dedicated to the memory of our late colleague, long-time friend, and vajra brother Gyurme Dorje (1950–2020), who worked assiduously on this translation in his final years and into the very last months of his life. We would also like to express our gratitude to his wife, Xiaohong, for the extraordinary support she gave him on so many levels.

The translation was completed under the patronage and supervision of 84000: Translating the Words of the Buddha.


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The generous sponsorship of Kris Yao and Xiang-Jen Yao, which helped make the work on this translation possible, is most gratefully acknowledged.

Text Body

The Translation
The Perfection of Wisdom in Twenty-Five Thousand Lines
3.

Chapter 3

3.­1

Then the Blessed One addressed the venerable Subhūti: “Subhūti, commencing with the perfection of wisdom, you should be inspired to tell bodhisattva great beings152 how bodhisattva great beings will become emancipated in the perfection of wisdom!” [F.87.a]

T3808
3.­2

Thereupon, those bodhisattva great beings, those great śrāvakas, and those gods who were present thought, “Will this venerable Subhūti teach the perfection of wisdom to these bodhisattva great beings through the armor of the strength and force just of his own wisdom and inspired speech, or will he teach it through the power of the Buddha?”

T3808
3.­3

Through the power of the Buddha, the venerable Subhūti knew in his own mind the thoughts in the minds of those bodhisattva great beings, those śrāvakas, and those gods, and he said to the venerable Śāradvatīputra, “Venerable Śāradvatīputra, whatever the śrāvakas of the Blessed One say, whatever they teach, whatever they expound, it is the power of the Tathāgata. None of the doctrines that the Tathāgata have taught go against the nature of reality. {Dt.99} It is in this way that these noble children will train in the doctrines he teaches and actualize the nature of reality. Śāradvatīputra, it is the Tathāgata himself who through skillful means teaches the perfection of wisdom to bodhisattva great beings. However, Venerable Śāradvatīputra, this teaching of the perfection of wisdom to bodhisattva great beings is not within the capacity of any śrāvakas or pratyekabuddhas.”

T3808

3.­4

Then the venerable Subhūti asked the Blessed One, “Blessed Lord, you have spoken of ‘bodhisattvas, bodhisattvas,’ yet what is it that has the designation bodhisattva or perfection of wisdom? [F.87.b] Blessed Lord, I do not observe any such thing that is called ‘bodhisattva’ or ‘perfection of wisdom.’ Blessed Lord, since I do not observe such a ‘bodhisattva,’ such a ‘perfection of wisdom,’ or even such a term as ‘bodhisattva,’ what bodhisattva great being should I instruct and teach, and in what perfection of wisdom?”

T3808
3.­5

The Blessed One replied to the venerable Subhūti, “Subhūti, it is like this: the perfection of wisdom, a bodhisattva, and the term ‘bodhisattva’ are all just names. Those names do not exist inside, do not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two.

T3808
3.­6

“Subhūti, it is like this: the name used to refer to a being, for instance, is just a designation. Besides its assignment by convention to be a mere name or symbol, something that is a designation153 neither arises nor ceases. Those names do not exist inside, do not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two.

T3808
3.­7

“The self, life forms, living beings, life, living creatures, individuals, human beings, people, agents, actors, petitioners, instigators, experiencers, instigators of experience, knowers, and viewers are all just designations. {Dt.100} Besides their assignment by convention to be mere names or symbols, things that are designations neither arise nor cease. Those names do not exist inside, do not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two.

T3808
3.­8

“In the same way, Subhūti, the perfection of wisdom, a bodhisattva, and the term ‘bodhisattva’ are all just designations. [F.88.a] Besides their assignment by convention to be mere names or symbols, things that are designations neither arise nor cease. Those names do not exist inside, do not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two.

3.­9

“Subhūti, it is like this: the name used to refer to inner physical form, for instance, is no more than just a designation for something. Besides its assignment by convention to be a mere name or symbol, a designation for something154 neither arises nor ceases. That name does not exist inside, does not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two.

3.­10

“Subhūti, the terms feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness are no more than just designations for things. Besides their assignment by convention to be mere names or symbols, designations for things neither arise nor cease. Those names do not exist inside, do not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two.

3.­11

“In the same way, Subhūti, the perfection of wisdom, a bodhisattva, the term ‘bodhisattva’ and all those phenomena are no more than just designations for things. Besides their assignment by convention to be mere names or symbols, designations for things neither arise nor cease. Those names do not exist inside, do not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two.

3.­12

“Subhūti, the eyes is no more than just a designation for something. That designation for something is like this: besides its assignment by convention to be a mere name or symbol for the eyes, it neither arises nor ceases. That name does not exist inside, does not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two.

3.­13

“Subhūti, the ears, the nose, the tongue, the body, and the mental faculty are no more than just designations for things. Those designations for things are like this: besides their assignment by convention to be mere names or symbols for the mental faculty [and so forth], they neither arise nor cease. [F.88.b] Those names do not exist inside, do not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two.

T3808
3.­14

“Subhūti, sights is no more than just a designation for things. A designation for things is like this: besides its assignment by convention to be a mere name or symbol for sights, it neither arises nor ceases. That name does not exist inside, does not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two.

3.­15

“In the same way, Subhūti, sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena are no more than just designations for things. Those designations for things are like this: besides their assignment by convention to be mere names or symbols for mental phenomena [and so forth], they neither arise nor cease. Those names do not exist inside, do not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two.

3.­16

“Subhūti, the sensory element of the eyes is no more than just a designation for something. That designation for something is like this: besides its assignment by convention to be a mere name or symbol for the sensory element of the eyes, it neither arises nor ceases. That name does not exist inside, does not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two.

3.­17

“Subhūti, the sensory element of sights is no more than just a designation for something. That designation for something is like this: besides its assignment by convention to be a mere name or symbol for the sensory element of sights, it neither arises nor ceases. That name does not exist inside, does not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two.

3.­18

“Subhūti, the sensory element of visual consciousness is no more than just a designation for something. That designation for something is like this: besides its assignment by convention to be a mere name or symbol for the sensory element of visual consciousness, it neither arises nor ceases. That name does not exist inside, does not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two. [F.89.a]

3.­20

“In the same way, Subhūti, the perfection of wisdom, a bodhisattva, and the term ‘bodhisattva’ are no more than just designations for things. Those designations for things are like this: besides their assignment by convention to be mere names or symbols for the perfection of wisdom, a bodhisattva, and the term ‘bodhisattva,’ they neither arise nor cease. Those names do not exist inside, do not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two.

3.­21

“Subhūti, it is like this: associated with what is called the inner [dependent origination of] the physical body, as another instance, there are terms assigned by convention that are just designations. The bones of the head is a conventionally assigned designation, the bones of the neck is a conventionally assigned designation, and the bones of the shoulders, the bones of the arms, the bones of the joints, the bones of the ribs, the bones of the hips, the bones of the thighs, the bones of the shins, and the bones of the feet [F.89.b] are conventionally assigned designations, but these are all no more than just designations. Those designations for things are like this: besides their assignment by convention to be mere names or symbols for the bones of the head and [the other bones of the body], up to and including the bones of the feet, they neither arise nor cease. Those names do not exist inside, do not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two.

3.­22

“In the same way, Subhūti, the perfection of wisdom, a bodhisattva, and the term ‘bodhisattva’ are no more than just designations. Those designations for things are like this: besides their assignment by convention to be mere names or symbols, they neither arise nor cease. Those names do not exist inside, do not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two.

3.­23

“Subhūti, it is like this: associated with what is called outer [dependent origination], as yet another instance, there are diverse terms assigned by convention‍—grass, trees, branches, leaves, and petals‍—that are all no more than just designations. Those designations for things are like this: besides their assignment by convention to be mere names or symbols, they neither arise nor cease. Those names do not exist inside, do not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two.

T3808
3.­24

“In the same way, Subhūti, the perfection of wisdom, a bodhisattva, and the term ‘bodhisattva’ are no more than just designations. Those designations for things are like this: besides their assignment by convention to be mere names or symbols, they neither arise nor cease. Those names do not exist inside, do not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two.

3.­25

“Subhūti, it is like this: for ‘the blessed lord buddhas of the past,’ for instance, there is a mere name, but that name does not exist inside, [F.90.a] does not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two.

3.­26

“Subhūti, it is like this: phenomena such as, for instance, dreams, echoes, reflections, magical displays, mirages, the moon’s appearance in water, and phantom emanations of the tathāgatas are no more than just designations. Those designations for things, besides their assignment by convention to be mere names or symbols, neither arise nor cease. Those names do not exist inside, do not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two. {Dt.102}

T3808
3.­27

“In the same way, Subhūti, the perfection of wisdom, a bodhisattva, and the term ‘bodhisattva’ are all phenomena that are no more than just designations for things. Those designations for things, besides their assignment by convention to be mere names or symbols, neither arise nor cease. Those names do not exist inside, do not exist outside, and cannot be apprehended as neither of the two.

3.­28

“Subhūti, thus it is that when bodhisattva great beings practice the perfection of wisdom, they should train in names and symbols that are designations, instructions that are designations, and dharmas that are designations.155

T3808

3.­29

“Subhūti, bodhisattva great beings who practice the perfection of wisdom in that manner do not consider whether so-called physical forms are permanent. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are impermanent. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are imbued with happiness. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are imbued with suffering. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms constitute a self. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms constitute a nonself. [F.90.b] They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are at peace. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are not at peace. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are empty. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are not empty. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are with signs. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are without signs. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are with aspirations. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are without aspirations. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are conditioned. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are unconditioned. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are afflicted. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are purified. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms arise. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms cease. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are void. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are not void. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are virtuous. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are nonvirtuous. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are objectionable. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are free from being objectionable. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are contaminated. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are uncontaminated. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are tainted with afflicted mental states. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are untainted with afflicted mental states. [F.91.a] They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are mundane. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are supramundane. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are associated with cyclic existence. They do not consider whether so-called physical forms are associated with nirvāṇa. {Dt.103}

T3808
3.­30

“They do not consider whether so-called feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness are permanent. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are impermanent. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are imbued with happiness. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are imbued with suffering. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] constitute a self. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] constitute a nonself. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are at peace. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are not at peace. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are empty. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are not empty. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are with signs. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are without signs. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are with aspirations. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are without aspirations. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are conditioned. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are unconditioned. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are afflicted. [F.91.b] They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are purified. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] arise. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] cease. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are void. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are not void. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are virtuous. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are nonvirtuous. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are objectionable. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are free from being objectionable. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are contaminated. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are uncontaminated. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are tainted with afflicted mental states. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are untainted with afflicted mental states. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are mundane. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are supramundane. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are associated with cyclic existence. They do not consider whether so-called consciousness [and those other aggregates] are associated with nirvāṇa. [B7]

3.­31

“They do not consider whether the so-called eyes are permanent. They do not consider whether the so-called eyes are impermanent. They do not consider whether the so-called eyes are imbued with happiness or imbued with suffering, whether they constitute a self or a nonself, whether they are at peace or not at peace, whether they are empty or not empty, [F.92.a] whether they are with signs or without signs, whether they are with aspirations or without aspirations, whether they are conditioned or unconditioned, whether they are defiled or purified, whether they arise or cease, whether they are void or not void, whether they are virtuous or nonvirtuous, whether they are objectionable or free from being objectionable, whether they are contaminated or uncontaminated, whether they are tainted with afflicted mental states or untainted with afflicted mental states, whether they are mundane or supramundane, or whether they are associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­32

“They do not consider whether so-called sights are permanent. They do not consider whether so-called sights are impermanent. They do not consider whether so-called sights are imbued with happiness or imbued with suffering, whether they constitute a self or a nonself, whether they are at peace or not at peace, whether they are empty or not empty, whether they are with signs or without signs, whether they are with aspirations or without aspirations, whether they are conditioned or unconditioned, whether they are defiled or purified, whether they arise or cease, whether they are void or not void, whether they are virtuous or nonvirtuous, whether they are objectionable or free from being objectionable, whether they are contaminated or uncontaminated, whether they are tainted with afflicted mental states or untainted with afflicted mental states, whether they are mundane or supramundane, or whether they are associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­33

“They do not consider whether so-called visual consciousness is permanent. They do not consider whether so-called visual consciousness is impermanent. They do not consider whether so-called visual consciousness is imbued with happiness or imbued with suffering, whether it constitutes a self or a nonself, whether it is at peace or not at peace, whether it is empty or not empty, whether it is with signs [F.92.b] or without signs, whether it is with aspirations or without aspirations, whether it is conditioned or unconditioned, whether it is defiled or purified, whether it arises or ceases, whether it is void or not void, whether it is virtuous or nonvirtuous, whether it is objectionable or free from being objectionable, whether it is contaminated or uncontaminated, whether it is tainted with afflicted mental states or untainted with afflicted mental states, whether it is mundane or supramundane, or whether it is associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­34

“They do not consider whether so-called visually compounded sensory contact is permanent. They do not consider whether so-called visually compounded sensory contact is impermanent. They do not consider whether so-called visually compounded sensory contact is imbued with happiness or imbued with suffering, whether it constitutes a self or a nonself, whether it is at peace or not at peace, whether it is empty or not empty, whether it is with signs or without signs, whether it is with aspirations or without aspirations, whether it is conditioned or unconditioned, whether it is defiled or purified, whether it arises or ceases, whether it is void or not void, whether it is virtuous or nonvirtuous, whether it is objectionable or free from being objectionable, whether it is contaminated or uncontaminated, whether it is tainted with afflicted mental states or untainted with afflicted mental states, whether it is mundane or supramundane, or whether it is associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa. {Dt.104}

3.­35

“They do not consider whether any so-called feelings conditioned by sensory contact compounded by the eyes, sights, and visual consciousness‍—be they imbued with happiness or suffering, or giving rise to neither happiness nor suffering‍—are permanent or impermanent, whether they are imbued with happiness or imbued with suffering, [F.93.a] whether they constitute a self or a nonself, whether they are at peace or not at peace, whether they are empty or not empty, whether they are with signs or without signs, whether they are with aspirations or without aspirations, whether they are conditioned or unconditioned, whether they are defiled or purified, whether they arise or cease, whether they are void or not void, whether they are virtuous or nonvirtuous, whether they are objectionable or free from being objectionable, whether they are contaminated or uncontaminated, whether they are tainted with afflicted mental states or untainted with afflicted mental states, whether they are mundane or supramundane, or whether they are associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­36

“They do not consider whether the so-called ears are permanent. They do not consider whether the so-called ears are impermanent [and so forth]. They do not consider whether the so-called ears are associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­37

“They do not consider whether so-called sounds are permanent. They do not consider whether so-called sounds are impermanent [and so forth]. They do not consider whether so-called sounds are associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­38

“They do not consider whether so-called auditory consciousness is permanent. They do not consider whether so-called auditory consciousness is impermanent [and so forth]. They do not consider whether so-called auditory consciousness is associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­39

“They do not consider whether so-called aurally compounded sensory contact is permanent. They do not consider whether so-called aurally compounded sensory contact is impermanent [and so forth]. [F.93.b] They do not consider whether so-called aurally compounded sensory contact is associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­40

“They do not consider whether any so-called feelings conditioned by sensory contact compounded by the ears, sounds, and auditory consciousness‍—be they imbued with happiness or suffering, or giving rise to neither happiness nor suffering‍—are permanent or impermanent. They do not consider whether they are imbued with happiness or imbued with suffering, whether they constitute a self or a nonself, whether they are at peace or not at peace, whether they are empty or not empty, whether they are with signs or without signs, whether they are with aspirations or without aspirations, whether they are conditioned or unconditioned, whether they are defiled or purified, whether they arise or cease, whether they are void or not void, whether they are virtuous or nonvirtuous, whether they are objectionable or free from being objectionable, whether they are contaminated or uncontaminated, whether they are tainted with afflicted mental states or untainted with afflicted mental states, whether they are mundane or supramundane, or whether they are associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­41

“They do not consider whether the so-called nose is permanent. They do not consider whether the so-called nose is impermanent [and so forth]. They do not consider whether the so-called nose is associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­42

“They do not consider whether so-called odors are permanent. They do not consider whether so-called odors are impermanent [and so forth]. They do not consider whether so-called odors are associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­43

“They do not consider whether so-called olfactory consciousness is permanent. They do not consider whether so-called olfactory consciousness is impermanent [and so forth]. [F.94.a] They do not consider whether so-called olfactory consciousness is associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­44

“They do not consider whether so-called nasally compounded sensory contact is permanent. They do not consider whether so-called nasally compounded sensory contact is impermanent [and so forth]. They do not consider whether so-called nasally compounded sensory contact is associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­45

“They do not consider whether any so-called feelings conditioned by sensory contact compounded by the nose, odors, and olfactory consciousness‍—be they imbued with happiness or suffering, or giving rise to neither happiness nor suffering‍—are permanent or impermanent. They do not consider whether they are imbued with happiness or imbued with suffering, whether they constitute a self or a nonself, whether they are at peace or not at peace, whether they are empty or not empty, whether they are with signs or without signs, whether they are with aspirations or without aspirations, whether they are conditioned or unconditioned, whether they are defiled or purified, whether they arise or cease, whether they are void or not void, whether they are virtuous or nonvirtuous, whether they are objectionable or free from being objectionable, whether they are contaminated or uncontaminated, whether they are tainted with afflicted mental states or untainted with afflicted mental states, whether they are mundane or supramundane, or whether they are associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­46

“They do not consider whether the so-called tongue is permanent. They do not consider whether the so-called tongue is impermanent [and so forth]. They do not consider whether the so-called tongue is associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­47

“They do not consider whether so-called tastes are permanent. [F.94.b] They do not consider whether so-called tastes are impermanent [and so forth]. They do not consider whether so-called tastes are associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­48

“They do not consider whether so-called gustatory consciousness is permanent. They do not consider whether so-called gustatory consciousness is impermanent [and so forth]. They do not consider whether so-called gustatory consciousness is associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­49

“They do not consider whether so-called lingually compounded sensory contact is permanent. They do not consider whether so-called lingually compounded sensory contact is impermanent [and so forth]. They do not consider whether so-called lingually compounded sensory contact is associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­50

“They do not consider whether any so-called feelings conditioned by sensory contact compounded by the tongue, tastes, and gustatory consciousness‍—be they imbued with happiness or suffering, or giving rise to neither happiness nor suffering‍—are permanent or impermanent. They do not consider whether they are imbued with happiness or imbued with suffering, whether they constitute a self or a nonself, whether they are at peace or not at peace, whether they are empty or not empty, whether they are with signs or without signs, whether they are with aspirations or without aspirations, whether they are conditioned or unconditioned, whether they are defiled or purified, whether they arise or cease, whether they are void or not void, whether they are virtuous or nonvirtuous, whether they are objectionable or free from being objectionable, whether they are contaminated or uncontaminated, whether they are tainted with afflicted mental states or untainted with afflicted mental states, whether they are mundane or supramundane, or whether they are associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­51

“They do not consider whether the so-called body is permanent. [F.95.a] They do not consider whether the so-called body is impermanent [and so forth]. They do not consider whether the so-called body is associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­52

“They do not consider whether so-called tangibles are permanent. They do not consider whether so-called tangibles are impermanent [and so forth]. They do not consider whether so-called tangibles are associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­53

“They do not consider whether so-called tactile consciousness is permanent. They do not consider whether so-called tactile consciousness is impermanent [and so forth]. They do not consider whether so-called tactile consciousness is associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­54

“They do not consider whether so-called corporeally compounded sensory contact is permanent. They do not consider whether so-called corporeally compounded sensory contact is impermanent [and so forth]. They do not consider whether so-called corporeally compounded sensory contact is associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­55

“They do not consider whether any so-called feelings conditioned by sensory contact compounded by the body, touch, and tactile consciousness‍—be they imbued with happiness or suffering, or giving rise to neither happiness nor suffering‍—are permanent or impermanent. They do not consider whether they are imbued with happiness or imbued with suffering, whether they constitute a self or a nonself, whether they are at peace or not at peace, whether they are empty or not empty, whether they are with signs or without signs, whether they are with aspirations or without aspirations, whether they are conditioned or unconditioned, whether they are defiled or purified, whether they arise or cease, whether they are void [F.95.b] or not void, whether they are virtuous or nonvirtuous, whether they are objectionable or free from being objectionable, whether they are contaminated or uncontaminated, whether they are tainted with afflicted mental states or untainted with afflicted mental states, whether they are mundane or supramundane, or whether they are associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­56

“They do not consider whether the so-called mental faculty is permanent. They do not consider whether the so-called mental faculty is impermanent [and so forth]. They do not consider whether the so-called mental faculty is associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­57

“They do not consider whether so-called mental phenomena are permanent. They do not consider whether so-called mental phenomena are impermanent [and so forth]. They do not consider whether so-called mental phenomena are associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­58

“They do not consider whether so-called mental consciousness is permanent. They do not consider whether so-called mental consciousness is impermanent [and so forth]. They do not consider whether so-called mental consciousness is associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­59

“They do not consider whether so-called mentally compounded sensory contact is permanent. They do not consider whether so-called mentally compounded sensory contact is impermanent [and so forth]. They do not consider whether so-called mentally compounded sensory contact is associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa.

3.­60

“They do not consider whether any so-called feelings conditioned by sensory contact compounded by the mental faculty, mental phenomena, and mental consciousness‍—be they imbued with happiness or suffering, or giving rise to neither happiness nor suffering‍—are permanent or impermanent. [F.96.a] They do not consider whether they are imbued with happiness or imbued with suffering, whether they constitute a self or a nonself, whether they are at peace or not at peace, whether they are empty or not empty, whether they are with signs or without signs, whether they are with aspirations or without aspirations, whether they are conditioned or unconditioned, whether they are defiled or purified, whether they arise or cease, whether they are void or not void, whether they are virtuous or nonvirtuous, whether they are objectionable or free from being objectionable, whether they are contaminated or uncontaminated, whether they are tainted with afflicted mental states or untainted with afflicted mental states, whether they are mundane or supramundane, or whether they are associated with cyclic existence or associated with nirvāṇa. {Dt.105}


3.­61

“If you ask why, it is that when bodhisattva great beings practice the perfection of wisdom, they do not consider whether that perfection of wisdom, that bodhisattva, or that term bodhisattva are present in conditioned elements. They do not consider whether they are present in unconditioned elements. And if you ask why that is, it is because when bodhisattva great beings practice the perfection of wisdom, they do not imagine and they do not conceptualize any of those phenomena. This is because, when they practice the perfection of wisdom, they remain in nonconceptual states and cultivate the applications of mindfulness. Practicing the perfection of wisdom, apart from focusing their attention on all-aspect omniscience, they still do not observe a perfection of wisdom itself. Nor do they observe the name perfection of wisdom. Nor do they observe a bodhisattva. [F.96.b] Nor do they observe the name bodhisattva. Nor do they observe the buddhas. Nor do they observe the name buddha.

T3808
3.­62

“So as to cultivate the correct exertions, the supports for miraculous ability, the faculties, the powers, the branches of enlightenment, the path, the perfections, all the aspects of emptiness, the truths of the noble ones, the meditative concentrations, the immeasurable attitudes, the formless absorptions, the eight aspects of liberation, the nine serial steps of meditative absorption, emptiness, signlessness, wishlessness, the extrasensory powers, the meditative stabilities and dhāraṇī gateways, the powers of the tathāgatas, the fearlessnesses, the kinds of exact knowledge, and the eighteen distinct qualities of the buddhas, as they practice the perfection of wisdom they do not even observe the nature of the perfection of wisdom. They do not even observe the name perfection of wisdom. Nor do they observe the bodhisattvas. They do not even observe the name bodhisattva. Nor do they observe the buddhas. They do not even observe the name buddha.

T3808
3.­63

“If you ask why, it is because when bodhisattva great beings practice the perfection of wisdom, they absolutely understand what is the defining characteristic of a phenomenon for all phenomena, and that defining characteristic of a phenomenon for all phenomena is to be neither defiled, nor to be purified.

T3808

3.­64

“Subhūti, when bodhisattva great beings [F.97.a] practice the perfection of wisdom, they understand the designation for things as names or symbols, and in thus understanding the designation for things as names or symbols, they will not be attached to physical forms. They will not be attached to feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, or consciousness. {Dt.106}

T3808
3.­65

“They will not be attached to the eyes. They will not be attached to sights. They will not be attached to visual consciousness. They will not be attached to visually compounded sensory contact. They will not even be attached to feelings conditioned by sensory contact compounded by the eyes, sights, and visual consciousness‍—be they imbued with happiness or suffering, or giving rise to neither happiness nor suffering.

3.­66

“They will not be attached to the ears. They will not be attached to sounds. They will not be attached to auditory consciousness. They will not be attached to aurally compounded sensory contact. They will not be attached to feelings conditioned by sensory contact compounded by the ears, sounds, and auditory consciousness‍—be they imbued with happiness or suffering, or giving rise to neither happiness nor suffering.

3.­67

“They will not be attached to the nose. They will not be attached to odors. They will not be attached to olfactory consciousness. They will not be attached to nasally compounded sensory contact. They will not even be attached to feelings conditioned by sensory contact compounded by the nose, odors, and olfactory consciousness‍—be they imbued with happiness or suffering, or giving rise to neither happiness nor suffering.

3.­68

“They will not be attached to the tongue. They will not be attached to tastes. They will not be attached to gustatory consciousness. [F.97.b] They will not be attached to lingually compounded sensory contact. They will not be attached to feelings conditioned by sensory contact compounded by the tongue, tastes, and gustatory consciousness‍—be they imbued with happiness or suffering, or giving rise to neither happiness nor suffering.

3.­69

“They will not be attached to the body. They will not be attached to tangibles. They will not be attached to tactile consciousness. They will not be attached to corporeally compounded sensory contact. They will not be attached to feelings conditioned by sensory contact compounded by the body, touch, and tactile consciousness‍—be they imbued with happiness or suffering, or giving rise to neither happiness nor suffering.

3.­70

“They will not be attached to the mental faculty. They will not be attached to mental phenomena. They will not be attached to mental consciousness. They will not be attached to mentally compounded sensory contact. They will not be attached to feelings conditioned by sensory contact compounded by the mental faculty, mental phenomena, and mental consciousness‍—be they imbued with happiness or suffering, or giving rise to neither happiness nor suffering. They will not be attached to conditioned elements. They will not be attached to unconditioned elements.

3.­71

“They will not be attached to the perfection of generosity. They will not be attached to the perfection of ethical discipline, the perfection of tolerance, the perfection of perseverance, the perfection of meditative concentration, or the perfection of wisdom. They will not even be attached to the names of these [perfections] or their defining characteristics. They will not even be attached to the body of a bodhisattva.

3.­73

“They will not be attached to the real nature. They will not be attached to the very limit of reality. They will not be attached to the realm of phenomena. They will not be attached to the maturation of beings. They will not be attached to the refinement of the buddhafields. They will not be attached to skillful means. If you ask why, it is because there is no such thing as attaching, [F.98.b] nothing that attaches, and nothing to be attached to.

T3808
3.­75

“They will perfect the extrasensory powers, and having indeed perfected the extrasensory powers, they will bring beings to maturity, and in order to to serve, honor, respect, and worship the blessed lord buddhas, refine the buddhafields, and behold the lord buddhas, they will move from buddhafield to buddhafield. And, having indeed seen those lord buddhas, they will also manifest the roots of virtuous action through which they seek to serve, honor, respect, and worship those lord buddhas. Also, through those roots of virtuous action they will be reborn in proximity to those lord buddhas. They will also hear the Dharma from those lord buddhas. [Their retention of] all the teachings that they have heard will never be interrupted until they have manifestly attained buddhahood in unsurpassed, complete enlightenment. They will also acquire the dhāraṇī gateways, and they will also acquire the gateways of the meditative stabilities. Subhūti, bodhisattva great beings [F.99.a] who practice the perfection of wisdom should understand these designations for things as names and symbols. {Dt.108}

T3808

3.­76

“Subhūti, you asked, ‘Blessed Lord, you have spoken of “bodhisattvas, bodhisattvas.…” ’156 Do you think, Subhūti, that physical forms constitute a bodhisattva?”

T3808

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­77

“Subhūti, do you think that anything other than physical forms constitutes a bodhisattva?”

T3808

“No, Blessed Lord!”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­79

“Subhūti, do you think that anything other than feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­80

“Subhūti, do you think that a bodhisattva is present in physical forms, or do you think that a bodhisattva is present in feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness?”

T3808

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­81

“Subhūti, do you think that physical forms are present in a bodhisattva, or do you think that feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness are present in a bodhisattva?”

T3808

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­82

“Subhūti, [F.99.b] do you think that an absence of physical forms constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that an absence of feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness constitutes a bodhisattva?”

T3808

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­83

“Subhūti, do you think that the eyes constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­84

“Subhūti, do you think that the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­85

“Subhūti, do you think that anything other than the eyes constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that anything other than the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­86

“Subhūti, do you think that a bodhisattva is present in the eyes, or do you think that a bodhisattva is present in the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­87

“Subhūti, do you think that the eyes are present in a bodhisattva, or do you think that the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty are present in a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­88

“Subhūti, do you think that an absence of the eyes constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that an absence of the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!” [F.100.a]

3.­89

“Subhūti, do you think that sights constitute a bodhisattva, or do you think that sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­90

“Subhūti, do you think that anything other than sights constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that anything other than sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­91

“Subhūti, do you think that a bodhisattva is present in sights, or do you think that a bodhisattva is present in sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­92

“Subhūti, do you think that sights are present in a bodhisattva, or do you think that sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena are present in a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­93

“Subhūti, do you think that an absence of sights constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that an absence of sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­94

“Subhūti, do you think that the sensory element of the eyes, or do you think that the sensory element of sights constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that the sensory element of visual consciousness constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!” {Dt.109} [F.100.b]

“No, Blessed Lord!”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­99

“Subhūti, do you think [F.101.b] that an absence of the sensory element of the eyes constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that an absence of the sensory element of sights constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that an absence of the sensory element of visual consciousness constitutes a bodhisattva; or else do you think that an absence of the sensory element of the ears, an absence of the sensory element of sounds, an absence of the sensory element of auditory consciousness, an absence of the sensory element of the nose, an absence of the sensory element of odors, an absence of the sensory element of olfactory consciousness, an absence of the sensory element of the tongue, an absence of the sensory element of tastes, an absence of the sensory element of gustatory consciousness, an absence of the sensory element of the body, an absence of the sensory element of touch, an absence of the sensory element of tactile consciousness, or an absence of the sensory element of the mental faculty constitutes a bodhisattva; or do you think that an absence of the sensory element of mental phenomena constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that an absence of the sensory element of mental consciousness constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­100

“Subhūti, do you think that the earth element constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­101

“Subhūti, do you think that the water element constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that the fire element, the wind element, the space element, or the consciousness element constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­102

“Subhūti, do you think that anything other than the earth element constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that anything other than the water element, the fire element, the wind element, the space element, or the consciousness element constitutes a bodhisattva?” [F.102.a]

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­103

“Subhūti, do you think that a bodhisattva is present in the earth element, or do you think that a bodhisattva is present in the water element, the fire element, the wind element, the space element, and the consciousness element?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­104

“Subhūti, do you think that the earth element is present in a bodhisattva, or do you think that the water element, the fire element, the wind element, the space element, and the consciousness element are present in a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­105

“Subhūti, do you think that an absence of the earth element constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that an absence of the water element, an absence of the fire element, an absence of the wind element, an absence of the space element, or an absence of the consciousness element constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­107

“Subhūti, do you think that anything other than ignorance constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that anything other than formative predispositions, consciousness, name and [F.102.b] form, the six sense fields, sensory contact, sensation, craving, grasping, the rebirth process, actual birth, and aging and death constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­108

“Subhūti, do you think that a bodhisattva is present in ignorance, or do you think that a bodhisattva is present in [the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­109

“Subhūti, do you think that ignorance is present in a bodhisattva, or do you think that [the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death, are present in a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­110

“Subhūti, do you think that an absence of ignorance constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that an absence of [the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death, constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­111

“Subhūti, do you think that the real nature of physical forms constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that the real nature of feelings, the real nature of perceptions, the real nature of formative predispositions, or the real nature of consciousness constitutes a bodhisattva?” {Dt.110}

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­112

“Subhūti, do you think that anything other than the real nature of physical forms constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that anything other than the real nature of feelings, the real nature of perceptions, the real nature of formative predispositions, or the real nature of consciousness constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­113

“Subhūti, [F.103.a] do you think that a bodhisattva is present in the real nature of physical forms, or do you think that a bodhisattva is present in the real nature of feelings, the real nature of perceptions, the real nature of formative predispositions, or the real nature of consciousness?”

T3808

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­114

“Subhūti, do you think that the real nature of physical forms is present in a bodhisattva, or do you think that the real nature of feelings, the real nature of perceptions, the real nature of formative predispositions, or the real nature of consciousness is present in a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­115

“Subhūti, do you think that an absence of the real nature of physical forms constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that an absence of the real nature of feelings, an absence of the real nature of perceptions, an absence of the real nature of formative predispositions, or an absence of the real nature of consciousness constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­116

“Subhūti, do you think that the real nature of the eyes constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that the real nature of the ears, the real nature of the nose, the real nature of the tongue, the real nature of the body, or the real nature of the mental faculty constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­117

“Subhūti, do you think that anything other than the real nature of the eyes constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that anything other than the real nature of the ears, the real nature of the nose, the real nature of the tongue, the real nature of the body, or the real nature of the mental faculty [F.103.b] constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­118

“Subhūti, do you think that a bodhisattva is present in the real nature of the eyes, or do you think that a bodhisattva is present in the real nature of the ears, the real nature of the nose, the real nature of the tongue, the real nature of the body, or the real nature of the mental faculty?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­119

“Subhūti, do you think that the real nature of the eyes is present in a bodhisattva, or do you think that the real nature of the ears, the real nature of the nose, the real nature of the tongue, the real nature of the body, or the real nature of the mental faculty is present in a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­120

“Subhūti, do you think that an absence of the real nature of the eyes constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that an absence of the real nature of the ears, an absence of the real nature of the nose, an absence of the real nature of the tongue, an absence of the real nature of the body, or an absence of the real nature of the mental faculty constitutes a bodhisattva?” {Dt.111}

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­121

“Subhūti, do you think that the real nature of sights constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that the real nature of sounds, the real nature of odors, the real nature of tastes, the real nature of tangibles, or the real nature of mental phenomena constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­122

“Subhūti, do you think that anything other than the real nature of sights constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that anything other than the real nature of sounds, [F.104.a] the real nature of odors, the real nature of tastes, the real nature of tangibles, or the real nature of mental phenomena constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­123

“Subhūti, do you think that a bodhisattva is present in the real nature of sights, or do you think that a bodhisattva is present in the real nature of sounds, the real nature of odors, the real nature of tastes, the real nature of tangibles, or the real nature of mental phenomena?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­124

“Subhūti, do you think that the real nature of sights is present in a bodhisattva, or do you think that the real nature of sounds, the real nature of odors, the real nature of tastes, the real nature of tangibles, or the real nature of mental phenomena is present in a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­125

“Subhūti, do you think that an absence of the real nature of sights constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that an absence of the real nature of sounds, an absence of the real nature of odors, an absence of the real nature of tastes, an absence of the real nature of tangibles, or an absence of the real nature of mental phenomena constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

“No, Blessed Lord!”

3.­130

“Subhūti, do you think that an absence of the real nature of the sensory element of the eyes constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that an absence of the real nature of the sensory element of sights constitutes a bodhisattva, or do you think that an absence of the real nature of the sensory element of visual consciousness constitutes a bodhisattva; or do you think that an absence of the real nature of the sensory element of the ears, an absence of the