དགོངས་པ་ངེས་འགྲེལ།
Unraveling the Intent
Notes
Saṃdhinirmocana
འཕགས་པ་དགོངས་པ་ངེས་པར་འགྲེལ་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོའི་མདོ།
’phags pa dgongs pa nges par ’grel pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo
The Noble Great Vehicle Sūtra “Unraveling the Intent”
Āryasaṃdhinirmocananāmamahāyānasūtra
Toh 106
Degé Kangyur, vol. 49 (mdo sde, ca), folios 1.b–55.b
Imprint
Translated by the Buddhavacana Translation Group (Vienna)
under the patronage and supervision of 84000: Translating the Words of the Buddha
First published 2020
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Table of Contents
Summary
In Unraveling the Intent, the Buddha gives a systematic overview of his three great cycles of teachings, which he refers to in this text as the “three Dharma wheels” (tridharmacakra). In the process of delineating the meaning of these doctrines, the Buddha unravels several difficult points regarding the ultimate and relative truths, the nature of reality, and the contemplative methods conducive to the attainment of complete and perfect awakening, and he also explains what his intent was when he imparted teachings belonging to each of the three Dharma wheels. In unambiguous terms, the third wheel is proclaimed to be of definitive meaning. Through a series of dialogues with hearers and bodhisattvas, the Buddha thus offers a complete and systematic teaching on the Great Vehicle, which he refers to here as the Single Vehicle.
Acknowledgements
Translation by the Buddhavacana Translation Group.
The text was translated by Gregory Forgues and edited by Casey Kemp. With special thanks to Harunaga Isaacson, Matthew Kapstein, Klaus-Dieter Mathes, Jonathan Silk, Lambert Schmithausen, Tom Tillemans, and William Waldron for their helpful comments and advice.
The translation was completed under the patronage and supervision of 84000: Translating the Words of the Buddha.
The generous sponsorship of Qiang Li (李强) and Ya Wen (文雅), which helped make the work on this translation possible, is most gratefully acknowledged.
Text Body
The Translation
The Noble Great Vehicle Sūtra
Unraveling the Intent
Unraveling the Intent
Abbreviations
| Bd | Bardan (Zanskar) canonical collection |
|---|---|
| C | Choné xylograph Kangyur |
| Cbeta | Chinese Electronic Buddhist Association, (www.cbeta.org) |
| Cz | Chizhi Kangyur |
| D | Degé xylograph Kangyur |
| Dd | Dodedrak Kangyur |
| Dk | Dongkarla Kangyur |
| Do | Dolpo canonical collection |
| F | Phukdrak manuscript Kangyur |
| Go | Gondhla (Lahaul) canonical collection |
| Gt | Gangteng Kangyur |
| H | Lhasa xylograph Kangyur |
| He | Hemis I Kangyur |
| J | ’jang sa tham/Lithang xylograph Kangyur |
| Kʙ | Berlin manuscript Kangyur |
| Kǫ774 | Peking 1737 xylograph Kangyur |
| L | London (Shelkar) manuscript Kangyur |
| Lg | Lang mdo Kangyur |
| Mvyut | Mahāvyutpatti |
| N | Narthang xylograph Kangyur |
| Ng | Namgyal Kangyur |
| Np | Neyphug Kangyur |
| O | Tawang Kangyur |
| Pj | Phajoding I Kangyur |
| Pz | Phajoding II Kangyur |
| R | Ragya Kangyur |
| S | Stok manuscript Kangyur |
| Saṃdh. | Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra |
| Saṃdhdh | Dunhuang manuscript: Stein Tib. n°194 (49 folios) and Stein Tib. n°683 (1 folio) (Hakamaya 1984–1987) |
| T | Tokyo manuscript Kangyur |
| Taishō 676 | 解深密經, translated by Xuanzang (596–664 ᴄᴇ) |
| TrBh | Sthiramati’s Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣyam |
| U | Urga xylograph Kangyur |
| V | Ulaanbaatar manuscript Kangyur |
| VD | Degé; xylograph of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi from the Tengyur |
| VG | Golden; xylograph of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi from the Tengyur |
| VP | Peking; xylograph of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi from the Tengyur |
| VinSg | Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi |
| X | Basgo manuscript Kangyur |
| YBht P ’i | Tibetan translation of Acarya Asanga’s Yogācārabhūmi from the Peking Tengyur (n°. 5540, sems-tsam, ’i 143aI-382a5 (vol. I l l : 121-217) |
| Z | Shey Palace manuscript Kangyur |
Notes
See Brunnhölzl 2018, p. 1590, n. 89 on this point.
The numbering of paragraphs of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra follows Lamotte’s critical edition.
See Radich 2007, p. 1257 on the relationship between āśrayaparivṛtti and dauṣṭhulyakāya. Saṃdh. is the only text in the entire Kangyur in which the term dauṣṭhulyakāya is found.
In bold are textual resources I used to translate the text into English.
See Powers 2015. Unfortunately, I haven’t been able to consult this reference work at the time of completing this translation.
Here is a list of the sigla I used to identify the various witnesses of Saṃdh.:
(1) Witnesses of the sūtra found in the available Kangyurs and canonical collections (MsK = manuscript Kangyur, PK = xylograph): Kʙ: Berlin MsK, C: Choné PK, Cz: Chizhi, D: Degé PK, Dd: Dodedrak, Dk: Dongkarla, F: Phukdrag MsK, H: Lhasa PK, Gt: Gangteng, He: Hemis I, J: ’jang sa tham/Lithang PK, L: London (Shelkar) MsK, Lg: Lang mdo, N: Narthang PK, Ng: Namgyal, Np: Neyphug, O: Tawang, Pj: Phajoding I, Pz: Phajoding II, Kǫ: Peking 1737 PK, R: Ragya, S: Stok MsK, T: Tokyo MsK, U: Urga PK, V: Ulaanbaatar MsK, W: Wangli supplement, X: Basgo MsK, Z: Shey Palace MsK. Other canonical collections: Ba: Basgo fragments (Ladakh), Bd: Bardan (Zanskar), Go: Gondhla (Lahaul), Do: Dolpo. Source: http://www.rkts.org (last accessed on July 20, 2020). I am following the typology of Kangyur groups suggested by rKTs (Vienna University). I would like to warmly thank Professor Helmut Tauscher and Bruno Lainé for making available to me the editions I used for this translation project. For a general discussion of some Tibetan sources, see Skilling 1994, p. 775.
(2) Xylographs of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi from the Tengyur: VD Degé, VG Golden, VP Peking. My thanks go to Kojirō Katō for having shared with me the bibliographical detail of these witnesses. The Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī is also available in Chinese under the following title: 瑜伽師地論卷第七十六攝決擇分.
For the reference of possible additional folios, see Chayet 2005, p. 67 (n°615—1 folio, n°590—6 folios).
解深密經疏 (ZZ369) is a text originally composed in Chinese that has been translated into Tibetan. On Wonch’uk’s life and works, see Powers 1992a.
I would like to warmly thank Zhuoran Xie (Vienna University) for her assistance in reading this text.
See also Katō 2011 for textual variations.
See Schmithausen 2014, p. 425ff.
See Schmithausen 2014, pp. 419–20, n. 1852. On necessary adjustments to Lamotte’s rendition of the original Sanskrit terms, see Hakayama 1984, p. 180 and Delhey 2013.
See Tillemans 1997 for a review of Powers 1995. From a general perspective, it seems that Powers chose to ignore the work and methodological approach of Lamotte and Frauwallner.
See Schmithausen 1987 and 2014, Delhey 2013, and Skilling 2013 on the simile of the illusionist (māyākāra), which is also included inter alia in the Māyājāla, a sūtra also quoted in the Yogācārabhūmi.
On this issue, see Brunnhölzl 2018, pp. 414–18, n. 5.
See Steinkellner 1989 and Powers 1992a, 1992b, and 1998. For a review of Powers 1998, refer to Wedemeyer 2003.
See for instance Hopkins 1999, 2002, and 2006.
See Lamotte 1935, p. 12ff., Ware 1937, Edgerton 1937, Edgerton 1953, p. 558, and later Keenan 1980, p. 126, Powers 1991a, and Powers 1993b, p. 28ff.
Research relevant to terminological choices, syntactic reading of complex passages, and interpretation of the meaning includes Powers 1991b, 1991c, 1993b, pp. 41–77 (chapters 1 to 4); Tillemans 1997 (chapter 1); Matsuda 2013 on Sanskrit terms (chapter 2); Wayman 1974, Tillemans 1997, Mathes 2007, Matsuda 2013 (chapter 3); Katō 2002, Lusthaus 2002, Waldron 2003, Buescher 2007, 2008, Muller 2011, Schmithausen 1987 and 2014, Brunnhölzl 2018 (chapter 5); Frauwallner 1969, Takahashi 2006, Schmithausen 2014 (chapter 6); Frauwallner 1969, Tucci 1971, Tillemans 1997, Mathes 2007, Schmithausen 2014, Brunnhölzl 2018 (chapter 7); Takasaki 1966, Lamotte 1970, Lin 2010, Matsuda 2013, Schmithausen 1984, 1987, 2005, and 2014 (chapter 8); Obermiller 1933, Matsuda 1995 (chapter 9); Braarvig 1985, Kapstein 1988, Steinkellner 1989, Sakuma 1990, Yoshimizu 1996, Xing 2005, Lin 2010, Yoshimizu 2010 (chapter 10).
For a detailed introduction to this text, see Steinkellner 1989.
See Billeter 2014. I would like to thank Professor Tom Tillemans for having drawn my attention to Billeter’s principles of translation.
See Edgerton 1953, p. 102.
See Schmithausen 2014, p. 400, n. 1770.
See Lamotte 1935, p. 174.
See Mvyut 4414.
See Vinay and Darbelnet 1958.
Or even “Yep,” “I’m with you,” “So true,” etc.
“Une compilation assez maladroite”; see Lamotte 1935, p. 17. For an extensive discussion on the date and composition of Saṃdh., see Lamotte, pp. 14–25. See also Schmithausen 2014, p. 354ff. regarding the relation between the various chapters of Saṃdh.
See Schmithausen 2014, pp. 354–55.
See Schmithausen 2014, p. 365.
See Schmithausen 2014, p. 359.
On the usage and various shades of meaning of vijñapti, see Hall 1986.
rin po che sna bdun does not refer to jewels only, as found in Lamotte (1935) and Keenan (2000). I follow here Powers (1995), Cornu (2005), and Cleary (1999).
The logical subject of ’jig rten gyi khams dpag tu med pa rgyas par ’gengs pa’i ’od zer chen po shin tu mnga’ ba is the palace (khang). Cornu (2005) and Keenan (2000) seem to read this phrase as a qualifier for the seven precious substances.
The first paragraph of the nidāna is a presentation of the place where the Buddha is dwelling. As already mentioned in the introduction, a succession of compounds, mainly bahuvrīhis, enables the topicalization of the temple (khang). Lamotte’s translation reflects this literary device, contrary to Powers who does not topicalize the palace to the same degree on account of some ambiguities regarding the logical subject of a few clauses describing this palace. To illustrate this point, it seems unclear whether the adjectives “steadfast,” “enduring,” or “free” in Powers’ translation qualify the temple or the beings attending it. Cornu mainly follows Powers here but the grammatical necessity to indicate the gender and number of qualifiers in French limits the risk of confusion, which is obviously not the case in English. Regarding the usage of tenses, Lamotte is the only translator who uses both narrative past and present in this first paragraph. He thus switches from the past tense to the present tense in order to describe the characteristics of the temple, a decision I chose not to follow in the present translation.
Lamotte, Cornu, and Powers do not translate the anaphoric pronoun de in ’jig rten las ’das pa de’i bla ma’i dge ba’i rtsa ba las byung ba. Powers explains in a footnote (see Power 1995, p. 313, n. 3) that this pronoun refers to gnosis according to Wonch’uk, although his translation does not reflect this interpretation. Since wisdom has not been mentioned earlier in the text and since the pronoun de is anaphoric, I read de as referring to the Buddha. Moreover, the concept of “root of virtue” is usually associated with persons and we have a reference to dbang sgyur ba in the next qualifying phrase.
The clause dbang sgyur ba’i rnam par rig pa shin tu rnam par rig pa’i mtshan nyid is problematic. Lamotte translates it in the following way: “très pur, il se caractérise par une pensée maîtresse de soi.” Cornu and Powers follow the reading found in D, folio 2.a; S, folio 4.a; Kǫ, folio 1.a; L, folio 3.a; and H, folio 3.a ( dbang sgyur ba’i rnam par rig pa shin tu rnam par rig pa’i mtshan nyid) and render the two occurrences of rnam par rig pa by an apposition: “It was characterized by perfect knowledge, the knowledge of one who has mastery.” (Powers 1995, p. 5). However, in F, folio 4.b we find a variant reading which, I believe, makes more sense: dbang byed pa’i rnam par rig pa shin tu rnam par dag pa’i mtshan nyid. The Tibetan verbal prefix shin tu rnam par is used to render the upasarga su- in Sanskrit, like in suviśuddha. In Mvyut 351, blo shin tu rnam par dag pa thus translates the Sanskrit suviśuddhabuddhiḥ.
nges par ’byung ba. In Skt. niḥsaraṇa or niryāṇa, which have the meaning of setting forth, issue, exit, departure, escape, a road out of town. The analogy here is not about emancipation or renunciation as Powers and Cornu translated it but rather with the metaphor of the journey. In that sense, what is meant here is the departure to reach the palace. Lamotte (1935), Keenan (2000), and Cleary (1999) follow Xuanzang’s translation: 大念慧行以為游路 (Cbeta, Taishō 676). Interestingly enough, F does not have nges par ’byung ba but just ’byung ba.
rin po che’i pad ma’i rgyal po chen po yon tan gyi tshogs mtha’ yas pas brgyan pa’i bkod pa la rten pa na bzhugs te. This clause has been translated in various ways depending on how one understands the compound rin po che’i pad ma’i rgyal po chen po yon tan gyi tshogs mtha’ yas pas. Lamotte (1935), Powers (1995), and Cornu (2005) read it as a dvandva: “II est orné de qualités infinies, de joyaux, de lotus et de grands rois” (Lamotte 1935, p. 167); “this pattern was adorned with boundless masses of excellent qualities, and with great kingly jeweled lotuses” (Powers 1995, pp. 5–6); “paré d’infinies qualités et de grands lotus royaux incrustés de pierreries” (Cornu 2005, p. 26). However, it seems to me that it would be better to read this compound as a karmadhāraya. Folio 5.a offers a variant reading that could support this interpretation: yon ten gyi tshogs mtha’ yas pas/ brgyan pa’i rin po che chen po pad mo’i rgyal po’i bkod pa’i gnas na nyan thos kyi dge ’dun tshad med pa dang / thabs gcig tu bzhugs te. In addition to this problem, one should note that Lamotte’s translation of the compound rin po che’i pad ma’i rgyal po chen po as a dvandva is inaccurate here. Powers’ reading of this term is correct.
chos in the sense of qualities as understood by Lamotte (1935), Powers (1995), and Cleary (1999).
spyod yul; gocara. This term refers here to an object perceived by the six senses, so its semantic field pertains to perception as opposed to meditative practice, in which case it would be close in meaning to ālambana (“referential object”). Translating all these terms with “object” would conflate these various semantic fields in the context of the present text.
bsam gyis mi khyab pa rnam par ’jog pa (cf. rnam par gzhag pa bsam gyis mi khyab pa; acintyavyavasthānaḥ, see Mvyut 359). Compare with Lamotte: “ses attributs sont inconcevables” (Lamotte 1935, p. 168); Powers: “positing [doctrines] inconceivably” (Powers 1995, p. 7); Cornu: “il était entré dans l’indicible” (Cornu 2005, p. 26).
dus gsum mnyam pa nyid tshar phyin pa; tryadhvasamatāniryātaḥ (Mvyut 360). The term niryāta means here “adept, perfected, perfectly skilled” (see Edgerton 1953, p. 303).
byang chub sems dpa’ thams cad kyis ye shes yang dag par blangs pa. See Mvyut 366: ye shes byang chub sems dpa’ thams cad kyis yang dag par mnos pa; sarvabodhisattvasampratīcchitajñānaḥ. One should follow here the translations of Lamotte (1935), Keenan (2000), and Cleary (1999).
de bzhin gshegs pa ma ’dres pa’i rnam par thar par mdzad pa’i ye shes kyi mthar phyin pa. See Mvyut 368: de bzhin gshegs pa ma ’dres pa’i rnam par thar pa’i mdzad pa’i ye shes kyi mthar phin pa/ de bzhin gshegs pa ma ’dres pa’i rnam par thar par mdzad pa’i ye shes kyi mthar phin pa; asaṃbhinnatathāgata-vimokṣajñānaniṣṭhāgataḥ. See also Mvyut 5192: dbyer med pa; ma ’dres pa; ma ’dres pa’m dbyer med pa; asaṃbhedaḥ. If we understand ma ’dres pa in the sense of dbyer med pa, or even zung ’jug (yuganaddha), the meaning of the term is “indivisible/in unity,” conveying the notion of nonduality of the sameness mentioned several times in this introduction. Lamotte translates ma ’dres pa with “non diversifié,” Cornu with “distinctement,” Powers with “uniquely,” Keenan with “unified.” I don’t think one should understand ma ’dres pa with the meaning of kevala in the present case since it is associated with ye shes in other contexts where the idea of being exclusive to a particular person (e.g., buddhas) is negated (see Keenan 1980, p. 782ff.).
mtha’ dang dpung med pa’i sangs rgyas kyis mnyam pa nyid thugs su chud pa. One should read here instead: mtha’ dang dbus med pa’i sangs rgyas kyi sa mnyam pa nyid bu thugs su chud pa; anantamadhyabuddhabhūmisamatādhigataḥ (see Mvyut 369).
D, folio 2.b: nam mkha’i khams kyi mthas gtugs pa, which stands in apposition to chos kyi dbyings kyis klas pa (“the ultimate within the domain of truth”). See Mvyut 6430: nam mkha’i dbyings kyi mtha’ gtugs pa, nam mkha’i khams kyi mthar gtugs for the Sanskrit ākāśadhātuparyavasānaḥ. Compare with Mvyut 371: nam mkha’i khams kyi mtha’ klas pa, nam mkha’i khams kyi mthas klas pa as Tibetan equivalents of ākāśadhātuparyavasānaḥ. In Mvyut 431, don gyi mthar gtugs pa and don gyi mthar thug pa are Tibetan translations of paryavasitārthaḥ.
nges par ’byung ba; niryāṇika (?). Powers (1995) and Cornu (2005) translate it as “renunciation.”
See Mvyut 7450: nges par rtog pa/nges par rtogs pa; nirūpaṇā. Translated by Lamotte with “pénétrante” and by Keenan with “penetrating,” while Powers and Cornu opted respectively for “certain realization” and “réalisation certaine.”
See Mvyut 1113: yon yongs su sbyong ba chen po; mahādakṣiṇāpariṣodhakaḥ. D, 4,5; Kǫ, folio 2.b; and H, 7,2 omit yon. However, it is present in S, 7,2 and L, folio 5.a: yon tan, while F.5.b reads sbyin pa.
Powers (1995) and Cornu (2005) read nges pa, but one should read here instead the graphically very similar des pa (“gentleness”) as in Mvyut 1115 where this expression is also found extensively: bzod pa dang des pa chen po dang ldan pa; mahākṣāntisauratyasamanvāgataḥ.
brjod du med pa dang / gnyis su med pa’i mtshan nyid. I read this compound as a bahuvrīhi. The full clause [brjod du med pa dang / gnyis su med pa’i mtshan nyid] + [don dam pa] is a karmadhāraya meaning literally “the ultimate that is that whose defining characteristic is inexpressible and absolute.” Powers’ suggestion is also possible here (“the ultimate whose defining characteristic is inexpressible and non-dual”). Lamotte leaves out mtshan nyid. Cornu somewhat mixes qualifiers and qualified terms in his rendering of this clause.
yongs su ma grub pa; apariniṣpanna (?). This paragraph establishes the opposition between the imaginary (parikalpita) and the actual (pariniṣpanna). These two aspects are found in the teaching on the three kinds of essencelessness: see Saṃdh. chapters 6–8.
shes pa dang mthong ba; jñānadarśana. D, folio 3.b: shes pa but F, folio 6.b; S, folio 5.a; VD, folio 44.b: ye shes. I emended the text in this way throughout the sūtra since this expression is repeated several times.
Xuanzang’s translation reads 謂諸聖者以聖智聖見離名言故現等正覺 (Cbeta, Taishō 676).
As noted by Tillemans (1997), Powers reads phyir in the sense of “because” here. Keenan and Cleary’s readings of Xuanzang’s translation (為慾令他現等覺故, Cbeta, Taishō 676) agree with Lamotte’s and Tillemans’ understanding of this passage.
ston pas btags pa’i tshig yin te. VD, folio 44.b: om.
rnam grangs; paryāya. The Dunhuang manuscript of the sūtra instead has gzhung du ’du shes (n°194 folio 62.a; see Hakayama 1984, p. 187).
VD, folio 45.b reads the demonstrative pronoun as a plural (i.e., de dag) throughout this paragraph.
’di ltar don in the sense of yathārtha.
Powers’ and Cornu’s translations are inaccurate here: “Subsequently they do not make the conventional designations: ‘This is true, the other is false.’ They make conventional designations because they completely understand the object in this way.” (Powers 1995, p. 17). “Comme ils connaissent parfaitement le sens réel de ces phénomènes…” (Cornu 2005, p. 32). Lamotte seems to have translated 1.4 on the basis of the Chinese. In addition, rjes su should be read as rjes su tha snyad for anuvyavahāra.
Lamotte’s rather free translation of 1.5 fails to render the opposition between what does not exist and what does according to the sūtra: ’di snyam du sems te/ ’dus byas dang / ’dus ma byas snang ba gang yin pa ’di ni med kyi/ gang la ’dus byas dang ’dus ma byas kyi ’du shes dang / ’dus byas dang / ’dus ma byas kyi rnam grangs kyi [F.5.a] ’du shes ’byung ba/ rnam par rtog pa las byung ba/ ’du byed kyi mtshan ma sgyu ma lta bu ’di ni yod/ blo rnam par rmongs par byed pa ’di ni yod do. The first chapter gives an introduction to central concepts, such as conditioned/unconditioned, existent/nonexistent, imaginary/actual. It prefigures the treatment of the two truths (bden pa gnyis; satyadvaya) in Saṃdh. chapter 3 as well as that of the three natures/essences and three kinds of nonexistence of nature/essence (ngo bo nyid (med pa) nyid; (niḥ)svabhāvatā) expounded in Saṃdh. (cf. chapters 6–8).
brtsams pa; ārabhya with the meaning of “referring to/having to do with,” a frequent occurrence in Saṃdh. See Edgerton 1953, p. 102.
rtog ge thams cad las yang dag par ’das pa; sarvatarkasamatikrānta. Regarding the translation of the term rtog ge (tarka), Powers 1995, p. 25 suggests “argumentation,” but the emphasis in the present context is not on logical reasoning. The term tarka denotes here any kind of assumption, presupposition, representation, or conjecture regarding the absolute that is the product of the intellect (manas).
The English translation of this passage should convey the paradox of the situation. Although the ultimate is inexpressible, the Buddha gave countless teachings. Syntactic connective particles between clauses about the inexpressible ultimate and the domain of expression and reasoning have therefore an adversative meaning in the present paragraph: ngas ni don dam pa rtog ge thams cad las yang dag par ’das pa’i mtshan nyid mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas te/ mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas nas kyang bsnyad cing gsal bar byas/ rnam par phye/ gdags par byas/ rab tu bstan to/ de ci’i phyir zhe na. Lamotte’s and Powers’ translation do not make this point clear.
so so(r) rang rig pa; pratyātmavedya/pratyātmavedanīya/pratyātmajñāna/prātyatmam (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 346), in the sense of realizing or understanding for oneself in an intuitive way, as personal experience. Powers’ translation does not reflect the meaning of this term: “I have explained that the ultimate is realized individually by the Aryas, while objects collectively known by ordinary beings [belong to] the realm of argumentation.” In the sūtra, so so(r) rang rig pa is a synonym or a qualifier of ye shes (jñāna).
Lamotte translates rtog ge’i spyod yul by “affaire de tradition”; see Lamotte 1935, p. 173. Beyond the fact that this is wrong, it is worth noting that the opposition here is between the intuitive and personal knowledge of the noble beings and the intellectual and transactional knowledge of ordinary beings, namely, between gnosis and mind. Powers 1995, p. 27 reflects the personal aspect of so sor rang gi rig but not its intuitive quality.
mtshan ma; nimitta. Although “notion” would fit well here, one should keep in mind that nimitta as a polysemic term denotes phenomenal appearance throughout the sūtra. However, it is clear that “phenomenal appearance” and “notion” are two terms that are joined at the hip from the perspective of the doctrine expounded in Saṃdh.
In 2.2, the Buddha mentions a paradox. He gives explanations about the ultimate in speculative terms, although the ultimate is inexpressible. This paradox is best rendered in English or French by reading the particle la in the statements in question as having an adversative meaning. For example: chos ’phags gzhan yang don dam pa ni tha snyad thams cad yang dag par chad pa yin par ngas bshad la/ rtog ge ni tha snyad kyi spyod yul yin te.
The Turfan Sanskrit fragment found by Matsuda reads paramārtha[dhar]mā vigatābhilāpaḥ at the end of chapter 2’s closing gāthā (cf. Sanskrit text in Matsuda 2013: p. 940 ad Lamotte VIII.41). In D, folio 6.b and F, folio 10.b, we have instead the Tibetan term rtsod dang bral ba. It is possible that brjod med in line 2 and rtsod dang bral ba were inverted metri causae.
Powers reads don dam pa and mtshan nyid as being in apposition in the sentence de [i.e., don dam pa] ni rtog ge kun las ’das mtshan nyid. Lamotte reads rtog ge kun las ’das mtshan nyid (sarvatarkasamatikrāntalakṣaṇa) as a bahuvrīhi, which is much better. See Powers 1995, p. 31 and Lamotte 1935, p. 174.
I am using the adjective “indistinct” here in the sense of the first definition given in the Oxford English Dictionary: “1. Not distinct or distinguished from each other, or from something else; not kept separate or apart in the mind or perception; not clearly defined or marked off.” Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “indistinct,” accessed July 20, 2020, https://www-oed-com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2443/view/Entry/94602?redirectedFrom=indistinct#eid.
mos pa; praṇidhāna. See mos pa spyod pa’i sa. See Mvyut 897: mos pa spyod pa’i sa; adhimukticaryābhūmiḥ.
Schmithausen reads don dam pa’i mtshan nyid (paramārthalakṣaṇa) as “the defining characteristic that is the ultimate” in 3.5 (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 558, §512.3). However, Saṃdh. chapter 3 is about conditioned phenomena in relation to the ultimate when their respective defining characteristics are examined. The question here is not to determine whether the ultimate is the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena. Rather, it is to determine whether the conditioned and the ultimate are different by examining their defining characteristics. Therefore, I read don dam pa’i mtshan nyid as “the defining characteristic of the ultimate,” namely, as a genitive tatpuruṣa and not as a karmadhāraya.
To render sha stag.
I did not translate the phrase so so’i skye bo kho nar gyur bzhin du in an adversative mode (e.g., “though merely ordinary”) because the same phrase is found in the next paragraph in a parallel construction where the syntax in relation to the meaning cannot be interpreted to express contrast. Here bzhin du stands for yathā in the sense of “as” (i.e., “en tant que” in French).
grub pa dang bde ba; yogakṣema (see Edgerton 1953, p. 448a,b). Refer to Tillemans 1997, p. 157ff. for a discussion of Powers’ rendering of the term in his translation of Saṃdh. (Powers 1995). Lamotte translates this term with “de sécurité suprême.” See Lamotte 1935, p. 175.
I linked the two clauses with “and” because these two clauses are part of the logical argument on being “not different.” We have here a relative-correlative syntactic structure: gang gi phyir … de’i phyir (i.e., yasmāt … tasmāt). The first two clauses linked by “and” represent the hetu (“premise” or “reason”) posited by yasmāt. The logical structure of the paragraph is “since (a), (b), and (c), therefore (d)” (the conclusion that is stated in the very next sentence “For this reason…”): “Suviśuddhamati, ordinary beings (a) do not realize the truth and, as mere ordinary beings, (b) neither do they attain nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable good, (c) nor do they fully and completely awaken to the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening. For these reasons (de’i phyir, referring to (a), (b), and (c)), it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct.” D, folio 7.b: blo gros shin tu rnam dag gang gi phyir so so’i skye bo bden pa mthong ba ma yin/ so so’i skye bo kho nar gyur bzhin du grub pa dang / bde ba bla na med pa’i mya ngan las ’das pa ’thob par yang mi ’gyur/ bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par ’tshang rgya bar mi ’gyur ba de’i phyir ’du byed kyi mtshan nyid dang / don dam pa’i mtshan nyid tha dad pa ma yin zhes bya bar mi rung ste.
This entire paragraph is problematic in D: blo gros shin tu rnam dag gang gi phyir bden pa mthong ba rnams ’du byed kyi mtshan ma dang bral ba ma yin gyi/ bral ba kho na yin pa dang / bden pa mthong ba mtshan ma’i ’ching ba las rnam par grol ba ma yin gyi/ rnam par grol ba yin pa dang / bden pa mthong ba gnas ngan len gyi ’ching ba las rnam par grol ba ma yin gyi/ rnam par grol ba dang / ’ching ba de gnyi ga las rnam par grol na grub pa dang / bde pa bla na [F.8.a] med pa’i phyir mya ngan las ’das pa ’thob par ’gyur ba dang / bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par ’tshang rgya bar yang ’gyur ba. However, Lamotte, Keenan, and Cleary translate the phrases in bold with a double negation. If we look at the same paragraph in F, folio 10.a, we find an interesting textual variant in which the expected double negation is found: ma bral ba’ang ma yin te and ma grol ba’ang ma yin te, just like in Xuanzang’s translation (由此道理當知一切非如理行 不如正理善清淨慧。由於今時非見諦者。於諸行相不能除遣。然能除遣非見諦者。Cbeta, Taishō 676). Powers chose to translate this passage without proceeding to any emendation, which makes little sense from the perspective of the argument expounded in this section of the text: “Suviśuddhamati, it is not the case that seers of truth are free from the signs of the compounded; they are simply free. Moreover, seers of truth are not liberated from the bondage of signs, but they are liberated. Seers of truth are not liberated from the bondage of errant tendencies, but they are liberated.” (Powers 1995, p. 41).
We have here again a complex relative-correlative syntactic structure: gang gi phyir … de’i phyir (i.e., yasmāt … tasmāt). All the clauses between gang gi phyir and de’i phyir represent the hetu (“premise” or “reason”) posited by yasmāt. The logical structure of the paragraph is “since (a), (b), (c), (d), therefore (e)” (the conclusion that is stated in the very next sentence, “For all these reasons,…”): “Suviśuddhamati, it is not the case that (a) those who realize the truth are not detached from the phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, for they are indeed detached from it. (b) Neither are they not liberated from the bondage of phenomenal appearance, for they are indeed liberated from it. (c) Nor are they not liberated from the bondage of corruption, for they are indeed liberated from it. (d) Since they are liberated from these two kinds of bondage, [F.8.a] not only do they attain nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable good, but they will also fully and completely awaken to the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening. (e) For all these reasons (de’i phyir referring to (a), (b), (c), and (d)), it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are distinct.” D, folios 7.b–8.a: blo gros shin tu rnam dag gang gi phyir bden pa mthong ba rnams ’du byed kyi mtshan ma dang bral ba ma yin gyi/ bral ba kho na yin pa dang / bden pa mthong ba mtshan ma’i ’ching ba las rnam par grol ba ma yin gyi/ rnam par grol ba yin pa dang / bden pa mthong ba gnas ngan len gyi ’ching ba las rnam par grol ba ma yin gyi/ rnam par grol ba dang / ’ching ba de gnyi ga las rnam par grol na grub pa dang / bde ba bla na med pa’i phyir mya ngan las ’das pa ’thob par ’gyur ba dang / bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par ’tshang rgya bar yang ’gyur ba de’i phyir ’du byed kyi mtshan nyid dang / don dam pa’i mtshan nyid tha dad pa zhes byar mi rung ste.
gdags pa; prajñapti. Lamotte translates this term with “dire.” This does not convey the meaning of gdags pa, which implies the idea of imputation, intimation, conceptualization, or representation. Here, in the sense of “decide,” see Edgerton 1953, p. 359,1.
mi bzod; na kṣamate, na kṣamati (see Edgerton 1953, p. 199,1). Pāli: khamati (see The Pali–English Dictionary (Rhys-Davids 1921), p. 234).
D: blo gros shin tu rnam dag ngas ni de ltar don dam pa phra ba mchog tu phrag mchog tu zab pa/ rtogs par dka’ ba/ mchog tu dka’ ba/ tha dad pa dang / tha dad pa ma yin pa nyid las yang dag par ’das pa’i mtshan nyid mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas te. I read tha dad pa ma yin pa nyid las yang dag par ’das pa’i mtshan nyid as a bahuvrīhi, not a tatpuruṣa. The terms don dam pa and tshan nyid are not in apposition in chapter 3, since the two terms are repeatedly connected through a genitive particle: don dam pa’i mtshan nyid (which occurs 32 times in folios 5.a, 5.b, 6.b, 7.a, 7.b, 8.a, 8.b, and 9.a). I also understand similar constructions with don dam pa and tshan nyid in the following chapter as bahuvrīhis.
This phrase is also found in 2.2, 3.6, and 4.7 (see also folios 5.b, 9.a–b, and 10.b–11.a): mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas nas kyang bsnyad cing gsal bar byas/ rnam par phye/ gdags pa byas/ rab tu bstan to.
Powers translates mtshan nyid as singular (see Powers 1995, p. 49). But the question of the identity or difference in this chapter is evaluated from the perspective of two defining characteristics, namely, the defining characteristic of the conditioned and the defining characteristic of the unconditioned.
The last two lines are quoted in the Bhāvanākrama; see Tucci 1971, p. 1: nimittabandhanāj jantur atho dauṣṭhulabandhanāt/ vipaśyanāṃ bhāvayitvā śamathañ ca vimucyata iti.
F reads here shes pa in agreement with D. See F, folio 14.bff.
dmigs pa; ālambana. I think it is important here to read dmigs pa as meaning “object” because in folio 11.a the Buddha contrasts these various objects (aggregates, sense sources, constituents, truths, etc.) with the “object conducive to purification” (rnam par dag pa’i dmigs pa, *viśuddhyālambana; see Schmithausen 2014, p. 362, §306.5 and n. 1644). Translating dmigs pa here as “observing” would weaken the central opposition between (a) the objects taken as a reference point for their practice by those who have not realized the defining characteristic of the ultimate and (b) the object conducive to purification, which is present within all phenomena. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce this fundamental point.
This paragraph deals with the thirty-seven branches of awakening (byang chub kyi yan lag; bodhyaṅgāni).
ro gcig pa; ekarasa. I read the compound thams cad du ro gcig pa’i mtshan nyid; *sarvatraikarasalakṣaṇa (?) as a bahuvrīhi; see D, folio 12.a: rab ’byor de bzhin du don dam pa yang mtshan nyid tha dad pa’i chos rnams la thams cad du ro gcig pa’i mtshan nyid yin par blta bar bya’o. I understand thams cad du ro gcig pa’i mtshan nyid to refer here to the defining characteristic of the ultimate since this definition presents dharma as having various lakṣaṇa. As a consequence, I read this sentence as stating that the ultimate is that whose defining characteristic is always of a single nature in all phenomena that have diverse defining characteristics. See also 4.8, which supports this interpretation.
rnam par dag pa’i dmigs pa; *viśuddhyālambana. Lamotte reads here rnam par dag pa’i dmigs pa with the meaning of viśuddhālambana (“objet pur”), but Schmithausen gives *viśuddhyālambana as the Sanskrit equivalent for the Tibetan (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 362, §306.5 and n. 1644). It is worth noting that this term is also found in chapter 7, where it is again equated with the ultimate (don dam pa). In this context, it is said that paratantra is not an object conducive to purification whereas the actual (pariniṣpanna) is. In this sense, one should make the distinction here between vastu and ālambana. The ultimate is conceived here as the referential object, or support object, of a purification that leads to awakening. The usage of ālambana in reference to the ultimate clearly refers to practice in the present chapter.
Compare D, folio 11.a: rab ’byor rnam grangs des na khyod kyis ’di ltar thams cad du ro gcig pa’i mtshan nyid gang yin pa de ni don dam pa yin par rig par bya’o with D, folio 12.a: rab ’byor de bzhin du don dam pa yang mtshan nyid tha dad pa’i chos rnams la thams cad du ro gcig pa’i mtshan nyid yin par blta bar bya’o (passim).
de bzhin nyid; tathatā. I translate tathatā with “true reality” (in the sense of the true state or nature of things) instead of the more usual “suchness” or “thusness.” However, when de bzhin nyid is qualified by an adjective such as don dam pa, I simply translate it with “reality” to improve readability. See Schmithausen 2014, p. 356, §303.1 (passim), in which tathatā is translated with “True Reality” or “Suchness.”
D reads gnyis med pa’i shes pa, while F, folio 16.b reads gnyis su med pa’i ye shes.
kho na; eva. For a comparison between Buescher’s and Schmithausen’s translations of this sentence, see Schmithausen 2014, p. 380, §324.
D: de bzhin gshegs pa rnams byung yang rung ma byung yang rung ste/ rtag pa rtag pa’i dus dang / ther zug ther zug gi dus su chos gnas par bya ba’i phyir chos rnams kyi chos nyid dbyings de ni rnam par gnas pa kho na yin pa. Lamotte translates chos gnas par bya ba’i phyir with “pour le maintien des choses,” but phyir does not have a dative function here. Powers’ translation reads, “because phenomena abide in permanent, permanent time and in everlasting, everlasting time, the domain of reality of phenomena alone abides.” This does not make sense either. Conditioned phenomena are impermanent as explained at length in the first four chapters. The argument simply runs as follows: since it is present in all things, this alone is permanent. As for the expression chos nyid dbyings, D, folio 11.b reads chos rnams kyi chos nyid dbyings while F, folio 17.a has chos rnams kyi chos nyid/ chos gnas pa’i dbyings, referring respectively to dharmatā and dharmadhātu (compare with Mvyut 1719: chos gnas pa nyid; dharmasthititā). I am reluctant to translate dbyings (dhātu) as “realm/domain” here because the meaning of dhātu as “constituent” makes so much sense, particularly when reading F, in which dbyings is glossed as chos gnas pa, “that which abides within phenomena,” “that which is the support/source of phenomena,” or “the condition of phenomena.” Xuanzang’s translation confirms the suggested translation: 唯有常常時恒恒時如來出世若不出世諸法法性安立法界安住 (Cbeta, Taishō 676).
ji tsam gyis; kiyant. The complete sentence reads, “In what sense are they skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition?”
D: blo gros yangs ba ’gro ba drug gi ’khor ba ’di na sems can gang dang gang dag sems can gyi ris gang dang gang du yang sgo nga nas skye ba’i skye gnas sam/ yang na mngal nas skye ba’am/ yang na drod gsher las skye ba’am/ yang na rdzus te skye ba’i skye gnas su lus mngon par ’grub cing ’byung bar ’gyur ba der. “For whatever sentient beings an individual existence (ātmabhāva) comes about and emerges in this saṃsāra comprising six destinations, in whatever community of beings, be it in [the mode of] egg-born, womb-born, moisture-born or spontaneous generation, there…” (Schmithausen 2014, p. 177, §149). Regarding lus mngon par ’grub cing ’byung bar ’gyur ba, one finds the Sanskrit equivalent ātmabhāvam abhinirvartayati for lus mngon par ’grub ’gyur ba (see Yokoyama, Kōitsu, and Hirosawa Takayuki, eds., Index to the Yogācārabhūmi (Chinese-Sanskrit-Tibetan) (Tokyo: Sankibō Busshorin, 1996)). Schmithausen reads here, “For whatever sentient beings an individual existence (ātmabhāva) comes about and emerges” (Schmithausen 2014, p. 177, §149), but it seems to me that we could have had here a causative (ātmabhāvam abhinirvartayanti) with the Literal meaning of producing or bringing about a [new] existence, in a word, being reborn (for an instance of this rendering, see ibid., p. 191, n. 812). Otherwise, one would expect a syntactic particle in Tibetan after sems can gang dang gang dag to match Schmithausen’s reading, “For whatever sentient beings,” particularly if one understands ’gro ba drug gi ’khor ba ’di na sems can gang dang gang dag as not in apposition to sems can gyi ris gang dang gang du, which I think is the correct way to understand the expression.
I follow here the second possible interpretation of the correlative-relative syntactic structure of the sentence as suggested by Schmithausen (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 178, §150), in which der (tatra) is read as having a temporal connotation, rendered by the adverb “then.”
D: sa bon thams cad pa’i sems rnam par smin cing ’jug la rgyas shing ’phel ba dang yangs par ’gyur ro. See Schmithausen 1987, p. 356, n. 508; and 2014, p. 325, n. 1490 for the Sanskrit reconstruction: *( sarvabījakaṃ cittaṃ) vipacyate saṃmūrcchati vṛddhiṃ virūdhiṃ vipulatām apadyate. See also Waldron 2003, p. 218, n. 13. Lamotte (1973, p. 65ff.) suggests kalalatvena saṃmūrcchati in his translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha I,34. The appended commentary describes how the appropriating cognition enters the mother’s womb by uniting with the semen and the blood (śukraśoṇita). The embryo with which, from then on, the appropriating cognition shares a common destiny (ekayogakṣema) is the result of this “coagulation.” On the topic, see Kritzer 2000.
See Waldron 2003, pp. 94–95 for a translation of 5.2. See also Brunnhölzl 2018, p. 1305ff. regarding Asaṅga’s and Wonch’uk’s commentaries on Saṃdh. 5.2–7.
kun tu bsags pa; ācita. This explanation corresponds to an etymological analysis of the Sanskrit term citta. Xuanzang’s translation reads: 由此識色聲香味觸等積集滋長故 (Cbeta, Taishō 676).
See Schmithausen 2014, p. 157ff. for an extensive discussion of the various testimonies and interpretations of this sentence. See also Waldron 2003, pp. 95–96 for a translation of 5.3, and Tillemans 1997, pp. 157–58 for a discussion of Powers’ translation of 5.3. Powers translates the verb in last sentence with an active form “because it collects and accumulates forms, sounds…” (Powers 1995, p. 71). It seems to me that, since this is an etymological explanation of citta, a passive is better in the present case.
rnam par shes pa’i tshogs drug po, lit. “the sixfold group of cognitions.”
Waldron’s translation (Waldron 2003, p. 97) seems to follow the Sanskrit and Tibetan found in Sthiramati’s Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣyam (see TrBh, 33.25–34.4 in Buescher 2007). However, the quote of Saṃdh. in this treatise is drawn from 5.5. It does not quite match the last sentence of 5.4. See D: gal te rnam par shes pa’i tshogs gnyis sam/ gsum mam bzhi lhan cig gam/ lnga car lhan cig ’byung na yang der rnam par shes pa’i tshogs lnga po dag dang / spyod yul mtshungs pa rnam par rtog pa’i yid kyi rnam par shes pa yang gcig kho na lhan cig ’byung ngo. Compare with TrBh, 33.26–27 (Buescher 2007): gal te rnam par shes pa gnyis sam gsum mam lnga ’byung ba’i rkyen nye bar gnas par gyur na yang gnyis sam gsum mam lnga’ bar du ’byung bar ’gyur ro. Sanskrit: saced dvayos trayānāṃ sacet pañcānāṃ vijñānām utpattipratyayaḥ pratyupasthito bhavati sakṛd yāvat pañcānāṃ pravṛttir bhavati.
For a comparison with the Dunhuang edition of 5.5, as well as for a general evaluation of the relevance of this edition, see Schmithausen 2014, p. 419, n. 1852.
D: gal te rlabs gnyis sam gal te rab tu mang po dag ’byung ba’i rkyen nye bar gnas par gyur na rlabs rab tu mang po dag ’byung but VD, folio 54.a: gal te rlabs gnyis sam gal te rab tu mang po dag ’byung ba’i rkyen nye bar gnas par gyur na rlabs kyang gnyis sam rab tu mang po dag ’byung. S, folio 19.a is in agreement with D here (gnyis sam is omitted).
On the metaphor of the mirror in Buddhist texts, see Wayman 1974.
D: gal te gzugs brnyan gnyis sam gal te rab tu mang po dag ’byung ba’i rkyen nye bar gnas par gyur na gzugs brnyan rab tu mang po dag ’byung but VD, folio 54.a: gal te gzugs brnyan gnyis sam gal te gzugs brnyan rab tu mang po dag ’byung ba’i rkyen nye bar gnas pa gyur na gzugs brnyan yang gnyis sam rab tu mang po dag ’byung.
Lamotte 1935, p. 186 translates yongs su sbyor bar yang mi mngon with “ne souffre aucun dommage.”
shes pa, although it is worth noting that the Dunhuang manuscript reads ye shes. See Hakayama 1986, 11 E6 (3).
D: blo gros yangs pa gang gi phyir byang chub sems dpa’ rang gi so so nang gi len pa mi mthong / len pa’i rnam par shes pa yang mi mthong la/ de yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du yin pa. I am following here Schmithausen’s reading of gang gi phyir (yataḥ) in the sense of “as soon as” (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 346–47, n. 1577). This interpretation is confirmed by F, folio 19.b, which reads nam instead of gang gi phyir.
nang gi so sor rang rig pa; adhyātmaṃ prātyatmam (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 346–47, n. 1577). See F, folio 19.b: nang gi so so rang.
Sanskrit verses are found in Buescher 2007, see TrBh, 34.2–3. Also translated into English in Waldron 2003, p. 101.
yongs su grub pa’i mtshan nyid; pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa. I read these compounds as karmadhārayas, not as genitive tatpuruṣas. For an analysis of these compounds, see Schmithausen 2014, p. 359, n. 1626.
rnam par bzhag pa; vyavasthā, which has the connotation of something being agreed upon, represented, arranged, settled, decreed, or established.
Frauwallner and Lamotte do not translate ji tsam du (see Frauwallner 1969, p. 285: “um sie im täglichen Sprachgebrauch zu bezeichnen” and Lamotte 1935, p. 188: “permettant de les mentionner dans le langage courant”). The Chinese term 乃至 in Xuanzang’s translation (乃至為令隨起言說, Cbeta, Taishō 676) corresponds to the Tibetan ji tsam du (for yāvat or kiyat), which I understand here in the sense of “at least, only, even just.” Interestingly enough, the Go witness has ci tsam gis (see Go, folio 12.a); F, folio 20.a reads gang ji skad du, and He, folio 77.a returns gang ji snyed du (while rjes su is omitted) for ji tsam du in D.
The Tibetan rjes su tha snyad gdags pa and the Chinese 隨起言說 correspond to anuvyavahāra.
D: ji tsam du rjes su tha snyad gdags pa’i phyir chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid dam bye brag tu ming dang brdar rnam par gzhag pa gang yin pa’o. Frauwallner’s translation of this passage is slightly ambiguous and could be potentially misleading on account of the German preposition “nach”: “Es ist jede Festsetzung eines Namens und einer Vereinbarung für die Gegebenheiten nach Wesen oder Besonderheit, um sie im täglichen Sprachgebrauch zu bezeichnen.” (Frauwallner 1969, p. 286). If one reads this sentence as “a determination in terms of being and specific defining characteristic,” then the translation is correct. However, if one reads it as meaning “the determination of … in accordance with/corresponding to [their] being or specific defining characteristic,” then the translation becomes problematic since the point made in the text is precisely that there is no such thing. The determination (Festsetzung) of a name and convention for phenomena (für die Gegebenheiten) is not made according to the essence or defining characteristic of phenomena (nach Wesen oder Besonderheit). Hence the term “imaginary defining characteristic.” If this determination occurred according to the essence of phenomena, it would be illogical to call this defining characteristic “imaginary.” Lamotte’s translation is therefore more accurate in the present case, although his rendering of rnam par bzhags pa (vyavasthāna) as a present participle qualifying ming dang brda slightly modifies the original meaning of the sentence. Sanskrit compounds with vyavasthāna can be read as instrumental tatpuruṣa, for example saṃjñākaraṇavyavasthāna, mātrāvyavasthāna, or aṅgavyavasthāna. Xuanzang translates this passage as 云何諸法遍計所執相。謂一切法名假安立自性差別。乃至為令隨起言說。 (Taishō 676), in which nāmasaṃketa (“names and common references”) seem at first glance to be the grammatical passive subject of the main verb of the clause (安立) or an adverb. In fact, F, folio 20.a and He, folio 77.a read ming dang brdas rnam par bzhag pa instead of ming dang brdar rnam par bzhag pa in D and other witnesses mentioned in the preceding notes. The terminative of the Tibetan ming dang brdar could be read adverbially in the sense of “nominally and conventionally” in the sense of “by means of/in terms of names and common references” for nāmasaṃketa.
Regarding the choice of terminology for pariniṣpanna, Edgerton mentions two possible meanings (see Edgerton 1953, p. 325): (1) “completely perfected” in the sense of “accomplished/attained,” which corresponds to the second clause in the present definition (6.6) in which the yong su grub pa is glossed in the sense of yang dag par ’grub pa (D) and yang dag par bsgrub pa (F). (2) The second meaning of pariniṣpanna according to Edgerton is “absolute.” The term is also translated into English as meaning “real.” Understanding pariniṣpanna as “established” or “perfected” is indeed problematic. Reality in the sense of tathatā cannot be referred to as “perfected,” because it is not perfectible. If it were, it would be conditioned (see Saṃdh. chapter 3). Likewise, tathatā cannot be termed “established” because if it were, it would be impermanent, but it is said to be the only permanent reality (see Saṃdh. chapter 4). As a consequence, it appears clearly from the context of the definition given above and Edgerton’s explanations that pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa refers to both the “character accomplished [by bodhisattvas]” in the sense of the accomplishment of the defining characteristic of the ultimate as the ultimate attainment of the bodhisattva’s spiritual path, and the “absolute or real character” in the sense of reality itself (tathatā). As emphasized throughout Saṃdh., pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa is indeed none other than the defining characteristic of the ultimate (don dam pa’i mtshan nyid; paramārthalakṣaṇa), the object conducive to purification, (rnam par dag pa’i dmigs pa; *viśuddhyālambana). In the present translation, I opt for “actual,” a term that fits well with the metaphors found in Saṃdh. chapter 6, to explain the three natures (Lamotte chose “absolu,” and Frauwallner “vollkommen”). The term “actual” obviously induces a clear dichotomy between what is imaginary and what is real, which was most probably at the origin of these terminological choices in the source language. On the opposition between the imaginary and the actual by equating the imaginary with the unreal through the usage of the same terminology (i.e., pariniṣpanna and parikalpa/parikalpita), see 1.2.
The syntax of this sentence differs according to the various available editions of the text with little bearing on the meaning of the sentence. For example, compare D; VD, folios 55.a–b: chos rnams kyi de bzhin nyid gang yin pa ste/ byang chub sems dpa’ rnams kyis rtun pa’i rgyu dang / legs par tshul bzhin yid la byas pa’i rgyus de rtogs shing de rtogs pa goms par byas pa yang dag par grub pas kyang bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub kyi bar du yang dag par ’grub pa gang yin pa’o; F, folio 20.a–b: gang chos rnams kyi de bzhin nyid de/ byang chub sems dpa’ rnams kyis brtson ba’i rgyu dang / yang dag par tshul bzhin yid la byed pa’i rgyud gang rtogs par ’gyur ba yin te rtogs dang / bsgoms pa bsgrubs pas/ bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub kyi bar du yang dag par bsgrub pa’o; and S, folio 20.b: gang chos rnams kyi de bzhin nyid/ gang byang chub sems dpa’ rnams kyis brtson ba’i rgyu dang / yang dag par tshul bzhin yid la byed pa’i rgyus rtogs par ’gyur ba yin te/ de rtogs pa goms par byas pa yang dag par grub pas kyang / bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub kyi bar du yang dag par ’grub pa’o. Frauwallner reads this passage in the following way: “Es ist die Soheit der Gegebenheiten, ihr Erschauen durch die Bodhisattva auf Grund ihrer Energie und richtigen Beobachtung (yoniśomanasikāraḥ), und durch das Zustandekommen der Übung dieses Erschauens schließlich das Zustandekommen der hochsten vollkommenen Erleuchtung.” (Frauwallner 1969, p. 286). Lamotte 1935, p. 189 is similar to Frauwallner’s reading. It is plausible that Frauwallner simply followed Lamotte’s translation of this passage. Schmithausen suggests that the relative clause starting with gang byang chub specifies the tathatā, which I agree with, although reading the two clauses defining pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa as being in apposition would not negate the fact that the second one merely specifies the first one (tathatā) as being that which is attained by bodhisattvas: “(Suchness) into which the bodhisattvas, in consequence of their zeal and in consequence of their appropriate contemplation, obtain direct insight (*prativedha, cf. SaṃdhDH: so sor chud pa), and, through the accomplishment of the repeated practice of this insight, finally attain the Highest Perfect Awakening.” (Schmithausen 2014, p. 540, n. 2241). It is important here to note that rtogs shing de rtogs pa goms par byas pa stands on the same level in relation to yang dag par grub pas, which is not apparent in Schmithausen’s translation. Thus, “obtain direct insight” (de rtogs shing) is part of a larger argument: rtogs shing de rtogs pa goms par byas pa (D) or rtogs par ’gyur ba yin te rtogs dang / bsgoms pa bsgrubs pas (F). This meaning unit should therefore not be put on the same level as yang dag par ’grub pa gang yin pa’o as it is in Schmithausen’s translation, since it is one of the reasons why there is an accomplishment according to the available testimonies. Regarding the translation of bar du (yāvat), I followed Schmithausen’s way of solving the problem. Powers understands it in its usual sense of “up to,” but it does not work here, since this would imply that what are accomplished are also inferior realizations, which Powers refers to between square brackets as “stages”; see Powers 1995, p. 83. Schmithausen’s reading of the second clause as specifying tathatā seems preferable.
de lta bur ni; evam eva.
Lamotte translates this term with “essentiellement fantaisiste”; see Lamotte 1935, p. 190. This is missing the point that this actually refers to the imaginary defining characteristic.
D; VD, folio 56.a: gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid de/ kun brtags pa’i mtshan nyid der rtag pa rtag pa’i dus dang / ther zug ther zug gi dus su yongs su ma grub cing ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyis yongs su grub pa’i mtshan nyid blta bar bya’o. F, folio 21.b: gzhan gyi dbang de nyid la/ kun brtag brtags pa’i mtshan nyid de rtag pa rtag pa’i dus dang / ’khor bar ’khor ba’i dus su ma grub cing rang bzhin med pa nyid ni/ yongs su grub pa’i mtshan nyid du blta’o; S, folio 21.b: gzhan gyi dbang de nyid kun brtags pa’i mtshan nyid der rtag pa rtag pa’i dus dang / ther zug ther zug gi dus su yongs su ma grub cing rang bzhin med pa nyid ni/ yongs su grub pa’i mtshan nyid du blta’o. F and S are helpful here to interpret the syntax of D. The following simple emendation would improve the syntax of D: gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid de la/ kun brtags pa’i mtshan nyid der rtag pa rtag pa’i dus dang / ther zug ther zug gi dus su yongs su ma grub cing ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyis yongs su grub pa’i mtshan nyid blta bar bya’o. Lamotte’s translation of 6.9 is more intelligible than that of Frauwallner. who is more Literal and strictly follows the syntax found in D. Xuanzang’s translation reads: 即依他起相上由遍計所執相於常常時於恆恆時無有真實無自性性圓成實性當知亦爾 (Cbeta, Taishō 676). In my translation I chose to topicalize yongs su grub pa’i mtshan nyid (in agreement with D) because the purpose of this dialogue is to define the three defining characters.
rab tu shes; prajānāti with the meaning of pratijānāti; see Edgerton 1953, p. 357. Lamotte translates this term with “repose,” which does not convey the meaning of prajānāti; see Lamotte 1935, p. 190. In the following paragraph, Lamotte uses the verb “connaître” for the same term.
mtshan ma dang ’brel pa’i ming la brten nas. VD, folio 56.a: ming dang ’brel ba’i mtshan ma la brten nas.
mngon par zhen pa; abhiniveśa. Usually with a negative connotation; see Edgerton 1953, p. 53. Powers reads it as meaning “strongly adhering”; see Powers 1995, p. 87.
See the definition of the imaginary defining characteristic in 6.4: “Guṇākara, what is the imaginary defining characteristic? It is what is nominally and conventionally posited as the essence or the distinctive [characteristic] of phenomena, even just in order to designate [them].” See also 7.4: “Paramārthasamudgata, what is the essencelessness of all phenomena as a defining characteristic? It is the imaginary defining characteristic. Why? Because as much as this defining characteristic is nominally and conventionally posited, it is not posited on the basis of an essence or a distinctive [characteristic]. This is why it is called ‘the essencelessness of all phenomena [that is] a defining characteristic.’ ”
See 6.5: “Guṇākara, what is the other-dependent defining characteristic? It is the dependent arising of phenomena. It is like this: ‘When this is, that arises; because this arises, that arises;’ and also: from ‘[in dependence upon ignorance as a condition,] conditioning mental factors [arise]’ up to ‘thus, the whole great mass of suffering comes to be.’ ” And also 7.5: “Paramārthasamudgata, what is the essencelessness of all phenomena [that is] arising? It is the other-dependent defining characteristic of phenomena. Why? Because this is [the defining characteristic] arising on account of causes other [than itself], and not by itself. This is why it is referred to as ‘essencelessness with regard to arising.’ ”
I read mtshan nyid med pa dang / kun nas nyon mongs pa’i mtshan nyid dang / rnam par byang ba’i mtshan nyid (D) as in the previous clauses, namely, as bahuvrīhis.
Lamotte 1935: 191: “Ils excitent la pitié.” A la rigueur, one could have accepted “ils suscitent la pitié”!
D: thams cad ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa for chos thams cad ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa (D, folio 16.b passim).
For a list of texts including this sentence, see Lamotte 1935, p. 198.
rnam par gnas pa; vyavasthita (Chinese: 安立).
See Lamotte’s and Frauwallner’s translations of this passage (Lamotte 1935, p. 194 and Frauwallner 1969, p. 291). Both read rnam par gnas pa (“établi,” “beruht”) as the main verb in both clauses, which is syntactically dubious. Xuanzang’s translation concords with D: 善男子云何諸法無自性性謂諸法遍計所執相。何以故。此由假名安立為相非由自性安立為相 (Cbeta, Taishō 676). The complete definition of parikalpitalakṣaṇa in 6.4: D should be kept in mind when translating the definition of the lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā: yon tan ’byung gnas de la chos rnams kyi kun brtags pa’i mtshan nyid gang zhe na/ ji tsam du rjes su tha snyad gdags pa’i phyir chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid dam bye brag tu ming dang brdar rnam par gzhag pa gang yin pa’o.
rab tu phye ba; prabhāvita (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 400, n. 1770).
See Schmithausen 2014, p. 559. Schmithausen reads paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā as “lack of own-being [that is] the ultimate reality.”
For a discussion of the syntactic construction gcig … gcig, refer to Tillemans 1997, pp. 161–64.
See Schmithausen 2014, p. 560 on the textual material pertaining to this sentence.
See Schmithausen 2014, p. 561ff.
For a complete comparison of this passage across editions, see Kojirō Katō’s forthcoming edition of the text. As an example, it is interesting to compare the syntax of D and F. D: don dam yang dag ’phags pas ni sems can gyi khams na sems can rnams kyis kun brtags pa’i ngo bo nyid ngo bo nyid kyis tha dad par mthong zhing gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid dang / yongs su grub pa’i ngo bo nyid kyang ngo bo nyid kyis tha dad par mthong na/ de’i phyir ngo bo nyid med pa nyid rnam pa gsum mi ’dogs kyi. Interestingly, L, S, and T are in agreement with D, as are C, J, N. P. VD, VG, and VP. Only F offers a variant reading (folio 25.b): don dam yang dag ’phags sems can gyi khams ni/ sems can rnams kyis kun brtags pa’i rang bzhin ngo bo nyid kyis tha dad par mi mthong / gzhan gyi dbang gi rang bzhin dang / yongs su grub pa’i rang bzhin yang ngo bo nyid kyis tha dad par yang mi mthong ste/ de’i phyir ngas rang bzhin med pa rnams gsum du gzhag go. F explains why the Buddha taught an essencelessness by referring to beings as not perceiving a distinct essence in the three natures: “Paramārthasamudgata, beings in the world of beings do not consider the imaginary essence as different from an essence. They do not even consider the other-dependent essence and the actual essence as different from an essence. As a consequence, I presented the threefold essencelessness.” This does not make much sense. I therefore follow the reading found in D. Frauwallner chose to follow D very closely here. He takes as the subject of the verb mi ’dogs the Buddha, like Powers and Lamotte: “Ich habe … die dreifache Wesenlosigkeit nicht verkündet, weil die Lebewesen in der Sphäre der Lebewesen das vorgestellte Wesen seinem Wesen nach als etwas Verschiedenes ansehen, und weil sie das abhängige Wesen und das vollkommene Wesen seinem Wesen nach als etwas Verschiedenes ansehen.” Lamotte’s translation (Lamotte 1935, p. 196) reads, “Si j’expose [for ’dogs] la triple Irréalité, ce n’est pas parce que les êtres, dans le monde des êtres, considèrent la nature imaginaire comme une nature distincte, ou les natures dépendante et absolue comme des natures distinctes. Au contraire…” With “au contraire,” Lamotte expresses the adversative function of the particle kyi at the end of the clause de’i phyir ngo bo nyid med pa nyid rnam pa gsum mi ’dogs kyi. To achieve this, Lamotte reads mi ’dogs in an affirmative mode and in the negative the statement regarding beings, which is in agreement with Xuanzang’s translation: 復次勝義生非由有情界中諸有情類別觀遍計所執自性為自性故。亦非由彼別觀依他起自性及圓成實自性為自性故我立三種無自性性。然由有情於依他起自性及圓成實自性上增益遍計所執自性故我立三種無自性性 (Cbeta, Taishō 676).
sems; citta. This is one of the synonyms for the subliminal mind (kun gzhi rnam par shes pa; ālayavijñāna) as explained in chapter 5. See chapters 5 and 6 on the latent disposition of the mind through karmic seeds in the sense of conventions.
bag la nyal; anuśaya. In the sense of “adhering/sticking” and “being latent/inclined” here (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 687).
Powers’ translation does not render the meaning of this sentence: “Due to these causes and conditions, in the future [this view of] the own-being of the other-dependent proliferates.” (Powers 1995, p. 107). The other-dependent in the sense of dependent arising refers here to rebirth and future lives.
yang dag par (“perfectly”) is important here, as it echoes the statement above and without it the entire paragraph loses its meaning: to achieve perfect liberation, the teaching on essencelessness with regard to both defining characteristics and the ultimate is necessary.
L, S, T, and F (e.g., F, folio 27.a) logically confirm shes pa, which is interesting since it establishes a distinction between occurrences of shes pa and ye shes, which D does not do systematically (see Kojirō Katō’s edition of chapter 7). The term here is a synonym for sems; see the parallel passage above in 7.10.
F, folio 27.a, has lam ’di nyid dang ’grod pa ’di nyid kyis instead of D: lam ’di nyid dang sgrub pa ’di nyid kyis grub pa dang. C, H, J, N, and Kǫ also read sgrub; VD, VG, VP: bsgrub; L, S: bgrod; F, T: ’grod. (cf. Kojirō Katō’s edition).
don dam yang dag ’phags nyan thos kyi rigs can gang zag zhi ba’i bgrod pa gcig pu pa ni sangs rgyas thams cad brtson pa dang ldan par gyur kyang byang chub kyi snying po la bzhag ste. Brunnhölzl reads the qualifying clause sangs rgyas thams cad brtson pa dang ldan par gyur in quite a different way here: “even if all buddhas with [all] their effort] were [to attempt] to establish persons with the śrāvaka disposition…” (Brunnhölzl 2018, p. 1522).
’du byed mngon par ’du bya ba; saṃskārābhisaṃskaraṇa. Compare with the Sanskrit sentence in Tucci’s edition of Bhāvanākrama (Tucci 1971, p. 22): ekāntasattvārthavimukhasya ekāntasaṃsārābhisaṃskāravimukhasya [nā]uttarā samyaksaṃbodhir uktā mayeti, which has saṃsārābhisaṃskāra instead of saṃskārābhisaṃskaraṇa as found in Tibetan.
chos; dharma.
drang po dang drang po’i rang bzhin can/ rtog pa dang sel mi nus pa. Powers understands rtog pa dang sel as “to remove conceptuality.” (Powers 1995, p. 117). F, folio 28.b reads, brtag pa dang / bzhig pa mi nus pa. The problem is that sel is a transitive verb. It is therefore syntactically difficult to take rtog pa as the object of sel. In the present case, Keenan’s solution based on Chinese is interesting: “to make judgments” (Keenan 2000, p. 42).
zhib mo brtags pa’i mkhas pa dang ’dzangs pas rig pa; sūkṣmaṃ nipuṇapaṇḍitavijñavedanīyaḥ (see Mvyut 2918). Lit. “It is to be known.” All Sanskrit synonyms for this sentence are found in Mvyut 2013–20.
In accordance with the multiple occurrences of this phrase in chapter 2, shes pa should be read here as ye shes in agreement with F.
See Lamotte 1935, p. 201, n. 31: las kyi sgrib chen po refers here to saddharmapratikṣepakarmāvaraṇa.
I read rnam par rtog pa’i spyod yul kun brtags pa’i mtshan nyid kyi gnas ’du byed kyi mtshan ma (D) as a karmadhāraya, which means that the last compound in the series of three should be topicalized. It seems to me that since the opposition between nimitta (“phenomenal appearance”) and svabhāva or svalakṣaṇa (“unique/specific/particular defining characteristic or essence”) is central throughout the text, reading the compound in this way clarifies the meaning of this definition of the parikalpita, which basically results from the operation consisting in attributing an essence to appearance by means of verbal conventions.
This definition elaborates on the definition of parikalpitasvabhāva formulated in 6.4. In 6.5 and 6.7; that which has the defining characteristic of dependent arising is equated with phenomenal appearance. On the basis of what is dependent on an other, essence is imputed in the sense of a real entity, independent of any other cause to exist as what it is. This corresponds to the imaginary defining characteristic.
Lamotte’s translation is built on the same structure but inverts the main clauses of the sentence: In the nimitta, the parikalpita is unestablished. See Lamotte 1935, p. 204.
Lamotte’s translation is built on the same structure but inverts the main clauses of the sentence: In the nimitta, the parikalpita is unestablished. See Lamotte 1935, p. 204. D: kun brtags pa’i mtshan nyid der yongs su ma grub. I read kun brtags pa’i mtshan nyid as a bahuvrīhi: “that which has the imaginary defining characteristic” or “that which consists in/is characterized by the imaginary.”
yang dag pa’i ting nge ’dzin; samyaksamādhi.
D: bcom ldan ’das nges pa’i don bstan pa ’di should be read bcom ldan ’das kyi (or kyis as in VD) nges pa’i don bstan pa ’di, lit. “of the Blessed One,” rendered here as “[expounded] by the Blessed One.” bcom ldan ’das is omitted in L, S, T, and F; see Katō’s edition of chapter 7.
Lamotte and Powers understand the statement “All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa” to be the teaching of definitive meaning (see Lamotte 1935, p. 206 and Powers 1995, pp. 135–37). However, the entire point of this chapter is that there is an underlying intent of definitive meaning to this statement. This is the reason why it is explained in the next paragraphs that a third turning of the wheel of Dharma was necessary.
D: de bzhin du chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa nyid las brtsams/ skye ba ma mchis pa dang / ’gag pa ma mchis pa dang / gzod ma nas zhi ba dang / rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las ’das pa nyid las brtsams nas/ bcom ldan ’das nges pa’i don bstan pa ’di yang drang ba’i don gyi mdo sde thams cad du stsal bar bgyi pa lags so. C, H, J, N, Kǫ, VG, VP, L, S, T, and F also read stsal; VD: bstsal (cf. Kojirō Katō’s edition). Lamotte translates stsal with “se recommande” to create a parallel construction with the analogy of the dried ginger (see Lamotte 1935, p. 205). This somehow does not solve our problem. Powers translates stsal bar gyi with a past tense “placed” (see Powers 1995, p. 137). Keenan 2000, p. 48 offers a Literal rendering of Xuanzang’s translation that is similar to the Tibetan version of the text (如是世尊依此諸法皆無自性無生無滅本來寂靜自性涅槃無自性性了義言教遍於一切不了義經皆應安處, Cbeta, Taishō 676): “just so, World-Honored One, the explicit teaching that all things have no-essence, no arising, and no passing away, are originally quiescent, and are essentially in cessation must be put into all the scriptures of implicit meaning.”
D: drang ba’i don rtsod pa’i gzhi’i gnas su gyur pa lags la in the sense of drang ba’i don lags te/ rtsod pa’i gzhi’i gnas su gyur pa lags la as in nges pa’i don lags te/ rtsod pa’i gzhi’i gnas su gyur pa ma lags so (see D, folio 25.a).
This is an important statement regarding the intent of the third turning of the wheel, which is to bring together those following the hearers’ and the bodhisattvas’ paths within a single vehicle.
By repeating the same statement to describe the second and third turnings, it is made clear that interpreting this statement in terms of emptiness alone is provisional. The underlying intent of the statement corresponds to the teaching found in the third turning.
Lit. “Blessed One, what is the name of that which has been taught as a Dharma discourse ascertaining the [Tathāgata’s] intent?”
gzung bar bgyi; dhārayāmi (cf. Sanskrit text in Matsuda 2013, p. 940 ad Lamotte VIII.41). I suggest reading dhārayāmi, which is a causative present of dhṛ-, as an optative here.
This refers to byang chub kyi sems; bodhicitta.
This paragraph follows the pattern according to which prajñā is developed as śrutamayī prajñā, cintāmayī prajñā, bhāvanāmayī prajñā. Once the bodhisattvas have heard and contemplated what has been taught, they proceed with practice.
Read thob instead of thos. See F, folio 36.b: lus shin tu sbyangs pa dang / sems shin tu sbyangs pa de dag thob pa de’i bar du and lus shin tu sbyangs pa dang / sems shin tu sbyangs pa de dag thob kyi bar du (8.5).
D: de lus shin tu sbyangs pa dang / sems shin tu sbyangs pa de thos nas de nyid la gnas te/ sems kyi rnam pa spangs nas ji ltar bsams pa’i chos de dag nyid nang du ting nge ’dzin gyi spyod yul gzugs brnyan du so sor rtog par byed mos par byed do. S, folio 37.b; F, folio 36.a: des lus shin tu sbyangs pa dang / sems shin tu sbyangs pa de dag thos nas de nyid la gnas te/ ji ltar bsams pa’i chos de dag nyid nang du ting nge ’dzin gyi spyod yul gzugs brnyan du sems kyi rnam pa spangs nas/ so sor rtog cing byed mor byed do.
For a detailed discussion of 8.7–9, refer to Schmithausen 2014, p. 391ff.
rab tu phye ba; prabhāvita in the compound *ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvita (see Schmithausen 1984, p. 436; 2014, pp. 400–1 passim). On the possible meanings of the Sanskrit term prabhāvita in the sense of “consisting of” or “characterized as” as opposed to “characterized by,” refer to Schmithausen 2014, p. 400, n. 1770.
The compound dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam; *ālambanavijñaptimātra can be read as a tatpuruṣa: “the mere representation of a referential object,” or as a karmadhāraya: “a referential object that is a mere representation” or “a mere representation as a referential object” (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 411). If we add to these possibilities the distinction between “characterized as/consists of” and “characterized by” mentioned by Schmithausen in reference to prabhāvita (see n.181), it is clear that this important statement can be interpreted in various ways that are consistent with the syntax of this sentence. If one wishes to read the compound *ālambanavijñaptimātra as a tatpuruṣa, the phrase reads “the mere representation of a referential object.” However, it seems to me that we should read this compound as a karmadhāraya, since the whole point of this paragraph is to answer Maitreya’s original question about the nature of the image qua object. The answer to this question is that the image (pratibimba) that is the object of concentration is not distinct from mind because mind is constituted by a representation that is the actual object of this cognition. With regard to this issue, Xuanzang’s translation reads, 善男子當言無異何以故由彼影像唯是識故善男子我說識所緣唯識所現故 (Cbeta, Taishō 676), which is compatible with the suggested translation. For a complete analysis of these two sentences across selected Chinese and Tibetan editions, see Schmithausen 2014, p. 392ff. and Brunnhölzl 2018, p. 511, n. 139, which contains a detailed summary of Schmithausen’s analysis.
On VIII.7, see Brunnhölzl 2018, p. 512, n. 141.
D: bcom ldan ’das sems can rnams kyi gzugs la sogs par snang ba sems kyi gzugs brnyan rang bzhin du gnas pa gang lags pa de yang sems de dang tha dad pa ma lags zhes bgyi’am; S, folio 38.b: bcom ldan ’das sems can rnams kyi sems kyi gzugs brnyan rang bzhin du gnas pa/ gzugs la sogs pa gang lags de yang sems de dang tha dad pa ma lags shes bgyi’am; F, folio 37.a: bcom ldan ’das sems can rnams kyi sems kyi gzugs brnyan rang bzhin du gnas pa/ gzugs la tshogs pa de dag kyang sems de dang tha dad pa ma lags shes bgyi’am.
D: mtshan nyid la byed pa. F, folio 37.b: mtshan nyid yid la byed pa.
sems kyi mtshan nyid but sems kyi mtshan ma would be better here since Maitreya inquires about mtshan ma right after this. Unfortunately, Xuanzang’s translation does not contribute to solving this quandary since 相 can refer to both lakṣaṇa and nimitta (see 若相續作意唯思维心相, Cbeta, Taishō 676). However, the structure of the paragraph in which questions are asked about definitions of terms found in the Buddha’s previous answer in 8.8 indicates that we should emend sems kyi mtshan nyid to sems kyi mtshan ma.
Based on the definitions above, it appears that one-pointedness of mind refers to the state in which appearance (the object of the practice of insight), representation (the object of the practice of mental stillness), and emptiness (the nature of reality as explained in the previous chapters) are in unity.
so sor rtog pa in the sense of “comprehension/realization” (pratibodha)
Compare D: de dang der shes rab kyis shin tu legs par ma rtogs pa’i chos de dag nyid shin tu legs par rtogs par [F.28.a] bya ba’i phyir yid la byed pa’i lhag mthong gang yin pa’o with S, folio 39.b: gang de dang des shes rab kyis legs par ma rtogs pa’i chos de dag nyid legs par rtogs par bya ba’i phyir de nyid yid la byed pa’i lhag mthong ngo and F, folio 38.a: gang shes rab kyis legs par ma rtogs pa’i chos de dang de dag la legs par rtogs par bya ba’i phyir de nyid yid la byed pa’i lhag mthong ngo.
The last four meditation objects represent the four seals of Dharma (phyag rgya bzhi; caturmudrā).
ma ’dres pa’i chos. On ma ’dres pa’i chos and ’dres pa’i chos, see Brunnhölzl 2018, p. 561, n. 322. Brunnhölzl translates ’dres pa’i chos as “dharmas in fusion.” Considering dharmas without fusing them means considering them individually. However, 8.14 seems to indicate that dharma is used here in the sense of “teaching” rather than “phenomenon.”
gnas gyur pa; āśrayaparivṛtti. I chose to translate this technical term with “shift in one’s basis [of existence]” or “shift of the basis [of existence]” instead of “transformation of the basis” as is usually the case. The āśrayaparivṛtti in Saṃdh. is an attainment that is obtained after the ālayavijñāna has ceased (see Schmithausen 1987, p. 198 and Schmithausen 2014, p. 37). In this sūtra, the ālaya therefore does not seem to be equated with the āśraya. In chapter 10, the basis is evoked in relation to the truth body (dharmakāya). According to 10.2 and 8.35.11, it appears that the basis one possesses once all corruption has been eliminated is none other than the truth body after it has been purified of adventitious defilements (see Xing 2005, p. 97), at least in the case of the bodhisattvas. The dhāraṇī in 10.8 makes it clear that conceptions of being defiled or purified have in fact no raison d’être. From the perspective of true reality, they are completely adventitious. As stated by the Buddha at the conclusion of 10.8, bodhisattvas exchange the body afflicted by corruption for the body of truth or actual body, the dharmakāya. In line with this interpretation, āśraya is read as a quasi-synonym for kāya as in the expression āśrayapādātṛ (on this term, see Schmithausen 2014, p. 331, §272.1). This reading seems to be confirmed, for example, in YBht P ’i 30b4f (see ibid., pp. 521–22, §483), which explains the āśrayaparivṛtti as the completely purified dharmadhātu, which is permanent and inconceivable. Schmithausen adds, “At the same time, it [this passage of the Ybht] stresses the permanence of āśrayaparivṛtti (in the ontological perspective), precluding thereby a causal process in the strict sense.” Elsewhere, Schmithausen refers to this term as “the [accomplished] āśrayaparivṛtti or purification of the tathatā” (Schmithausen 2014, p. 527, 536ff.). While there is certainly a multiplicity of interpretations with regard to this complex matter, it seems to me that this reading is precisely what is meant in Saṃdh. In that sense, āśrayaparivṛtti, as a result (phala), corresponds to an unveiling (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 537) or purification of the basis in the form of a return, a restoration, a restitution, or a re-entry into the dharmakāya, tathatā, or dharmadhātu. The synonyms given in the list above (true reality, awakening, and nirvāṇa) show that āśrayaparivṛtti does not refer to afflicted dharmas, which would be the case if the ālayavijñāna was meant here. To conclude this discussion, it seems on the basis of Sakuma’s work (Sakuma 1990) that we are in presence of (at least) two models of āśrayaparivṛtti: (1) an originally ontological model, as found in the Śrāvakabhūmi, in which the psychophysical base (lit. the basis of existence) of the person practicing śamatha and vipaśyanā is transformed, as dauṣṭhulya is replaced by praśrabdhi; and (2) a cognitive or epistemic model using this originally ontological terminology to express the purification of the tathatā. In this model, the purification as an elimination of the dauṣṭhulya alone is the manifestation of the dharmakāya that is not the creation of a causal process transforming an entity conceived in ontological terms, as repeatedly stated throughout the later chapters of Saṃdh. In this latter model, the cognitive purification of the tathatā as a causal process can only make sense from the perspective of conventional truth (see chapter 3). From the ultimate standpoint of realization, nothing was ever purified by anyone (cf. dhāraṇī in 10.8). As a consequence of this (and following William Waldron’s suggestion), I would like to make clear that the “shift in one’s basis of existence” referred to in Saṃdh. is a cognitive restoration of the basis in which the attainment of gnosis plays a central role, from the perspective of conventional truth. In the present context, one should therefore refrain from interpreting the term āśrayaparivṛtti as implying any ontological commitment to the process thereby described. To conclude on this point, I understand āśrayaparivṛtti in Saṃdh. as implying a “doctrine of (re-)embodiment” as explained in Radich 2007, p. 1109ff. At the end of the path, one has as a basis of existence the truth body in lieu of the body afflicted by corruption as mentioned above, hence the notion of a shift.
chos; dharma.
D: byams pa mdo’i sde nas shin tu rgyas pa’i sde dang / rmad du byung ba’i chos kyi sde dang / gtan la bab par bstan pa’i sde’i bar dag so sor gcig tu bzlums te … [F.29.a] mdo’i sde la sogs pa de dag nyid ji snyed bzung ba dang / bsams pa so sor gcig tu bzlums te yid la byed pa ni ’dres pa chen por gyur pa’i chos la dmigs pa yin par rig par bya’o. F, folio 39.a: so sor gcig tu bsdu ba te … bsam pa de dag nyid gcig tu bsdu ba byas te. I followed F and did not translate so sor in the sentence pertaining to the highly universal teaching (’dres pa chen por gyur pa’i chos).
rtog pa; vitarka. For the translation of vitarka and vicāra, see Cousins 1992, p. 147.
See F, folio 40.a: gsal zhing che bar myong ba’i rjes su dpyod pa. This construction is also found in the following sentences in F.
Lit. “experienced as subtle,” according to F, or “the experience of the subtle” according to D.
See 8.9: “What is the unimpeded mind? Maitreya, it is the referential object of mental stillness, the mind that takes the image as an object.”
See 8.9: “Blessed One, what is a mental appearance? Maitreya, this is the referential object of insight, the conceptual image that is the object of concentration.”
nye ba’i nyon mongs; upakleśa.
These two expressions refer to dharmapratisaṃvid and arthapratisaṃvid. Lamotte and Powers opted for “object” and Keenan for “meaning” for artha, while dharma is usually translated with “Dharma.” For an interpretation of the term in the sense of the translation suggested above, refer to Nance 2012, pp. 58–59, 72, 74–75, 135, 227–28, and 233–35. The same interpretation is found in Lamotte 1970, p. 1617ff.: dharma is translated with “designation” and artha with “chose.”
ji lta ba bzhin du yod pa nyid; yathāvadbhāvikatā. On yāvadbhāvikatā and yathāvadbhāvikatā, see Takasaki 1966, p. 173.
mthar thug pa; paryanta, in the sense here of “entirety.”
For the Sanskrit of these seven, see Nagao 1964, p. 43.
See F, folio 41.a: rnam par rig pa’i de bzhin nyid ni gang / ’du byed rnam par rig pa tsam mo.
log par sgrub pa; mithyāpratipatti. In F, sgrub pa is translated with nan tan (see for example F, folio 41.b).
D: byams pa de la yang dag par sgrub pa’i de bzhin nyid des ni thos pa thams cad ’dres pa’i chos la dmigs pa’i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gi bsdus pa’i shes rab mtshungs shing mnyam mo. F, folio 41.b: byams pa gang yang dag pa’i nan tan de bzhin nyid des ni thos pa dang bsams pa dang / bsgoms pa’i ’dres pa la dmigs pa’i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gis yongs su zin pa’i shes rab mtshungs shing mnyam mo. Xuanzang’s translation confirms the reading found in D: 聽聞正法緣總境界勝奢摩他毘缽舍那所受慧平等平等 (Cbeta, Taishō 676). However, F makes sense from the perspective of the meaning of this chapter.
See Z, folio 38.a: rnam par grol bar byed instead of D: rnam par grol bar shes.
See Z, folio 37.b, F, folio 43.a: chos de dag nyid la instead of D: chos de dag nyid las.
We find slightly variant readings in F and D. D: byams pa de la rab tu rig par byed pa ni mngon sum du byas pa’i chos de dag nyid las rnam par grol bar shes pa dang / gzhan dag la yang rgya cher ston pa dang / yang dag par ston pa gang yin pa ste. F, folio 43.a: byams pa de la shes par byed pa ni gang mngon sum du byas pa’i chos de dag nyid la rnam par grol bar shes pa dang / rgya cher yang gzhan la ston cing ’chad pa dang / yang dag par ston pa’o.
In accordance with F, folio 44.b, shes pa should be read here also as ye shes.
The phrase is repeated throughout the text. Here shes pa should be read as ye shes, a reading confirmed by F.
mtshan ma corresponds here to a reflection (gzugs brnyan; pratibimba).
so sor brtags pa; pratisaṃkhyā. D: zhes bka’ stsal pa gang lags pa de la sems kyis so sor brtag pa ni gang lags.
rnam par rig pa’i de bzhin nyid; see 8.20.2, in which the true reality of representations corresponds to the fact that “all conditioned phenomena are just a representation.” In the preceding sentence, I added the term ‘truth’ (dharma) to render a frequent collocation that clarifies the meaning of this statement.
Lamotte reads chos dang don respectively as “Dharma” and “chose” (“thing”); see Lamotte 1935, p. 225. Powers reads them as “doctrine” and “meaning”; see Powers 1995, p. 189. However, as explained above (see 8.19–21), I understand these two technical terms to refer to “designation” and “objects of designations.” Lamotte’s rendering of the syntax of the entire passage appears to be inaccurate: “Pour celui qui…, il y a…”
skyes pa dang / bud med kyi bsnyen bkur, probably for upasthāna-kāri/-kārikā, “(a woman) serving, doing service to (a man, sexually; said of a courtesan)”; see Edgerton 1953, p. 143.
In the case of *viśuddhyālambana, one can read the Sanskrit compound as a genitive or dative tatpuruṣa; see Schmithausen 2014, p. 363, n. 1648 and p. 362, n. 1644. I read rnam par dag pa’i de bzhin nyid as *viśuddhitathatā in accordance with Schmithausen 2014, pp. 362–63, §306.5, and n. 1647.
gzugs brnyan; pratibimba; see 8.1–10 for the meaning of the image in the context of contemplative practice.
See Schmithausen 2014, p. 366, n. 1664 quoting YBht P’i 83a5f: de de la mi dmigs pa gang yin pa and F, folio 46.b: de’ang mi dmigs pa instead of D, folio 34.b: de la de dmigs pa gang yin pa.
lus dang longs spyod la lta ba; 顧戀身財.
This reference remains obscure. Could this point be directed at outcast bodhisattvas (byang chub sems dpa’ gdol ba; bodhisattvacāṇḍāla), namely, bodhisattvas taking pride in detachment who practice in the way of hearers? See Conze 1975, p. 438ff.?
D has bcom ldan ’das ci tsam gyis na zhi gnas kyi lam yongs su dag pa lags/ byams pa gang gi tshe rmugs pa dang gnyid legs par rab tu choms par gyur pa’o/ /bcom ldan ’das ji tsam gyis na lhag mthong gi lam yongs su dag pa lags/ byams pa gang gi tshe rgod pa dad ’gyod pa legs par rab tu choms par gyur pa’o, but one should read bcom ldan ’das ci tsam gyis na zhi gnas kyi lam yongs su dag pa lags/ byams pa gang gi tshe rgod pa dad ’gyod pa legs par rab tu choms par gyur pa’o/ /bcom ldan ’das ji tsam gyis na lhag mthong gi lam yongs su dag pa lags/ byams pa gang gi tshe rmugs pa dang gnyid dang the tshom legs par rab tu choms par gyur pa’o. See F, folio 47.a, which seems to indicate that the list of terms in D is incomplete and in the wrong order.
theg pa chen po dang ldan pa; mahāyānapratisaṃyukta.
nyon mongs pa dang shes bya’i sgrib pa; kleśajñeyāvaraṇa.
The reading of this passage found in D is problematic on account of the double la particle in the second part of the sentence: de legs par bcom pas thams cad la chags pa med pa dang / thogs pa med pa’i shes pa dang / mthong ba thob cing dgos pa yongs su grub pa’i dmigs pa la chos kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa la gnas pa yin no. Compare with VD, folio 77.a: de legs par bcom pas chos kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa la gnas pa na/ dgos pa yongs su grub pa’i dmigs pa la/ thams cad du chags pa med pa dang/ thogs pa med pa’i shes pa dang mthong ba thob po. Kǫ, folio 39.a: de legs par bcom pas thams cad la chags pa med pa dang / thogs pa med pa’i shes pa dang / mthong ba thob cing dgos pa yongs su grub pa’i dmigs pa la cha shas kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa la gnas pa yin no. S, folio 51.b: de legs par bcom pa’i phyir/ chos kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa la gnas pas/ dgos pa yongs su grub pa’i dmigs pa la thams cad du mi thogs mi chags pa’i ye shes mthong ba rab tu thob bo. F, folio 48.a: de bcom pa’i phyir chos kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa la gnas pas/ dgos pa yongs su grub pa’i dmigs pa la thams cad du mi thogs mi chags pa’i ye shes mthong ba rab tu thob po. Bd, folio 54: de legs par bcom pas chos kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa la gnas pa na/ dgongs pa yongs su grub pa’i dmigs pa thams cad la chags pa med pa dang / thogs pa med pa’i shes pa dang / mthong ba thob po. L, folio 48.a: de bcom pa’i phyir/ chos kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa la gnas pas/ dgos pa yongs su grub pa’i dmigs pa la thams cad du mi thogs mi chags pa’i ye shes mthong ba rab tu thob bo. (similar to F, folio 48.a). He, folio 102b: de bcom ldan pa’i phyir chos kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa la gnas pas dgongs pa yongs su grub pa’i dmigs pa dang/ thams cad du mi thogs mi chags pa’i ye shes mthong ba rab tu ’thob po/First, a few general remarks: Kǫ follows the syntax of D with an important variation cha shas kyi sku instead of chos kyi sku in D. In some other editions, such as F, L, and He as well as in Bd (which seems to be a compromise between D and K ǫ, on one side, and F and L on the other side), the syntax of the sentence is quite distinct from D and Kǫ; see for example VD in which entire blocks of text are found in a different order. In addition, we find in other minor variant readings, such as dgongs pa in apposition to yongs su grub pa’i dmigs pa (see Bd) instead of the more usual dgos pa.I therefore suggest the following emendations: One should read ye shes mthong ba instead of shes pa dang / mthong ba since we find in various forms the well-known collocation ma chags ma thogs pa’i ye shes mthong ba in Mvyut: ’das pa’i dus la ma chags ma thogs pa’i ye shes gzigs par ’jug go; ’das pa’i dus la ma chags ma thogs pa’i ye shes mthong ba ’jug pa, atīte ’dhvany asaṅgam apratihataṃ jñānadarśanaṃ pravartate (Mvyut 151) or da ltar gyi dus la ma chags ma thogs pa’i ye shes gzigs par ’jug go; da ltar gyi dus la ma chags ma thogs pa’i ye shes mthong ba ’jug pa, pratyutpanne ’dhvany asaṅgam apratihatam jñānadarśanaṃ pravartate (Mvyut 153).Based on the fact that jñānadarśana results from having discarded the obstructions, a doctrine already present in the Pāli tradition, F and L probably give a better account of the logical sequence of this passage: (1) first, obstructions are eliminated; (2) thereupon, one remains in the dharmakāya, which has been completely purified from these obstructions; (3) as a consequence of this, the insight into the accomplishment of the goal/intention, which is the real object, arises together with gnosis free from attachment and hindrance. In this context, jñānadarśana is interpreted as a dvandva (“gnosis and vision”).My suggestion for this passage would thus be quite close to Bd, folio 54: de legs par bcom pas chos kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa la gnas pa na (or gnas pas)/ dgos pa yongs su grub pa’i dmigs pa la thams cad du chags pa med pa dang / thogs pa med pa’i ye shes mthong ba thob po. (underlined words are additions to Bd. dang between shes and mthong ba was omitted).
Some editions (e.g., F) include ji ltar in the second clause: “once bodhisattvas have obtained mental stillness and insight, how do they attain the unsurpassable, complete, and perfect awakening?” The difference is not significant because the attainment of the fourth object of mental stillness and insight, the accomplishment of the goal, corresponds to the attainment of awakening (see 8.2).
F, folio 48.b reads legs par rtogs pa instead of D, which has simply bzung ba.
lhag par btang snyoms; adhyupekṣya.
F, folio 49.a ye shes instead of shes pa in D.
D reads, de la nang gi so so’i bdag nyid la so sor rang rig pa de bzhin nyid rnam pa bdun so sor rtog pa’i shes pa rnam pa bdun skye bar ’gyur te. Compare with F, folio 49.a: de bzhin nyid rnam pa bdun bden bden pa’i rnam pa nang gi so so rang gis shes par bya ba rab tu rtogs pa’i ye shes skye bar ’gyur te. I think F is more in the spirit of this paragraph than D. The notion of so sor rtog pa’i shes pa is at odds with nang gi so so’i bdag nyid la so sor rang rig pa, to which it stands in apposition in D. Instead, I’d rather read here rab tu rtogs pa’i ye shes as found in F.
yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa (D) or yang dag pa mi ’gyur ba (F); samyaktvaniyama.
These are the first three of the four objects of mental stillness and insight as explained in 8.2. The fourth is the accomplishment of the goal.
Lit. “They are skillful with regard to the arising of the mind as it is if they know the sixteen points of the arising of the mind. The sixteen points of the arising of the mind are the arising of…”
D reads yang dag pa’i tshor ba, probably in the sense of yang dag pa’i don gyi (or la) tshor ba, but F, folio 50.a has instead ’gag par ’gyur ba’i tshor ba (but the sentence in F is not built according to a pronominal relative-correlative structure as it is in D).
D reads rig pa in the sense of rnam par rig pa, while F, folio 50.a has tshor ba instead, which makes more sense in the present context. This reading is supported by Xuanzang’s reading: 一者所依粗重受二者彼果境界受 (Cbeta, Taishō 676), in which 受 refers to vedanā. I therefore emended the entire paragraph accordingly.
In the sense of sensations being the cause for future sensations as explained above (see 8.38.1.iv).
Sanskrit reads evam eva; see Matsuda 2013, p. 940 ad Lamotte XIII.39.
D: rigs kyi bu rnams dang / rigs kyi bu mo dag gis ’di la shin tu brtson par bya ba’i rigs so. Sanskrit: ayam atra kulaputraiḥ kuladuhitṛbhir vā tīvravyāyāmair bhavituṃ (see Matsuda 2013, p. 940 ad Lamotte VIII.39).
de’i tshe, tasyāṃ velāyam (cf. Sanskrit text in Matsuda 2013, p. 940 ad Lamotte VIII.39).
D: chos rnams gdags pa rnam gzhag gang yin pa/ /de ni rnal ’byor bag yod don chen yin; in Sanskrit: dharmāna prajñaptivyavasthito yo hi yoge pramattā na mahā[rtha] so hī. (see Matsuda 2013, p. 940 ad Lamotte VIII.40). The sentence is built according to a correlative-relative structure yaḥ … sa…, literally “that which is … is…” The Sanskrit here is of a hybrid nature as pointed out by Matsuda. Instead of pramattā na, apramāda would be expected for the Tibetan bag yod.
D: gang dag chos der brten nas rnal ’byor ’dir/ /yang dag brtson pa de dag byang chub ’thob; Sanskrit: taṃ dharmaṃ niśrāya ye atra yoge samyakprayukta te labha(ṃ)ti bodhi (see Matsuda 2013, p. 940 ad Lamotte VIII.40).
D: gang dag glags lta de skad rgol ba las/ thar bar lta ba chos kun chub byed pa/ /byams pa de dag rnal ’byor ’di las ni/ /thag ring gnas sa ring ba ji bzhin no; Sanskrit: upāraṃbhaprekṣā iti vādamokṣaprekṣā ye dharmaṃ sarva pu .. ../ (see Matsuda 2013, p. 940 ad Lamotte VIII.40).
blo ldan; dhīmān (cf. Sanskrit text in Matsuda 2013, p. 940 ad Lamotte VIII.40).
The Tibetan reads sems can don zhes while the Sanskrit has satvārthasāra (cf. Sanskrit text in Matsuda 2013, p. 940 ad Lamotte VIII.40). Sāra means both “real meaning”/“quintessence” and “wealth”/“riches.”
D: blo ldan sems can don zhes de dag las/ /lan byed rig nas sems can don brtson min; Sanskrit: satvārthasāro na tu kāra tebhyaṃ viditva satvārthaprayukta dhīmān.
Eva in Sanskrit (see Matsuda 2013: p. 940 ad Lamotte VIII.40).
… ca … ca in Sanskrit (see Matsuda 2013, p. 940 ad Lamotte VIII.40).
zang zing med pa; nirāmiṣa (in the sense of “disinterested, not expecting a reward”; see Matsuda 2013, p. 940 ad Lamotte VIII.40 for the Sanskrit term).
Sanskrit: punar (see Matsuda 2013, p. 940 ad Lamotte VIII.40).
Anagharatna (cf. Sanskrit text in Matsuda 2013, p. 940 ad Lamotte VIII.40).
spongs zhing rgyu; caraṃti bhikṣāṃ (cf. Sanskrit text in Matsuda 2013, p. 940 ad Lamotte VIII.40). The term bhikṣā literally corresponds to the French concept of “mendicité.”
gzung bar bgyi; dhārayāmi (cf. Sanskrit text in Matsuda 2013, p. 940 ad Lamotte VIII.41). I suggest reading dhārayāmi, which is a causative present, as an optative here.
Sanskrit reads adhimukti; see Matsuda 1995, p. 67.
Sanskrit reads suparibhāvitādhimuktikṣanti; see Matsuda 1995, p. 67.
See 7.31: “they develop devotion for [this teaching] and commission its transcription into writing. Once it has been put into writing, they keep it in mind, read it, venerate it, propagate it, expound it, chant it aloud, contemplate it, and apply it in their practice.”
D reads shin tu bsgoms pa’i phyir bzod pas sa de las yang dag par ’das nas byang chub sems dpa’i yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa la ’jug go. The term bzod pas appears to be out of place here and should have been found in the preceding clause, as is the case in the Sanskrit text, which in addition contains no parallel to phyir.
byang chub kyi phyogs dang mthun pa’i chos; bodhyaṅga. D, folio 39.b reads byang chub kyi phyogs dang ’thun ba’i chos ji ltar thob pa dag gis, but F, folio 52.a has byang chub kyi phyogs kyi chos ji ltar thob pa de dag la.
D: ’bad pas yan lag des yongs su rdzogs pa yin yang byang chub kyi phyogs dang ’thun ba’i chos ji ltar thob pa dag gis de la mang du gnas par bya ba dang / snyoms par ’jug pa la sred pa dang / chos la sred pa las sems lhag par btang snyoms su ’jug mi nus pas. The expression de la mang du gnas par bya ba corresponds to tadbahulavihārin. Sanskrit: na tu śaknoti yathāpratilabdhair bodhipakṣair dharmais tadbahulavihārī samāpattidharmatṝṣṇāyāś ca cittam adhyupekṣituṃ (see Matsuda 1995, p. 68). The subject is singular masculine. I used a plural for bodhisattva in this chapter to avoid the gender issue since bodhisattvas include both males and females.
Sanskrit reads sarvasūkṣāpattidauṣṭhulyamalavigatām (see Matsuda 1995, p. 69).
Sanskrit has apramāṇajñānāvabhāsena. It seems that jñāna has been translated by shes pa in D while the more frequent corresponding Tibetan term ye shes is usually found in F. Sanskrit: apramāṇajñānāvabhāsena sanniśrayatām upādāya tasya samādhes tasyāś ca śrutadhāraṇyās tṛtīyā bhūmiḥ prabhākarīty ucyate (see Matsuda 1995, p. 69).
The Sanskrit fragment (see Matsuda 1995, p. 69) does not contain the Sanskrit equivalent for me’i ’od, which is most probably agnyarci, as suggested by Matsuda. In this case, understanding ’od/arci as “flame” makes more sense. I translated arcibhūtatva as “set ablaze.”
chos kyi tshogs; dharmasaṃbhāra. The Sanskrit (see Matsuda 1995, p. 69) differs from the Tibetan (Go, folio 35.a reads chos kyi tshogs, just like the more recent witnesses): nabhopamsya dauṣṭhulyakāyasya mahāmeghopamena dharmakāyena spharanāc chādanatām upadāya daśamī bhūmir dharmameghaty ucyate. The process described here corresponds to the āśrayaparāvṛtti (i.e., the shift in one’s basis of existence), which is completed on the eleventh stage.
I follow Wonch’uk’s ṭīkā (vol. thi, folio 269.a) regarding the meaning of the analogy with the sky/space ( nam mkha’ lta bu): gnas ngan len gyi lus nam mkha’ lta bu la chos kyi sku yongs su rdzogs pa sprin chen po lta bus khyab cing khebs pas de’i phyir bcu pa ni chos kyi sprin gyis zhes bya’o zhes bya ba ni bcu pa chos kyi sprin rnam par bshad pa’o/ /’di ltar bdag dang chos su ’dzin pas yongs su bsgos pa’i sa bon gang yin pa de ni las su mi rung ba’i phyir gnas ngan len zhes bya’o/ /stong pa nyid rnam pa gnyis dang / bdag med pa’i don la sgrib pa’i phyir mdo las nam mkha’ lta bu’o zhes gsungs so/ /sa bcu po de la chos kyi dbyings rnam pa bcu’i chos kyi sku yongs su rdzogs pa ni sprin chen po dang mtshungs te/ chos kyi dbyings mngon du gyur pa ni chos kyi sku yongs su rdzogs pa dang / bsgoms pa las byung ba’i chos kyi sku gnas ngan len nam mkha’ lta bu la khebs pa’i phyir chos kyi sprin zhes bya’o.
shes bya’i rnam pa thams cad [mkhyen pa]; jñeyasarvākāra[jñatā-] (see Matsuda 1995, p. 69).
On the opposition between affliction and purification in this sentence, see Lamotte 1935, pp. 240–41, n. 13.
On the relation between pratibhāna and dhāraṇī, see Braarvig 1985.
gang la; yatredānīm (see Matsuda 1995, p. 70).
The variant reading found in F differs significantly from the Sanskrit edited by Matsuda in comparison to the Tibetan translation in D. I translated this passage from the Sanskrit (see Matsuda 1995, p. 70): (āścaryā bhaga)van yāvad mahānuśaṃsā mahāphalā anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhī yatredānīm evaṃ ma(hā)saṃmohajālaṃ saṃpracālya mahac ca dauṣṭhulyagahanaṃ samatikramya bodhisatvā anuttarāṃ samyaksaṃbodhim abhisaṃbudhyaṃte. D: bcom ldan ’das gang la de ltar/ byang chub sems dpa’ rnams de ltar kun tu rmongs pa’i dra ba chen po rab tu dral zhing de’i gnas dan len thibs po chen po las yang dag par ’das te/ bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par ’tshang rgya ba’i bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub ji tsam du phan yon che zhing ’bras bu che ba ni ngo mtshar lags so. F, folio 54.b: bcom ldan ’das ji tsam du bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub de ’bras bu che zhing legs pa che ba dang / de ltar gti mug chen po’i dra ba gsal nas ngan len che zhing sdug pa las yang dag par ’das te/ byang chub sems dpa’ rnams bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par ’tshang rgya ba ni ngo mtshar che’o.
D: chos rnam par dag pa dang / ches shin tu rnam par dag pa yin par rig par bya’o; compare with Kǫ, folio 55.b: ches rnam par dag pa dang / ches shin tu rnam par dag pa yin par rig par bya’o.
D: dgos pa med for nirupalepa (see Mvyut 6672)? F, folio 55.b: dgongs pa med pa. D and Xuanzang’s translation agree: 無緣無待發大願心 (Cbeta, Taishō 676).
D: khams, but F, folio 56.b reads mkhas pa.
D; Kǫ, folio 47.b: khams gya nom pa (syn. khams bzang po), praṇītadhātu(kam) (see Mvyut 7670), 妙界 (see Yokoyama, Kōitsu, and Takayuki Hirosawa, eds., Sanskrit-Tibetan Index for the Yogâcārabhūmi-śāstra, accessed August 29, 2016, http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?q=%E5%A6%99%E7%95%8C). As a translation for this term, Lamotte (1935, p. 245) suggests “complexion” and Powers (1995, p. 243) gives “constituents.” However, F, folio 57.a has dam pa’i dbyings su instead of khams gya nom pa las. Obermiller (1933, p. 207, n. 3) gives us the context in which gya nom pa (praṇīta) is usually used: “Emancipation, in the sense that (the extinction of Phenomenal Existence) represents the state of bliss and purity (which is completely free from the defiling forces of the Phenomenal World).” Xuanzang’s translation reads: 亦能獲得上界勝解 (Cbeta, Taishō 676), in which 上界 refers to the formless and form realms.
chos la nges par rtog pa’i bzod pa; dharmanidhyānakśānti. The term kśānti is used here in the sense of “acceptance.” In the Kīṭāgiri sutta (M. I, 480), the phrase dhammanijjhānakkhanti is glossed in the following way: “Monks, I do not say that the attainment of gnosis is all at once. Rather, the attainment of gnosis is after gradual training, gradual action, gradual practice. And how is there the attainment of gnosis after gradual training, gradual action, gradual practice? There is the case where, when confidence has arisen, one visits the teacher. Having visited, one grows close. Having grown close, one lends ear. Having lent ear, one hears the Dhamma. Having heard the Dhamma, one remembers it. Remembering, one penetrates the meaning of the teachings. Penetrating the meaning, one comes to an agreement through pondering the teachings.” Kathañca bhikkhave anupubbasikkhā anupubbakiriyā anupubbapaṭipadā aññārādhanā hoti: idha bhikkhave saddhājāto upasaṅkamati, upasaṅkamanto payirupāsati, payirupāsanto sotaṃ odahati, ohitasoto dhammaṃ suṇāti, sutvā dhammaṃ dhāreti, dhatānaṃ dhammānaṃ atthaṃ upaparikkhati, atthaṃ upaparikkhato dhammā nijjhānaṃ khamanti, dhammanijjhānakkhantiyā sati chando jāyati, chandajāto ussahati, ussahitvā tuleti, tulayitvā padahati, pahitatto samāno kāyena ceva paramaṃ saccaṃ sacchikaroti, paññāya ca naṃ paṭivijjha passati.” (Translation and citation are from Punnaji 2017).
byas shing bsags pa; 造作増長; kṛta-upacita.
rnam grangs is used here as a synonym for thabs.
Lit., “Likewise, beings who are suffering from being subject to the suffering resulting from being conditioned cannot be made happy by any method consisting in merely assisting them with material objects.”
According to Lamotte and Keenan, this refers to 9.13: “The perfections are without attachment, disinterested, free from faults, nonconceptual, and dedication of merit.”
Translating rnam par dag pa with “purity” does not work here as can be seen in the case of the following purifications (2–7), which are formulated according to the exact same lexicographical and syntactical structure as (1).
shag kyis ’chags; codanā; 諫誨 (see Yokoyama, Kōitsu, and Takayuki Hirosawa, eds., Sanskrit-Tibetan Index for the Yogâcārabhūmi-śāstra, accessed August 30, 2016, http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?q=%E8%AB%AB%E8%AA%A8). For codanā, see Edgerton 1953, p. 234.
rigs pa’i gnas lnga po; pañcavidyā. The five sciences are grammar, logic, philosophy, medicine, and crafts.
ma ’tshal ba (D), mi zad pa (F); akṣaya.
D: sar grub pa.
In D consistently expressed through the term ngo bo nyid, while in F rang bzhin is used instead.
D: ngo bo nyid dang bcas pa nyid kyang ci’i slad du mi ’dzin lags. F, folio 62.a: rang bzhin ma mchis pa’i rnams kyang ci’i slad du mi ’dzin.
D: spyan ras gzigs dbang phyug nga ni ngo bo nyid kyis ngo bo nyid med pa nyid ’dzin par mi smra mod kyi. Compare with F, folio 62.a: spyan ras gzigs dbang phyug nga ni rang bzhin med pa nyid la/ rang bzhin med par mi bzhad de; VD, folio 89.a: spyan ras gzigs dbang phyug nga ni ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyis ngo bo nyid ’dzin par mi smra mod kyi; and Xuanzang’s translation: 我終不說以無自性性取無自性性 (Cbeta, Taishō 676). The meanings of these translations can be interpreted as being similar, although their phrasing is quite different.
nye ba’i pha rol tu phyin pa. The prefix nye ba (for the upasarga upa-) refers here to proximity, intimacy, and immediacy (as defilements manifest in the present case). Reading this term as “subsidiary” or “secondary” does not make sense since the three kinds of transcendence are presented in increasing order from the lesser to the greater.
See 9.4.8: “The eighth stage is called Immovable because what lacks phenomenal appearance is spontaneously accomplished and [the bodhisattvas] are unshaken by the manifestation of defilements resulting from phenomenal appearance.” See also 9.5.8.
F has only two aspects; see F, folio 63.a. Xuanzang’s translation has three: 善男子略有三種 (Cbeta, Taishō 676).
For Schmithausen’s translation of 9.29, see Schmithausen 2014, p. 563.
Regarding the fact some editions have gnyis (“two”) and others gsum (“three”); see Schmithausen 2014, p. 563, nn. 2311–12.
Could this clause, de las gzhan pa’i yon tan rnams, refer to those who are not bodhisattvas?
See the verses below in D: de dag ’gal ba snyam du sems pa na/ /rnam par rmongs nas blo gros sna tshogs ’gyur.
See translation of VinSg 16 in Sakuma 1990, p. 202: “Der Dharmakāya der Tathāgatas ist dadurch charakterisiert, daß die [ihn konstituierende] ‘Umgestaltung der Grundlage’ daraus hervorgegangen ist, daß man die [Bodhisattva-]Stufen und Vollkommenheiten durch intensive Übung gemeistert hat.”
mngon par ’du bya ba med pa; anabhisaṃskāraṇa.
On vimuktikāya, see Radich 2007, p. 1254ff.
As with the compound in the opening question above, I read sprul pa’i sku’i mtshan nyid (nirmāṇakāyalakṣaṇa) as a bahuvrīhi.
byin gyis brlabs; adhiṣṭhita.
F, folio 65.a: bstan pa la.
dmigs pa la nye bar gtod pa.
D: sems can gnas pa, but F, folio 65.b reads sems gnas pa, which corresponds to Xuanzang’s translation: 心安住事 (Cbeta, Taishō 676).
mngon du bya ba; sākṣātkāra.
gsal ba; paṭu (?). See Mvyut 6695: spyod pa mi gsal ba; apaṭupracāraḥ. Another possibility for gsal ba would be saṃprakhyāna. Edgerton gives as synonym asaṃmoṣa (“absence of confusion”). As an equivalent for saṃprakhyāna, a Tibetan synonym of gsal ba is dran pa. See Edgerton 1953, pp. 83 and 576.
D: bsgom pa las yongs su skyob pa’i sbyor ba gsal ba. Compare with F, folio 66.a: bsgom pas yongs su skyob pa’i sbyor ba gsal ba.
pham pa’i gnas lta bu[’i chos]; pārājayikasthānīya[dharmāḥ]. See Edgerton 1953, p. 342.
bar du gcod pa’i chos; antarāyikadharmāḥ (see Mvyut 9324).
D, folio 50.b: gnas pa. F, folio 67.a: rnam par bzhag pa. They are synonyms for vyavasthāna.
See 8.21, in which the exact same enumeration is found. See D, folio 31.b: mgo gcig tu lan gdab pa dang / rnam par dbye ba dang / dris te lan gdab pa dang / gzhag pa dang / gsang ba dang.
’thob pa. Usually “obtainment” or “attainment.”
D: so so’i shes pa; compare with F, folio 67.a: dam bcas for the Sanskrit pratijñā. Yoshimizu opts for “objects that are known” (see Yoshimizu 2010, p. 142), although it is clear that so so’i shes pa is the Literal translation into Tibetan of pratijñā.
Yoshimizu 2010, p. 142 reads the correlative/relative sentence (yat … tat …; … gang dag yin pa de dag …) as meaning “Whatever is…, that is…” Alternatively, this grammatical construction could be literally translated with the following syntactic structure: “That which is … is…” While Yoshimizu’s translation is technically correct, reading gang dag yin pa in the sense of “whatever” in the present case is unnecessary since this grammatical structure is usually used to give a definition of a technical term. As a consequence, we do not need to mirror the Sanskrit correlative/relative structure in English. The result is a more simple and fluid rendering of the text.
In this paragraph, I read the compounds ending with lakṣaṇa as bahuvrīhis. Yoshimizu translated these compounds as tatpuruṣas. It seems to me that reading them as bahuvrīhis makes the entire passage much easier to understand.
de mngon sum du dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid; tatpratyakṣopalabdhilakṣaṇa (see Mvyut 4405).
de la gnas pa mngon sum du dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid; tadāśritya pratyakṣopalabdhilakṣaṇa/tadāśritya āśritapratyakṣopalabdhilakṣaṇa (see Mvyut 4406). See Yoshimizu 2010, p. 144: “the characteristic of the direct cognition [of something] depending on the [imperceptible object to be inferred].” The definition of this term reads, according to Yoshimizu, “The characteristic of the direct cognition [of something] depending on the [imperceptible object to be inferred consists in] such kinds of direct cognition, through which something directly not [cognizable] is inferred.”
rang gi rigs kyi dpe nye bar sbyar ba’i mtshan nyid; svajātīyadṛṣṭāntopasaṃhāralakṣaṇa (see Mvyut 4407). The term upasaṃhāra means “establishing,” in the way of the sādhana with respect to the sādhya. It is therefore also translated into Tibetan as nye bar sgrub, a synonym for nye ba sbyar ba, which is used for the Sanskrit sādhana too.
lung shin tu rnam par dag pa gtan la phab bar bstan pa’i mtshan nyid. See Mvyut 4409: lung shin tu rnam par dag pas gtan la bab par bstan pa’i mtshan nyid/ lung shin tu rnam par dag pas gtan la dbab par bstan pa’i mtshan nyid; suviśuddhāgamopadeśalakṣaṇa.
For the sake of readability, I inverted the order of the clauses in the sentences explaining the five points mentioned here. If we translate the Tibetan literally, the pattern would be: [example 1, example 2, etc.] are [the logical proof to be defined].
D: gang gis mngon sum du ma gyur pa la rjes su dpag par bya ba dang / de lta bu dang ’thun pa gang yin pa de ni de la gnas pa mngon sum du dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid yin no. Yoshimizu’s translation of this clause seems incorrect: “The characteristic of the direct cognition [of something] depending on the [imperceptible object to be inferred consists in] such kinds of direct cognition, through which something directly not [cognizable] is inferred, as…” followed by sentences (1), (2), and (3).
In this explanation of tadāśritya pratyakṣopalabdhilakṣaṇam, I do not understand why Yoshimizu takes elements of sentence (1) into sentence (2), in violation of the Tibetan syntax which is quite clear in the present case. See Yoshimizu 2010, p. 144.
Yoshimizu adds the concept of vipraṇa to this sentence, which is not found in the Tibetan. See Yoshimizu 2010, p. 145.
The analogies given as examples seem to be instances of [para]prasiddhānumāṇa ([tha snyad du gzhan la] grags pa’i rjes dpag) in that the perception of the analogy must be renowned (grags pa) in the world (or established from the perspective of the person to be persuaded), thereby offering a certain level of consensus, which is essential for the validity of this kind of logical proof.
This probably refers to the various kinds of suffering, which includes the suffering inherent to the conditioned phenomena as well as to the twelve factors of conditioned existence.
rang dbang med pa; asvatantra.
Yoshimizu segments this passage in a different way (see Yoshimizu 2010, p. 145), as it appears that she did not understand its syntactic structure (or chose not to follow it). The point of these instances in the form of established perceptions for which there is a consensus is to show how one thing (that which must be established) is established from the other (the commonly established perception). The relation here is again of the type sādhya/sādhana, this time through an instance belonging to the same class of phenomena. In these sentences, we have the following construction: X la Y dmigs pa nye bar sbyar ba. In the present case, X (i.e., external and internal conditioned phenomena) is the sādhya, and Y is the sādhana (i.e., clauses 1–2), which makes the svajātīyadṛṣṭāntopasaṃhāralakṣaṇam look like a type of prasiddhānumāṇa.
These three proofs are (A) a perception that is a direct cognition of the [thing to establish]; (B) a perception that is a direct cognition [of something existing] in dependence on the [thing to establish]; and (C) a demonstration through an instance belonging to the same class.
See beginning of 10.7.4 above. Yoshimizu translates rigs pa brtag pa yongs su dag pa with “the reasoning to be investigated.” See Yoshimizu 2010, p. 145.
dge sbyong bzhi for dge sbyong chos bzhi; see Mvyut 8708: dge sbyong du byed pa’i chos bzhi ming la; catvārah śramaṇakārakadharmāḥ.
This passage is interesting because the five defining characteristics of the principle of reason are reduced to three core ideas. Since pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa merely refers to the definition of correct reasoning with regard to the other four defining characteristics, it is understandable that it is not included in this list. However, it is fascinating to see that svajātīyadṛṣṭāntopasaṃhāralakṣaṇa is also excluded here, which might confirm that this proof was considered to be a form of prasiddhānumāṇa in spite of its seemingly inductive character resulting from the use of instances or examples upon which there is a consensus. However, the “engine” of the proof in the case of this valid cognition is not an induction but the deduction ensuing from facts that are accepted as conventions by virtue of consensus. As a consequence, one could argue that the svajātīyadṛṣṭāntopasaṃhāralakṣaṇa has a monotonic aspect explaining why it is not inductive in spite of its empirical aspect. The analogies used in this kind of reasoning are, in a way, carved in marble, in the sense of well-established principles that cannot be refuted by new information drawn from further experience or perception, which is precisely the reason why these reasonings have the capacity to establish the sādhya. They are by nature a deduction from a universal law or principle. Hence their possible inclusion in the category of anumāṇa as prasiddhānumāṇa since they surely do not correspond only to a direct cognition.
de las gzhan dang ’thun par dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid. See Mvyut 4410: de las gzhan dang mthun par dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid/ de las gzhan dang mthun par mngon sum du dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid; tadanyasārūpyopalabdhilakṣaṇa.
de la gzhan dang mi ’thun par dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid. See Mvyut 4411: de las gzhan dang mi mthun pa mngon sum du dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid/ de las gzhan dang mi mthun par dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid/ de las gzhan dang mi mthun par mngon sum du dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid; tadanyavairūpyopalabdhilakṣaṇa.
thams cad ’thun par dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid. See Mvyut 4412: thams cad mthun par dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid; sarvasārūpyopalabdhilakṣaṇa.
thams cad mi ’thun par dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid. See Mvyut 4413: thams cad mi mthun par dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid; sarvavairūpyopalabdhilakṣaṇa.
gzhan gyi rigs kyi dpe nye bar sbyar ba’i mtshan nyid. See Mvyut 4414: gzhan gyi rigs kyi dpe nye bar sbyar ba’i mtshan nyid; anyajātīyadṛṣṭāntopasaṃhāralakṣaṇa.
This refers to point (IV) above.
For an examination of similarities between Saṃdh. and Hetuvidyā, see Yoshimizu 2010.
This refers to point (IV) above.
This refers to point (I) above.
This point is not easy to unravel. I understand it in the following way. If the perception [of a logical proof] that does not conform with any[thing] could be used to establish the thesis, it also could be used to establish as well something that is not the thesis. As a consequence, it would be included in the reasons proving that which is not the thesis and would be therefore inconclusive. In other words, the perception of the proof would be present in both the sapakṣa and the vipakṣa. The proof of something that does not conform to anything would be necessarily also found in the perception of that which does not conform with that which must be established. As one proceeds to examine the proof, its absence of conformity with the premise is enough to disqualify it, whether it is conforming with something other than the premise or with nothing else.
This refers to point (VI) above.
This refers to point (III) above.
This refers to point (II) above.
This point is also not easy to understand. I take it to mean the following: if a perception that conforms with all [things] (i.e., with anything) demonstrates the thesis, it follows that the dharmin/pakṣa (all phenomena) constitutes the entire sapakṣa and there is not even the possibility of having a vipakṣa. The demonstration based on such perceptions is therefore inconclusive because it represents a tautology based on a circular argument that nothing could invalidate in the absence of a sapakṣa and a vipakṣa.
“Whether tathāgatas…”; see also 4.10 and 7.9. This quote is found in various other canonical scriptures with minor variations.
F, folio 69.b: ye shes.
ldem por dgongs pa.
I read kun nas nyon mongs pa’i chos and rnam par byang ba’i chos as bahuvrīhis.
The verses might have been corrupted. The prose section (D, folio 53.a) reads, ’jam dpal kun nas nyon mongs pa’i chos gang dag yin pa dang / rnam par byang ba’i chos gang dag yin pa de dag thams cad ni g.yo ba med pa gang zag med pa yin te/ de’i phyir ngas chos rnams rnam pa thams cad du byed pa med par bstan to, which does not match the variant reading found in the verses (D, folio 53.b): kun nas nyon mongs chos dang rnam par byang ba’i chos/ /thams cad byed pa med cing gang zag med pa yin/ /de phyir de dag byed pa med par ngas bshad do.
10.8 before the gāthās, in which the dhāraṇī is given, could be seen as a mchan ’grel of these verses (i.e., a ‘fill-in commentary’).
sprul pa; nirmāṇa. From the Sanskrit point of view, the juxtaposition of anabhisaṃskāra and nirmāṇa must have created a cognitive dissonance as it represents a paradox that can only be solved through the notion of nonduality, the topic of the next paragraph. The term anabhisaṃskāra expresses the notion of something that is uncreated, not brought about, and not the result of any conditioning process— something uncontrived, effortless, spontaneous. In contrast, nirmāṇa implies creation, construction, emanation, formation, composition, and transformation. A solution to this quandary that would not invoke nonduality is to understand the term anabhisaṃskāra as stressing primarily the idea of effortlessness as in the example of the dream given by the Buddha below. Another interpretation could be the apparition in a mirror. A reflection may seem real but is actually neither going nor coming anywhere. It is unproduced and nonexistent, not even “a thing.”
The question is to determine how the arising of anything is possible on the level of the relative truth in the absence of a causal process.
D: ’jam dpal sems yod pa yang ma yin/ sems med pa yang ma yin te/ sems rang dbang med pa nyid dang / sems kyi dbang nyid yin pa’i phyir ro.
yul; viṣaya.
Advayalakṣaṇa can be read in various ways: (1) as a genitive tatpuruṣa: “the defining characteristic of the nondual/of nonduality”; (2) as a karmadhāraya: “the nondual defining characteristic”; or (3) as a bahuvrīhi (which occurs frequently with lakṣaṇa as the second member of the compound): “who has the defining characteristic of nonduality/the nondual defining characteristic” or “who is characterized by nonduality.” On the basis of the question and the first part of the answer (D: bcom ldan ’das de bzhin gshegs pa’i mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa gang lags pa dang / chos kyi ’khor lo bskor ba gang lags pa dang / yongs su mya ngan las ’das pa chen po gang lags pa de dag gi mtshan nyid ni/ ji lta bur rig par bgyi lags/ ’jam dpal gnyis su med pa’i mtshan nyid yin te), I would tend to read the compound as a genitive tatpuruṣa: “Mañjuśrī, [you should understand it] as the defining characteristic of nonduality.” However, the following sentences in the answer are built with the verb yin, implying a series of expressions referring to the tathāgatas through the use of nominalized verbal adjectives such as byang chub pa (bodha) or bskor ba; see D, folio 54.a–b: mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa yang ma yin/ mngon par rdzogs par byang ma chub pa yang ma yin/ chos kyi ’khor lo bskor ba yang ma yin/ chos kyi ’khor lo mi bskor ba yang ma yin/ yongs su mya ngan las ’das pa chen po yang ma yin/ yongs su mya ngan las ’das pa chen po med pa yang ma yin te/ chos kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa nyid kyi phyir dang / sprul pa’i sku kun tu ston pa nyid kyi phyir ro. Lamotte translated the passage into French according to the structure defined by “il n’y a pas,” which would correspond to the verb yod in Tibetan, not yin. As a consequence, I chose to translate advayalakṣaṇa as a bahuv rīhi qualifying the tathāgatas.
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