Questions on Selflessness consists of a dialogue between a group of followers of the Mahāyāna tradition and a group of tīrthikas, who pose several questions on the doctrine of selflessness. In the exchange that follows, the Mahāyāna proponents elucidate this and other key Buddhist doctrines, such as the distinction between relative and ultimate reality, the origin of suffering, the emptiness and illusoriness of all phenomena, and the path to awakening.
This text was translated, introduced, and edited by the Dharmasāgara Translation Group: Raktrul Ngawang Kunga Rinpoche, Rebecca Hufen, Shanshan Jia, Jason Sanche, and Arne Schelling. Thanks to Prof. Harunaga Isaacson (University of Hamburg) for his kind help and support.
The translation was completed under the patronage and supervision of 84000: Translating the Words of the Buddha.
Questions on Selflessness consists of a dialogue between a group of followers of the Mahāyāna tradition and a group of tīrthika philosophers, who call upon the Buddhists to explain and defend their doctrine of selflessness. In the exchange that follows, the proponents of the Mahāyāna point out some of the problems with categorically affirming or denying the existence of a self, and they go on to clarify several related Buddhist doctrines, such as the distinction between relative and ultimate reality, the illusory nature of perceptions, and the emptiness of all phenomena. A passage of dialogue in prose is followed by a set of verses that describe the causes of suffering and the continuous transmigration in cyclic existence, as well as the liberation one attains by engendering the mind of awakening and the perfection of insight. The structure of the text deviates notably from the standard sūtra format, in which a description of the setting and the audience of the discourse is presented, followed by the delivery of the discourse itself and a conclusion extolling the benefits of the teaching. Rather, the text has neither a description of the setting nor the conclusion extolling its benefits, and its content consists not of the words of the Buddha himself but of those of the anonymous followers of the Mahāyāna.
A Sanskrit manuscript of this sūtra, written in Newari script, is preserved in the National Archives of Nepal.1 It was edited, introduced, and translated into French by Lévi (1928). Another edition was prepared by Vaidya (1961) and recently a revised edition was published by the Nairātmaparipṛcchā Study Group (2019). For our translation, we have compared the Tibetan text with this most recent Sanskrit edition by the Nairātmaparipṛcchā Study Group, and mention of the Sanskrit in the notes refers to this edition.
There are also two Chinese translations of this sūtra (Taishō 846 and Taishō 1643), both of which contain some notable differences from the Tibetan and the extant Sanskrit sources. In the earliest Chinese translation (Taishō 846, 外道問聖大乘法無我義經, Wai dao wen sheng dasheng fa wuwo yi jing), which was prepared by Fa Tian (d. 1001) in the year 986, the sūtra begins rather differently than it does in the Tibetan. Here the text starts with the usual opening phrase, “Thus did I hear at one time,” and we are moreover told that the Buddha is present in the assembly and is the one to whom the questions are posed. The other translation (Taishō 1643, 尼乾子問無我義經, Ni gan zi wen wuwo yi jing), which was prepared by Ri Cheng (1017–78) in the year 1063, has the same opening content as the Tibetan and Sanskrit sources, but instead of employing the general designation tīrthika, the translation uses the more specific category of nirgranthajñātiputra (尼乾子), which usually designates the Jains. This specification only exists in this later Chinese translation; otherwise, this translation is quite close to the extant Sanskrit. The translator also attributes the text to Aśvaghoṣa and categorizes it as a treatise (śāstra), rather than a sūtra.2
According to the colophon to the Tibetan translation, it was prepared by the Indian scholar Kamalagupta and the great Tibetan translator Rinchen Sangpo. We can therefore assume that it was undertaken in the first half of the eleventh century, when these two scholars flourished. The first translation of this text from the Tibetan into a Western language was the French translation by Feer in 1883. The translation presented here is based on the Tibetan version in the Degé Kangyur, the Comparative Edition (dpe bsdur ma) of the Kangyur, and the Stok Palace manuscript.
[F.5.b]Homage to all buddhas and bodhisattvas.
Now, the tīrthikas—those who hold views based on objectification and who engage in concepts and analysis—went among the followers of the Mahāyāna. Respectfully, with joined palms, they asked these questions on selflessness: “Sons of noble family, the Omniscient One taught that there is no self in the body. If there truly3 is no self in the body, then how do playfulness, laughter, crying, enjoyment, anger, pride, jealousy, calumny, and so forth come about? Is there truly a self in the body or not? It would be proper for you to dispel our doubts.”
The followers of the Mahāyāna replied, “Friends, it should not be said that there truly is or is not a self in the body, because to say in this case that there truly is or is not a self is mistaken speech. Now, if there were a self, then why is it not perceptible at all, even after searching through the hair, nails, skin, head, flesh, bones, marrow, fat, ligaments, liver, intestines, throat, hands, feet, limbs, and other minor parts, both inside and outside the body?”
The tīrthikas said, “The self is only visible to those who have the divine eye. How could it be visible to us who only have eyes of flesh?”
The followers of the Mahāyāna replied, “It is not seen even by those with the divine eye. For how can something that has no color, form, or shape be seen?”4
The tīrthikas asked,[F.6.a] “Then is it nonexistent?”
The followers of the Mahāyāna said, “To say that it is nonexistent5 or to say that it is existent is mistaken speech. If it is nonexistent, then why do playfulness, laughter, crying, enjoyment, anger, pride, jealousy, calumny, and so forth arise so clearly? Therefore, it is not correct to say that it is nonexistent. One should not say that it is existent or nonexistent. Since this would be a fault, one should not say that it exists or that it does not exist.”
The tīrthikas asked, “Then what is apprehended in this case?”
The followers of the Mahāyāna said, “Nothing at all is apprehended.”
The tīrthikas asked, “Is it as empty as the sky?”
The followers of the Mahāyāna said, “Friends, it is exactly like that! It is as empty as the sky.”
The tīrthikas asked, “If that is so, then how should one view playfulness, laughter, crying, enjoyment, anger, pride, jealousy, calumny, and so forth?”
The followers of the Mahāyāna said, “They should be regarded as like an illusion, a dream, and a magical deception.”
The tīrthikas asked, “How are they like an illusion, a dream, and a magical deception?”
The followers of the Mahāyāna said, “An illusion is a mere analogy. A dream is a mere appearance that is not graspable, empty by nature, and nonexistent in essence. A magical deception is intentionally fabricated. This is the way things are, friends. You should regard all these things as being like an illusion, a dream, and a magical deception.
“Moreover, the distinction between the relative and the ultimate should be pointed out. In this regard, the relative consists in the conception ‘this is self, that is other.’ To conceptualize a soul, a person,[F.6.b] an individual, an agent, an observer, wealth, children, wives, friends, relatives, and so forth is called the relative.
“Where there is no self, no other, no soul, no person, no individual, no agent, no observer, no wealth, no children, no wives, no friends, no relatives, and so forth, this is called the ultimate.6 The relative consists in habitually labeling all things, in the results of virtuous and nonvirtuous deeds, and in birth and cessation.
“The very essence of suchness, where there are no virtuous results, no nonvirtuous results, no birth, and no cessation, is beyond both pollution and purification.7 This is the middle way teaching to strive for in practice. In this regard, it is said:
Here ends the noble Mahāyāna sūtra “Questions on Selflessness.”
Translated, edited, and finalized by the Indian preceptor Kamalagupta and the great Tibetan editor-translator Bhikṣu Rinchen Sangpo.
Questions on Selflessness consists of a dialogue between a group of followers of the Mahāyāna tradition and a group of tīrthikas, who pose several questions on the doctrine of selflessness. In the exchange that follows, the Mahāyāna proponents elucidate this and other key Buddhist doctrines, such as the distinction between relative and ultimate reality, the origin of suffering, the emptiness and illusoriness of all phenomena, and the path to awakening.
This text was translated, introduced, and edited by the Dharmasāgara Translation Group: Raktrul Ngawang Kunga Rinpoche, Rebecca Hufen, Shanshan Jia, Jason Sanche, and Arne Schelling. Thanks to Prof. Harunaga Isaacson (University of Hamburg) for his kind help and support.
The translation was completed under the patronage and supervision of 84000: Translating the Words of the Buddha.
Questions on Selflessness consists of a dialogue between a group of followers of the Mahāyāna tradition and a group of tīrthika philosophers, who call upon the Buddhists to explain and defend their doctrine of selflessness. In the exchange that follows, the proponents of the Mahāyāna point out some of the problems with categorically affirming or denying the existence of a self, and they go on to clarify several related Buddhist doctrines, such as the distinction between relative and ultimate reality, the illusory nature of perceptions, and the emptiness of all phenomena. A passage of dialogue in prose is followed by a set of verses that describe the causes of suffering and the continuous transmigration in cyclic existence, as well as the liberation one attains by engendering the mind of awakening and the perfection of insight. The structure of the text deviates notably from the standard sūtra format, in which a description of the setting and the audience of the discourse is presented, followed by the delivery of the discourse itself and a conclusion extolling the benefits of the teaching. Rather, the text has neither a description of the setting nor the conclusion extolling its benefits, and its content consists not of the words of the Buddha himself but of those of the anonymous followers of the Mahāyāna.
A Sanskrit manuscript of this sūtra, written in Newari script, is preserved in the National Archives of Nepal.1 It was edited, introduced, and translated into French by Lévi (1928). Another edition was prepared by Vaidya (1961) and recently a revised edition was published by the Nairātmaparipṛcchā Study Group (2019). For our translation, we have compared the Tibetan text with this most recent Sanskrit edition by the Nairātmaparipṛcchā Study Group, and mention of the Sanskrit in the notes refers to this edition.
There are also two Chinese translations of this sūtra (Taishō 846 and Taishō 1643), both of which contain some notable differences from the Tibetan and the extant Sanskrit sources. In the earliest Chinese translation (Taishō 846, 外道問聖大乘法無我義經, Wai dao wen sheng dasheng fa wuwo yi jing), which was prepared by Fa Tian (d. 1001) in the year 986, the sūtra begins rather differently than it does in the Tibetan. Here the text starts with the usual opening phrase, “Thus did I hear at one time,” and we are moreover told that the Buddha is present in the assembly and is the one to whom the questions are posed. The other translation (Taishō 1643, 尼乾子問無我義經, Ni gan zi wen wuwo yi jing), which was prepared by Ri Cheng (1017–78) in the year 1063, has the same opening content as the Tibetan and Sanskrit sources, but instead of employing the general designation tīrthika, the translation uses the more specific category of nirgranthajñātiputra (尼乾子), which usually designates the Jains. This specification only exists in this later Chinese translation; otherwise, this translation is quite close to the extant Sanskrit. The translator also attributes the text to Aśvaghoṣa and categorizes it as a treatise (śāstra), rather than a sūtra.2
According to the colophon to the Tibetan translation, it was prepared by the Indian scholar Kamalagupta and the great Tibetan translator Rinchen Sangpo. We can therefore assume that it was undertaken in the first half of the eleventh century, when these two scholars flourished. The first translation of this text from the Tibetan into a Western language was the French translation by Feer in 1883. The translation presented here is based on the Tibetan version in the Degé Kangyur, the Comparative Edition (dpe bsdur ma) of the Kangyur, and the Stok Palace manuscript.
[F.5.b]Homage to all buddhas and bodhisattvas.
Now, the tīrthikas—those who hold views based on objectification and who engage in concepts and analysis—went among the followers of the Mahāyāna. Respectfully, with joined palms, they asked these questions on selflessness: “Sons of noble family, the Omniscient One taught that there is no self in the body. If there truly3 is no self in the body, then how do playfulness, laughter, crying, enjoyment, anger, pride, jealousy, calumny, and so forth come about? Is there truly a self in the body or not? It would be proper for you to dispel our doubts.”
The followers of the Mahāyāna replied, “Friends, it should not be said that there truly is or is not a self in the body, because to say in this case that there truly is or is not a self is mistaken speech. Now, if there were a self, then why is it not perceptible at all, even after searching through the hair, nails, skin, head, flesh, bones, marrow, fat, ligaments, liver, intestines, throat, hands, feet, limbs, and other minor parts, both inside and outside the body?”
The tīrthikas said, “The self is only visible to those who have the divine eye. How could it be visible to us who only have eyes of flesh?”
The followers of the Mahāyāna replied, “It is not seen even by those with the divine eye. For how can something that has no color, form, or shape be seen?”4
The tīrthikas asked,[F.6.a] “Then is it nonexistent?”
The followers of the Mahāyāna said, “To say that it is nonexistent5 or to say that it is existent is mistaken speech. If it is nonexistent, then why do playfulness, laughter, crying, enjoyment, anger, pride, jealousy, calumny, and so forth arise so clearly? Therefore, it is not correct to say that it is nonexistent. One should not say that it is existent or nonexistent. Since this would be a fault, one should not say that it exists or that it does not exist.”
The tīrthikas asked, “Then what is apprehended in this case?”
The followers of the Mahāyāna said, “Nothing at all is apprehended.”
The tīrthikas asked, “Is it as empty as the sky?”
The followers of the Mahāyāna said, “Friends, it is exactly like that! It is as empty as the sky.”
The tīrthikas asked, “If that is so, then how should one view playfulness, laughter, crying, enjoyment, anger, pride, jealousy, calumny, and so forth?”
The followers of the Mahāyāna said, “They should be regarded as like an illusion, a dream, and a magical deception.”
The tīrthikas asked, “How are they like an illusion, a dream, and a magical deception?”
The followers of the Mahāyāna said, “An illusion is a mere analogy. A dream is a mere appearance that is not graspable, empty by nature, and nonexistent in essence. A magical deception is intentionally fabricated. This is the way things are, friends. You should regard all these things as being like an illusion, a dream, and a magical deception.
“Moreover, the distinction between the relative and the ultimate should be pointed out. In this regard, the relative consists in the conception ‘this is self, that is other.’ To conceptualize a soul, a person,[F.6.b] an individual, an agent, an observer, wealth, children, wives, friends, relatives, and so forth is called the relative.
“Where there is no self, no other, no soul, no person, no individual, no agent, no observer, no wealth, no children, no wives, no friends, no relatives, and so forth, this is called the ultimate.6 The relative consists in habitually labeling all things, in the results of virtuous and nonvirtuous deeds, and in birth and cessation.
“The very essence of suchness, where there are no virtuous results, no nonvirtuous results, no birth, and no cessation, is beyond both pollution and purification.7 This is the middle way teaching to strive for in practice. In this regard, it is said:
Here ends the noble Mahāyāna sūtra “Questions on Selflessness.”
Translated, edited, and finalized by the Indian preceptor Kamalagupta and the great Tibetan editor-translator Bhikṣu Rinchen Sangpo.
This attribution to Aśvaghoṣa, however, was called into question by Lévi (1928) and Bhattacharya (1966). In addition to comparing the Tibetan text with the Sanskrit, we have also made occasional reference to the second Chinese translation by Ri Cheng.
The Skt. here reads “If the body is without self, there is no supreme self” (yadi śarīraṃ nairātmakaṃ paramātmā na vidyate).
The phrase “or to say that it is existent” is absent in the Skt., which instead reads “friends” (mārṣā). Taishō 1643 lacks this entire sentence.
Instead of “this is called the ultimate,” the Skt. reads “this is the middle way of all phenomena” (sā madhyamā pratipattir dharmāṇām).
The Skt. reads “Ordinary immature people, being blind, / Do not see the path to liberation” (muktimārgaṃ na paśyanti andhā bālāḥ pṛthagjanāḥ).
The Skt. reads “They are born and perish unceasingly in the five realms” (utpadyante nirudhyante ajasraṃ gatipañcasu).
In the extant Sanskrit, the preceding two verses appear to have become conflated into a single verse of six lines:
(bhramanti cakravan mūḍhā lokadharmasamāvṛtāḥ | paramārthaṃ na jānanti bhavo yatra nirudhyate | veṣṭitā bhavajālena saṃsaranti punaḥ punaḥ.)
The Tib. reads “devas and humans” (lha mi). Since devas are already mentioned in the first line of this verse, we opted for the Skt. reading “apsaras.” Taishō 1643 has only “gandharva” (乾闥婆).
The Skt. has two more stanzas here:
(na śvetaṃ nāpi raktaṃ ca na kṛṣṇaṃ na ca pītakam | avarṇaṃ ca nirākāraṃ bodhicittasya lakṣaṇam | nirvikāraṃ nirābhāsaṃ nirūhaṃ nirvibandhakam | arūpaṃ vyomasaṃkāśaṃ bodhicittasya lakṣaṇam.)
We are translating “vase” based on the Skt. (ghaṭī). The Tibetan translation reads “Assembled from a lump of clay,” (gong bu bzhin du bsdus gyur pa).
Translation of this verse is tentative. The Sanskrit and the two Chinese translations all differ slightly.
The Skt. reads:
(abhrāntare yathā vidyut kṣaṇād api na dṛśyate | prajñāpāramitādṛṣṭyā bhāvayet paramaṃ padam ||.)
Taishō 1643 reads:
(如月處雲中 剎那而不現 以甚深般若 達有為如幻.)
Taishō 846 reads:
“Just as lightning is no longer seen after a moment, observe that the perfection of insight and virtuous actions are also thus.”
(如電之住剎那不見。觀彼般若波羅蜜多。及作諸善。亦復如是.)
In the Tib. this line seems to have been rendered twice, in two slightly different ways. To leave both in place would make for an irregular verse of five lines, whereas the Skt. verse only has four lines. We have therefore followed the Skt. here.
The Skt. reads “nirvāṇa” instead of “Mahāyāna.” After this verse, the Sanskrit adds another verse and a concluding sentence:
“Then the tīrthikas, being satisfied, became free from conceptualization, and having concentrated on the practice, they acquired the wisdom of the Mahāyāna.”
(yāvantaḥ saṃvṛter doṣās tāvanto nirvṛter guṇāḥ | nirvṛtiḥ syād anutpattiḥ sarvadoṣair na lipyate || atha te tīrthikāḥ tuṣṭā vikalparahitāḥ | tadā bhāvanāṃ samādhāya mahāyānajñānalābhino 'bhūvann iti || mahāyānanirdeśe nairātmaparipṛcchā samāptā ||.)
Popular figures in Indian culture, apsarases are said to be goddesses of the clouds and water and to be wives of the gandharvas.
In the most general sense the devas—the term is cognate with the English divine—are a class of celestial beings who frequently appear in Buddhist texts, often at the head of the assemblies of nonhuman beings who attend and celebrate the teachings of the Buddha Śākyamuni and other buddhas and bodhisattvas. In Buddhist cosmology the devas occupy the highest of the five or six “destinies” (gati) of saṃsāra among which beings take rebirth. The devas reside in the devalokas, “heavens” that traditionally number between twenty-six and twenty-eight and are divided between the desire realm (kāmadhātu), form realm (rūpadhātu), and formless realm (ārūpyadhātu). A being attains rebirth among the devas either through meritorious deeds (in the desire realm) or the attainment of subtle meditative states (in the form and formless realms). While rebirth among the devas is considered favorable, it is ultimately a transitory state from which beings will fall when the conditions that lead to rebirth there are exhausted. Thus, rebirth in the god realms is regarded as a diversion from the spiritual path.
A term used to express the absence of any intrinsic essence in all phenomena.
In Indian religious mythology, a class of nonhuman beings who often appear as semidivine celestial musicians. The same term is used in certain Buddhist texts in a quite different sense: to denote a disembodied sentient being or anguished spirit in the intermediate state between two lives, seeking the conditions for a new birth as a human or other kind of embodied being.
An Indian scholar who was involved in a number of translations during the eleventh century in Tibet.
A semidivine being, half horse, half human, also often described as a celestial musician.
Literally “great serpents,” mahoragas are supernatural beings depicted as large, subterranean beings with human torsos and heads and the lower bodies of serpents. Their movements are said to cause earthquakes, and they make up a class of subterranean geomantic spirits whose movement through the seasons and months of the year is deemed significant for construction projects.
The sixth of the six perfections, it refers to the profound understanding of the emptiness of all phenomena, the realization of ultimate reality.
Refers in this text to the Buddhist distinction between relative and ultimate. Relative reality refers to the world of reified entities that are believed to have essential existence, whereas ultimate reality refers to the emptiness or lack of inherent existence in all phenomena.
A famous Tibetan translator who lived from 958 to 1055 ᴄᴇ. He was mainly active in western Tibet, especially at Tholing monastery.
The lord of the gods in the Heaven of the Thirty-Three (trāyastriṃśa). Alternatively known as Indra, the deity that is called “lord of the gods” dwells on the summit of Mount Sumeru and wields the thunderbolt. The Tibetan translation brgya byin (meaning “one hundred sacrifices”) is based on an etymology that śakra is an abbreviation of śata-kratu, one who has performed a hundred sacrifices. Each world with a central Sumeru has a Śakra. Also known by other names such as Kauśika, Devendra, and Śacipati.
Selflessness denotes the lack of inherent existence in self-identity and also, more subtly, in all physical and mental phenomena.
An accomplished being; a class of semidivine beings.
A follower of a non-Buddhist religious system or philosophy. It is of interest that in the first sentence of this text, “tīrthikas” are glossed as “those who hold views based on objectification and who engage in concepts and analysis.”
A class of semidivine beings who are famous for wielding (dhara) spells (vidyā). Loosely understood as “sorcerers,” these magical beings are frequently petitioned through dhāraṇī and Kriyātantra ritual to grant magical powers to the supplicant. The later Buddhist tradition, playing on the dual valences of vidyā as “spell” and “knowledge,” began to apply this term to realized figures in the Buddhist pantheon.
A class of semidivine beings who haunt or protect forests, rivers, and other natural spaces, or serve as guardians to villages and towns. They are traditionally propitiated for health, wealth, protection, and other boons.
bdag med pa dris pa (Nairātmyaparipṛcchā). Toh 173, Degé Kangyur vol. 60 (mdo sde, ma), folios 5.b–7.b.
bdag med pa dris pa. bka’ ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) [Comparative Edition of the Kangyur], krung go’i bod rig pa zhib ’jug ste gnas kyi bka’ bstan dpe sdur khang (The Tibetan Tripitaka Collation Bureau of the China Tibetology Research Center). 108 volumes. Beijing: krung go’i bod rig pa dpe skrun khang (China Tibetology Publishing House), 2006–9, vol. 60, pp. 14–19.
bdag med pa dris pa. Stok Palace Kangyur vol. 72 (mdo sde, zha), folios 322.b–326.a.
Pekar Sangpo (pad dkar bzang po). mdo sde spyi’i rnam bzhag [short title]. bstan pa spyi’i rgyas byed las mdo sde spyi’i rnam bzhag bka’ bsdu ba bzhi pa zhes bya ba’i bstan bcos. Beijing: mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 2006. BDRC W1PD76588.
Bhattacharya, Biswanath. “A Critical Appraisal of the Nairātmyaparipṛcchā Ascribed to Aśvaghoṣa.” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie 10 (1966): 220–23.
Feer, Léon, trans. Fragments extraits du Kandjour. Annales du Musée Guimet 5. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1883.
Lévi, Silvain. “Encore Aśvaghoṣa.” Journal Asiatique 213 (1928): 193‒216.
NGMPP (Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project, now NGMCP, Nepalese-German Manuscript Cataloguing Project). Accessed September 6, 2015.
Nairātmaparipṛcchā Study Group. “Nairātmaparipṛcchā: Re-editing Sanskrit text collated with Tibetan and Chinese translations.” Journal of Indian and Tibetan Studies 22 (2019): 111‒52.
Vaidya, P. L. Mahāyāna-sūtra-saṁgraha: Part I. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 17. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1961.
Fa Tian (法天), trans. Wai dao wen sheng dasheng fa wuwo yi jing (外道問聖大乘無我義經). Taishō 846, vol. 17, pp. 934.a–935.a.
Ri Cheng (日稱), trans. Ni gan zi wen wuwo yi jing (尼乾子問無我義經). Taishō 1643, vol. 32, pp. 172.a–173.a.
