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དགོངས་པ་ངེས་འགྲེལ།

Unraveling the Intent
Chapter 10

Saṃdhinirmocana

འཕགས་པ་དགོངས་པ་ངེས་པར་འགྲེལ་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོའི་མདོ།

’phags pa dgongs pa nges par ’grel pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo

The Noble Great Vehicle Sūtra “Unraveling the Intent”

Āryasaṃdhinirmocananāmamahāyānasūtra

Toh 106

Degé Kangyur, vol. 49 (mdo sde, ca), folios 1.b–55.b

Translated by the Buddhavacana Translation Group (Vienna)
under the patronage and supervision of 84000: Translating the Words of the Buddha

First published 2020

Current version v 1.0.27 (2025)

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84000: Translating the Words of the Buddha is a global non-profit initiative to translate all the Buddha’s words into modern languages, and to make them available to everyone.

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Summary

s.1

In Unraveling the Intent, the Buddha gives a systematic overview of his three great cycles of teachings, which he refers to in this text as the “three Dharma wheels” (tridharmacakra). In the process of delineating the meaning of these doctrines, the Buddha unravels several difficult points regarding the ultimate and relative truths, the nature of reality, and the contemplative methods conducive to the attainment of complete and perfect awakening, and he also explains what his intent was when he imparted teachings belonging to each of the three Dharma wheels. In unambiguous terms, the third wheel is proclaimed to be of definitive meaning. Through a series of dialogues with hearers and bodhisattvas, the Buddha thus offers a complete and systematic teaching on the Great Vehicle, which he refers to here as the Single Vehicle.

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Acknowledgements

ac.1

Translation by the Buddhavacana Translation Group.

The text was translated by Gregory Forgues and edited by Casey Kemp. With special thanks to Harunaga Isaacson, Matthew Kapstein, Klaus-Dieter Mathes, Jonathan Silk, Lambert Schmithausen, Tom Tillemans, and William Waldron for their helpful comments and advice.

The translation was completed under the patronage and supervision of 84000: Translating the Words of the Buddha.

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The generous sponsorship of Qiang Li (李强) and Ya Wen (文雅), which helped make the work on this translation possible, is most gratefully acknowledged.

Introduction

Setting and Summary

i.1

In Unraveling the Intent, the Buddha gives a systematic overview of his three great cycles of teachings, which he refers to in this text as the “three Dharma wheels” (tridharmacakra). In the process of delineating the meaning of these doctrines, the Buddha unravels several difficult points regarding the ultimate and relative truths, the nature of reality, and the contemplative methods conducive to the attainment of complete and perfect awakening, and he also explains what his intent was when he imparted teachings belonging to each of the three Dharma wheels. Through a series of dialogues with hearers and bodhisattvas, the Buddha thus offers a complete and systematic teaching on the Great Vehicle, which he refers to here as the Single Vehicle .

The Context

Main Points of the Subject Matter

The Basis

The Path

The Result

Source Text and Various Versions

Translation Issues and Academic Research

1. Identifying and organizing source texts

2. Evaluating the available translations

3. Checking intertextual patterns and delineating the scope of primary sources

4. Collating academic research

5. Organizing academic resources according to the text structure and specific translation issues

Translating the text

The Translation

The Noble Great Vehicle Sūtra
Unraveling the Intent

Prologue

[F.1.b]

p.1

Homage to all buddhas and bodhisattvas!

Thus did I hear at one time. The Blessed One was dwelling in an unfathomable palace, built with the blazing seven precious substances,34 that emitted35 great light rays suffusing countless universes.36 Each of its rooms was well arranged and its design was infinite. It was the undivided maṇḍala, the domain transcending the three worlds. Arising from the supreme roots of virtue of the one who transcends the world,37 it was characterized by the perfectly pure cognition of the one who has achieved complete mastery.38 Abode of the Tathāgata where the assembly of innumerable bodhisattvas gathered, it was attended by countless gods, nāgas, [F.2.a] yakṣas, gandharvas, demigods, garuḍas, kinnaras, mahoragas, humans, and nonhumans. Supported by the great joy and bliss of savoring the Dharma and designed to accomplish the complete welfare of all beings, it was free of any harm caused by the stains of afflictions and clear of any demon. Surpassing all manifestations, this unfathomable palace was displayed by the sovereign power of the Tathāgata. Mindfulness, intelligence, and realization were its pathway;39 mental stillness and insight were the vehicle leading to it; the great gates of liberation‍—emptiness, appearancelessness, and wishlessness‍—were its entrance. It was set on foundations adorned with an infinite accumulation of excellent qualities, which were like great kings of jeweled lotuses.40

Chapter 1

1.1

At that time, the bodhisattva Vidhivatparipṛcchaka questioned the bodhisattva Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana on the ultimate whose defining characteristic is inexpressible and nondual:53 “O son of the Victorious One, when it is said that all phenomena are nondual, what are these phenomena? In what way are they nondual?”

Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana replied, “Noble son, all phenomena, what we refer to as all phenomena, are of just two kinds: conditioned and unconditioned. With respect to these, the conditioned is neither conditioned nor unconditioned. The unconditioned is neither unconditioned nor conditioned.”

Chapter 2

2.1

Then the bodhisattva Dharmodgata spoke these words: “Blessed One, very long ago in ancient times, beyond as many universes as there are grains of sand in seventy-seven Ganges rivers, I was residing in the world Kīrtimat of the tathāgata Viśālakīrti. There I saw 7,700,000 non-Buddhists, together with their teachers, who had gathered in one place to consider the ultimate defining characteristic of phenomena.65 [F.5.b] Although they had examined, analyzed, investigated, and considered in detail the ultimate defining characteristic of phenomena, they did not understand it. They had changing opinions, lacked certainty, and were slow-witted as well as argumentative. Insulting one another with harsh words, they became abusive, agitated, unprincipled, and violent. Then, Blessed One, I thought to myself, ‘This is so sad, and yet, how marvelous, how wonderful are the manifestations of the tathāgatas in the world and, through their manifestations, the realization and actualization of the ultimate whose defining characteristic is beyond all speculation!’ ”66

Chapter 3

3.1

Then the bodhisattva Suviśuddhamati addressed the Blessed One, “Blessed One, at an earlier time, you spoke these words: ‘The ultimate is subtle and profound. Characterized as transcending what is distinct or indistinct74 [from conditioned phenomena], it is difficult to understand.’ How wonderful indeed are these words of yours! Blessed One, regarding this point, I once saw many bodhisattvas who, having attained the stage of engagement through aspiration,75 assembled in one place to discuss in the following way whether conditioned phenomena and the ultimate are distinct or indistinct. Among them, some declared, ‘The defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct.’76 Others replied, ‘It is not the case that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct, for they are distinct indeed.’ [F.7.a] Some others, who were perplexed and lacked certainty, said, ‘Some pretend that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are distinct. Some pretend that they are indistinct. Which bodhisattvas speak the truth? Which speak falsity? Which are mistaken? Which are not?’ Blessed One, I thought to myself, ‘So, none of these noble sons understands the ultimate whose subtle defining characteristic transcends whether it is distinct or indistinct from conditioned phenomena. These bodhisattvas are truly77 naive, confused, dull, unskilled, and mistaken.’ ”

Chapter 4

4.1

Then the Blessed One spoke these words to Subhūti: “Subhūti, do you know how many beings in the world90 display their knowledge91 under the influence of conceit? Do you know how many beings in the world display their knowledge without conceit?”

Subhūti answered, “Blessed One, according to my knowledge, there are only a few in the world of beings who present their knowledge without conceit, but countless, innumerable, and inexpressible in number are those who do so under its influence. Blessed One, at one time I was staying in a hermitage set in a great forest. There were many monks living in the vicinity who had also established themselves there. At sunrise, I saw them gather together. They showed their knowledge and revealed their understanding by taking various aspects of phenomena as referential objects.92

Chapter 5

5.1

Then, the bodhisattva Viśālamati asked the Blessed One, “Blessed One, when bodhisattvas who are skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition are called ‘skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition,’ what does it mean?101 When they are designated in this way, what does it refer to?”

The Blessed One answered, “Viśālamati, you are asking this for the benefit and happiness of many beings, out of compassion for the world, and for the welfare, benefit, and happiness of all beings, including gods and humans. Your intention is excellent when questioning the Tathāgata on this specific point. Therefore, listen, Viśālamati. I will explain to you in which way bodhisattvas are skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition.

Chapter 6

6.1

Then, the bodhisattva Guṇākara asked the Blessed One, “Blessed One, when bodhisattvas who are skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena are called ‘skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena,’ what does it mean? Moreover, when the Tathāgata designates them as such, what does it refer to?”

6.2

The Blessed One replied to the bodhisattva Guṇākara, “Guṇākara, for the benefit and happiness of many beings, out of compassion for the world, for the welfare, benefit, and happiness of all beings, including gods and humans, you are asking this. Your intention is excellent when questioning the Tathāgata on this specific point. Therefore, listen, Guṇākara, I will explain to you in which way bodhisattvas are skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena.

Chapter 7

7.1

At that time, the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata asked the Blessed One, “Blessed One, when I was alone in a secluded place, I had the following thought: ‘The Blessed One also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic specific to the five aggregates, mentioning the defining characteristic of their arising, disintegration, abandonment, and comprehension.137 In the same way, he spoke of the twelve sense domains, dependent arising, and the four kinds of sustenance. The Blessed One also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic of the four noble truths, mentioning the comprehension of suffering, the abandoning of the cause of suffering, the actualization of the cessation of suffering, and the practice of the path. The Blessed One also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic specific to the eighteen constituents, mentioning their varieties, manifoldness, abandonment, and comprehension. The Blessed One also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic specific to the four applications of mindfulness, mentioning their adverse factors, antidotes, practice, their arising from being non-arisen, their remaining after they arose, and their maintaining, resuming, or increasing. Similarly, he also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic specific to the four correct self-restraints, the four bases of supernatural powers, the five faculties, the five forces, and the seven branches of awakening. [F.16.b] The Blessed One also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic specific to the eight branches of the path, mentioning their adverse factors, antidotes, and practices, their arising from being non-arisen and remaining after they arose, and their maintaining, resuming, or increasing.’

Chapter 8

8.1

Then, the bodhisattva Maitreya asked a question to the Blessed One, “Blessed One, when bodhisattvas practice mental stillness and insight in the Great Vehicle, what is their support and basis?”

The Blessed One answered, “Maitreya, their support and basis are the discourses teaching Dharma and the constant aspiration to attain the unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening.

8.2

“The Blessed One taught that four things are the referential objects of mental stillness and insight: the image with conceptualization; the image without conceptualization; the point where phenomena end; and the accomplishment of the goal.”

Chapter 9

9.1

Then the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara addressed the Blessed One, “Blessed One, the ten stages of the bodhisattva are called (1) Utmost Joy, (2) Stainless, (3) Illuminating, (4) Radiant, (5) Hard to Conquer, (6) Manifest, (7) Far Reaching, (8) Immovable, (9) Excellent Intelligence, and (10) Cloud of Dharma. When taken together with the eleventh, [called] Buddha Stage, in how many kinds of purification and subdivisions are they included?”

10.

Chapter 10

10.1

Then the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī addressed the Blessed One, “Blessed One, when you mention ‘the truth body of the tathāgatas,’ what is the defining characteristic of this truth body of the tathāgatas?”

The Blessed One answered, “Mañjuśrī, the truth body of the tathāgatas is characterized when one has fully achieved a shift in one’s basis of existence, the emergence [from cyclic existence] through the practice of the stages and the perfections.308 Because of the two [following] reasons, you should know that this truth body is characterized by inconceivability: (1) it is beyond mental elaborations and is not produced by intentional action,309 (2) while beings are fixated on mental elaborations and produced by intentional action.”

10.2

“Blessed One, is the shift in the hearers’ and solitary realizers’ basis of existence also designated as the truth body?”

“Mañjuśrī, it is not.”

“Blessed One, how should it be called?”

“Mañjuśrī, it should be called the liberation body.310 With regard to the liberation body, the tathāgatas are similar and equal to the hearers and solitary realizers, but, on account of the truth body, they are distinctively superior to them. This being so, they are also distinctively superior to them in terms of the distinctively immeasurable aspect of their positive qualities. This is not easy to illustrate with examples.”

10.3

“Blessed One, how should we consider those who have the characteristic of manifesting themselves through the birth of a tathāgata?”

“Mañjuśrī, those who have the characteristic of the emanation body 311 resemble those who manifest in the world realms. You should see them as those whose characteristic is to be established by the sovereign power 312 of the buddhas, being fully adorned with the ornaments of the tathāgatas’ qualities. The truth body does not have this manifestation of arising.”

10.4

“Blessed One, how should we consider the skillful means employed by the emanation body [for the sake of liberating beings from cyclic existence]?”313 [F.49.b]

“Mañjuśrī, being conceived in a family renowned to be powerful or honorable in all the buddha fields of the trichiliocosm, taking birth, growing up, enjoying desirous objects, leaving home, displaying immediately the practice of austerities, renouncing them, and displaying all the stages of the complete and perfect awakening should be considered as the skillful means of the emanation body.”

“Blessed One, through which teachings emanating from their sovereign power do the tathāgatas bring to maturity those spiritually immature beings who have been converted? How do they liberate spiritually mature beings by means of the very referential object [taught in the Great Vehicle]?”

“Mañjuśrī, they bring them to maturity through three teachings: the sūtras, the Vinaya, and the mātṛkās.”

10.5

“Blessed One, what are the sūtras, the Vinaya, and the mātṛkās?”

“Mañjuśrī, it is like this: sūtras are teachings that gather the subject matter of various Dharma methods in four, nine, or twenty-nine topics.

1. “What are the four topics? They are (i) what was heard, (ii) taking refuge, (iii) the training, and (iv) the awakening.

2. “What are the nine topics? They are (i) concepts of sentient beings, (ii) their possessions, (iii) their birth, (iv) their existence after birth, (v) their affliction and purification, (vi) their diversity, (vii) the teacher, (viii) the teaching, and (ix) the assembly.

3. “What are the twenty-nine topics? They are the topics related to affliction: (i) [the phenomena] included in the conditioned, (ii) their progressive activity, (iii) the cause of their arising in future lives once they have been conceptualized as a person, and (iv) the cause of their arising in future lives once they have been conceptualized as phenomena.

“They are also the topics related to purification: [F.50.a] (v) the referential objects that are taken as reference points;314 (vi) the exertion in [the practice of] these very [objects]; (vii) mental abiding;315 (viii) blissful abiding in this very life; (ix) the referential objects that liberate from all suffering; (x) the three kinds of comprehension, which are the comprehension of the basis of error, the comprehension of the basis of error with respect to beings’ conceptions for nonpractitioners, and the comprehension of the basis of humility for those who practice Dharma; (xi) the basis of practice; (xii) the actualization [of practice];316 (xiii) the practice; (xiv) [the practice] as the central activity; (xv) its aspects; (xvi) its referential objects; (xvii) the skills in the investigation of what has already been eliminated and what not yet been eliminated; (xviii) [the factors] that are distractions from practice; (xix) [the factors] that are not distractions from practice; (xx) the source of nondistraction; (xxi) the yoga of clear mindfulness 317 that is protected by318 the practice; (xxii) the benefit of practice; (xxiii) its stability; (xiv) the unification with the lord of the noble [practice]; (xv) the unification with its retinue and entourage; (xxvi) the realization of true reality; (xxvii) the attainment of nirvāṇa; (xxviii) the fact that the well-expounded Dharma and Vinaya are superior to the correct views of mundane beings and all nonpractitioners; and (xxix) the impairments resulting from not practicing. Thus, Mañjuśrī, without practicing the well-expounded Dharma and Vinaya, impairments will ensue, and this is not because one has faulty views.

10.6

“Mañjuśrī, the Vinaya is my teaching on prātimokṣa for hearers and bodhisattvas, as well as that which is associated with it.” [F.50.b]

“Blessed One, how many topics are included in [the teaching on the] prātimokṣa of bodhisattvas?”

“Mañjuśrī, there are seven topics: (1) the teachings on the ceremony of taking [the vows of the bodhisattva discipline], (2) the teachings on the basis of serious downfalls,319 (3) the teachings on the basis of transgressions, (4) the teachings on the nature of transgressions, (5) the teachings on the nature of what are not transgressions, (6) the teachings on the emergence from transgressions, and (7) the teachings on the abandonment of the vows.

10.7

“Mañjuśrī, the mātṛkās are the teachings that I imparted and categorized into eleven topics. What are these eleven topics? They are (1) the defining characteristic of the conventional, (2) the defining characteristic of the ultimate, (3) the defining characteristic of referential objects consisting of the awakening factors, (4) the defining characteristic of their features; (5) the defining characteristic of the[ir] nature, (6) the defining characteristic of their result, (7) the defining characteristic of the description of the experience of them, (8) the defining characteristic of the factors disrupting them,320 (9) the defining characteristic of the factors conducive to them, (10) the defining characteristic of the defects related to them, and (11) the defining characteristic of their benefit.

1. “Mañjuśrī, consider that the defining characteristic of the conventional has three subtopics: (1) the teaching on persons, (2) the teaching on the imaginary nature, and (3) the teaching on the activity, movement, and action of phenomena.

2. “Consider the defining characteristic of the ultimate in terms of the teaching on the seven aspects of true reality.321

3. “Consider the defining characteristic of referential objects in terms of the teaching on all the things corresponding to cognitive objects.

4. “Consider the defining characteristic of [their] features in terms of the teaching on the eight features of the analysis of cognitive objects. What are these eight? They are (i) the truth of cognitive objects, (ii) their determination,322 (iii) their faults, (iv) their positive qualities, (v) the methods for analyzing, (vi) the processes related to them, (vii) the principles of reason, and (viii) the condensed and extensive presentations of cognitive objects.

i. “With respect to these eight points, the truth of cognitive objects is true reality.

ii. “The determination of cognitive objects consists in establishing the person or the imaginary essence [F.51.a] or in establishing categorical, analytical, interrogative, and dismissive answers as well as secret instructions.323

iii. “The faults of cognitive objects are the defects of phenomena related to affliction, which I have taught in several ways.

iv. “The positive qualities of cognitive objects are the benefits arising from phenomena related to purification, which I have taught in several ways.

v. “The methods for analyzing cognitive objects includes six points: (a) the method for analyzing the meaning of true reality; (b) the method for analyzing attainments; (c) the method for analyzing explanations; (d) the method for analyzing the elimination of the two extremes; (e) the method for analyzing the inconceivable; and (f) the method for analyzing the underlying intention.

vi. “The processes related to cognitive objects are the three times, the three defining characteristics of the conditioned, and the four conditions.

vii. “There are four principles of reason in the analysis of cognitive objects: (a) the principle of reason based on dependence, (b) the principle of reason based on cause and effect, (c) the principle of reason based on logical proof, and (d) the principle of reason based on the nature of phenomena itself.

a. “The arising of conditioned phenomena and the causes for their being expressed through conventions, as well as related causal conditions, constitute the principle of reason based on dependence.

b. “The causes that will bring about a result,324 a completion, or an action once phenomena have arisen, as well as related causal conditions, constitute the principle of reason based on cause and effect.

c. “The causes establishing the meaning and bringing about the valid understanding of the thesis,325 the demonstration, and the statement of a proof, as well as related causal conditions, constitute the principle of reason based on logical proof.326 This logical proof is, moreover, of two kinds: valid and invalid. Among these, five are characterized as valid 327 and seven as invalid. What are the five logical proofs characterized as valid? They are the logical proofs characterized by (I) a perception that is a direct cognition of the thing to establish,328 (II) a perception that is a direct cognition of something existing in dependence on the thing to establish,329 (III) a demonstration through an instance belonging to the same class,330 [F.51.b] (IV) an actual demonstration, and (V) a citation from a valid scripture.331

“With regard to those five logical proofs:

I. “The logical proof characterized by the perception that is a direct cognition of the thing to establish consists [for example] in perceiving through a direct cognition that all conditioned phenomena are impermanent, suffering, and without a self as well as anything conforming to this.332

II. “The logical proof characterized by a direct cognition of something existing in dependence on the thing to establish consists in inferring something not directly perceptible by means of something333 [directly perceptible], as well as in anything conforming to this, [for example], (A) the perception as a direct cognition of the principle of impermanence that exists in dependence on the things to establish, [namely,] the momentariness of all conditioned phenomena, the existence of a next life, and the consequence of good and bad deeds;334 (B) the perception as direct cognition of the diversity of beings that exists in dependence on the thing to establish, [namely,] the diversity of karma; or (C) the direct cognition of the happiness and suffering of beings that exists in dependence on the things to establish, [namely,] virtue and nonvirtue].335

III. “You should know that the logical proof characterized by a demonstration through an instance belonging to the same class of phenomena336 consists in anything conforming to this, [for example] in the demonstration of external and internal conditioned phenomena through (A) the perception of death and rebirth, being born and other forms of suffering,337 and causal dependence,338 which are established as facts in all worlds or (B) the perception of wealth and misery, which are established as facts in all worlds, including those of future lives.339

IV. “Thus, you should know that a logical proof characterized by one of the three proofs mentioned above340 is an actual demonstration because it is conclusive with respect to the thing that must be established.

V. “Mañjuśrī, you should know that the logical proof characterized by a citation from a valid scripture consists in the words taught by quoting the omniscient ones, such as ‘Nirvāṇa is peace’ and other similar statements. [F.52.a]

“Therefore, on account of these five kinds of characteristics, an analysis of cognitive objects founded on the principle of reason based on logical proof is valid.341 Because such an analysis is valid, you should rely on it.”

“Blessed One, how many qualities do those we should consider as having the defining characteristics of the omniscient tathāgatas have?”

“Mañjuśrī, they have five qualities: (A) wherever they manifest, they are renowned in this world for their omniscience; (B) they have the thirty-two marks of a great being; (C) by means of their ten powers, they eliminate all qualms affecting beings; (D) the words of the Dharma they teach through the four kinds of assurance cannot be refuted or disputed by any opponent; (E) on the basis of their Dharma and Vinaya, the eightfold noble path as well as the four noble truths manifest for those who have renounced cyclic existence.342 Thus, you should know that their manifestation, marks, elimination of doubts, freedom from refutations and disputes, and support [for those who have renounced cyclic existence] constitute the defining characteristic of the omniscient tathāgatas.

“Thus, the principle of reason based on logical proof is valid on account of the five characteristics included within these valid cognitions: direct cognitions, inferences, and authoritative scriptures.343

“What are the seven logical proofs characterized as invalid? They are the logical proofs characterized by (I) a perception that conforms with something other than the thing to be established,344 (II) a perception that does not conform with anything other than the thing to establish,345 (III) a perception that conforms with all things,346 (IV) a perception that does not conform with anything,347 (V) a demonstration through an instance belonging to a different class of phenomena,348 (VI) a demonstration that is not actually demonstrating anything, and (VII) a citation drawn from an invalid scripture.

“The logical proof characterized by a perception that does not conform with anything349 is ascertained when the defining characteristics of the proof and the premise do not conform with one another because they are incompatible in terms of reason, essence, karma, quality, or cause and effect.350 [F.52.b]

“Mañjuśrī, the logical proof characterized by a perception that does not conform with anything351 is comprised by the logical proof characterized by a perception that conforms with something other than the thing to be established 352 and similar instances. This proof is therefore inconclusive with respect to the thing to establish.353 This is called an unestablished logical proof.354

“Moreover, the logical proof characterized by a perception that conforms with all things 355 is comprised by the logical proof characterized by a perception that does not conform with anything other than the thing to establish356 and similar instances. This proof is therefore inconclusive with respect to the thing to establish. This is also called an unestablished logical proof.357

“Because these logical proofs are not established, the analysis is invalid according to the principle of reason based on logical proof. Since this analysis is invalid, you should not rely on it. You should know that the logical proof characterized by a citation from an invalid scripture is invalid by nature.

d. “Whether tathāgatas manifest or not, the constancy of the domain of truth, the nature of phenomena, on account of the constancy of phenomena, constitutes the principle of reason based on the nature of phenomena.358

viii. “The condensed and the extensive presentation of cognitive objects consists of first summarizing, then analyzing words and sections of the teaching, and finally concluding the explanation.

5. “The defining characteristic of the nature of awakening factors consists in the apprehension of a referential object together with its aspects, as I have taught, such as the awakening factors, the four applications of mindfulness, and so on.

6. “The defining characteristic of their result is the accomplishment of their result, the mundane and supramundane positive qualities, by abandoning the defilements associated with the mundane or the supramundane phenomena.

7. “The defining characteristic of accounts telling how one experiences them as one proclaims them, explains them, and correctly teach them to others is the analytical knowledge of the gnosis 359 that liberates within true reality.

8. “The defining characteristic of the factors disrupting them is the afflicted phenomenon in the form of an obstacle to the practice of these very awakening factors. [F.53.a]

9. “The defining characteristic of the factors conducive to them is the phenomenon useful to [enhancing] them.

10.” The defining characteristic of defects related to them is the fault interrupting them.

11. “Mañjuśrī, you should know that the defining characteristic of their benefit consists in their corresponding positive qualities.”

10.8

Then, the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī further said to the Blessed One, “Blessed One, please explain the meaning of the formula through which bodhisattvas comply with the underlying intention360 of the profound Dharma expounded by the tathāgatas, the complete meaning of the sūtras, the Vinaya, and the mātṛkās that is not known by those not following you.”

“Mañjuśrī, listen. I will explain to you the complete meaning of the formula so that bodhisattvas will in this way understand my underlying intention. Mañjuśrī, the possessors of qualities resulting from affliction and purification 361 are all without movement and without a person. This is why I taught that all phenomena are in every respect beyond activity. It is not the case that the possessors of qualities resulting from affliction first became afflicted and will then become purified from these afflictions or that the possessors of qualities resulting from purification have become purified from afflictions they previously acquired. Thus, foolish ordinary beings rely on views resulting from their latent dispositions, on account of which they wrongly conceive the body afflicted by corruption as the essence of phenomena and persons. As a consequence, reifying [the ego through concepts such as] ‘I’ and ‘mine,’ they mistakenly conceive of the following notions: ‘I see,’ ‘I hear,’ ‘I smell,’ ‘I taste,’ ‘I touch,’ ‘I am conscious,’ ‘I eat,’ ‘I do,’ ‘I am afflicted,’ and ‘I am purified.’ [F.53.b]

“Thus, those who understand this fact as it really is abandon the body afflicted by corruption and instead obtain the body that is not a support for any defilement, being pure, free from mental elaborations, unconditioned, and unproduced by intentional action. Mañjuśrī, you should know that this is the complete meaning of the formula.”

Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:

“The possessors of qualities resulting from affliction and purification

Are all without movement362 and without a person;

Therefore, I declare them to be without activity,

As they are neither purified nor afflicted, be it in the past or the future.

“Relying on views resulting from their latent dispositions,

On account of which they wrongly conceive the body afflicted by corruption,

They reify [the ego through concepts such as] ‘I’ and ‘mine.’

As a consequence, notions arise, such as ‘I see,’ ‘I eat,’ ‘I do,’ ‘I am afflicted,’ and ‘I am purified.’

“Thus, those who understand this fact as it really is

Abandon the body afflicted by corruption

And instead will obtain a body that is not a basis for any defilement,

Being free from mental elaborations and unconditioned.”363

10.9

“Blessed One, how should we know the defining characteristic of the arising of the tathāgatas’ mind?”

“Mañjuśrī, tathāgatas are not characterized by mind, thought, or cognition.364 However, you should know that, similar to an emanation,365 the tathāgatas’ mind arises in the way of something that is not produced by intentional action.”

“Blessed One, if the truth body of the tathāgatas is not produced at all by intentional action, how then could their mind arise without being produced by intentional action?”366

“Mañjuśrī, their mind arises on account of a previous intentional action, namely, the practice of skillful means and wisdom. Mañjuśrī, it is like this: although awakening from a state of sleep in which there is no thought ensues [spontaneously] without resulting from intentional action, [F.54.a] one will awaken due to previous intentional actions. Although the emergence from the absorption in the state of cessation is not produced by intentional action, one will emerge from it merely due to previous intentional actions. Just as the mind arises from a state of sleep or from the absorption in the state of cessation, you should know that the tathāgatas’ mind also arises due to previous intentional actions such as the practice of skillful means and wisdom.”

“Blessed One, should we say that the mind emanated by tathāgatas exists or not?”

“Mañjuśrī, [their] mind neither exists nor does not exist, because it is causally independent and causally dependent.”367

“Blessed One, what is the sphere of activity of the tathāgatas? What is the domain368 of the tathāgatas? Should we consider these two as distinct?”

“Mañjuśrī, the sphere of activity of the tathāgatas consists in the pure buddha realms, the arrayed ornaments of inconceivable and boundless positive qualities common to all tathāgatas. The domain of the tathāgatas comprises five domains: the domain of the surrounding universe, the domain of beings, the domain of Dharma, the domain of discipline, and the domain of methods of discipline.369 There is a distinction between the two.”

10.10

“Blessed One, how should we understand the defining characteristic of the tathāgatas’ complete and perfect awakening, of their turning of the wheel of Dharma, and of their great parinirvāṇa?”

“Mañjuśrī, the tathāgatas are characterized by nonduality.370 They are neither completely and perfectly awakened nor not completely and perfectly awakened; [F.54.b] they neither turn the wheel of Dharma nor do not turn the wheel of Dharma; they neither [attain] the great parinirvāṇa nor do not attain the great parinirvāṇa. This is because the truth body is utterly pure and the emanation body constantly manifests.”

“Blessed One, why should we consider that the merit produced by beings on account of seeing, hearing, or serving the tathāgatas’ emanation body arises from the tathāgatas?”

“Mañjuśrī, it is because these activities consist in taking a superior referential object thanks to the tathāgatas, and also because the emanation body is the tathāgatas’ sovereign power.”

“Blessed One, since this does not seem to be produced by intentional action, why is it that the great light of gnosis manifests in beings solely through the truth body of the tathāgatas and that innumerable emanated reflections also manifest [as the tathāgatas’ emanation body], while this light and its reflections do not manifest from the hearers’ and solitary realizers’ liberation body?”

“Mañjuśrī, while this does not seem to be produced by intentional action, on account of the power of very strong beings and the force of beings’ karma, a great light manifests to beings from water and fire crystals produced from the disks of the moon and sun. However, it does not manifest from water and fire crystals produced from other sources. From a precious gem that has been well polished through [intentional] action, reflections corresponding to its engraving manifest [when it is placed before a light source]. However, they do not manifest from another unpolished gem. Likewise, because the truth body of the tathāgatas also is established by having been purified through the practice of skillful means and insight focusing on the immeasurable domain of truth, [F.55.a] the great light of gnosis manifests in beings, and innumerable emanated reflections arise. However, they do not manifest from the hearers’ and solitary realizers’ liberation body.”

10.11

“Blessed One, you said that, through the force of the tathāgatas’ and bodhisattvas’ sovereign power, one can obtain an excellent body in the realm of desire, such as that of a warrior or a brahman, a body that is like a great sāla tree, or the excellent body of a god residing in the realm of desire, the realm of form, or the realm of the formless. Blessed One, what was your underlying intention with regard to this?”

“Mañjuśrī, by means of their sovereign power, tathāgatas teach as they are the path and practices through which one obtains all these excellent bodies. Those accomplishing these path and practices will always obtain all these perfect bodies, while those who reject or denigrate these path and practices, as well as those who have animosity or resentment toward them, will always obtain all kinds of miserable bodies upon their death. Mañjuśrī, on account of this skillful means, you should know in this way that, because of the sovereign power of the tathāgatas, one will be reborn in a perfect body as well as in a miserable one.”

10.12

“Blessed One, in the universes that are impure and pure, what is abundant? What is rare?”

“Mañjuśrī, in the universes that are impure, [F.55.b] eight things are abundant and two are rare. Abundant are (1) followers of traditions other than mine; (2) suffering beings; (3) beings who are different in terms of lineages, families, and communities or wealth and poverty; (4) beings engaging into wrongdoing; (5) beings who have lost their discipline; (6) beings in bad destinies; (7) followers of inferior vehicles; and (8) bodhisattvas with inferior intentions and practices. Rare are (1) the actions of bodhisattvas having superior intentions and practices and (2) the manifestation of tathāgatas.

“Mañjuśrī, in the universes that are pure, it is the opposite of this. You should know that these eight things are rare and these two things abundant.”

Then, the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī asked the Blessed One, “Blessed One, what is the name of the teaching imparted in this Dharma discourse that unravels the Tathāgata’s intent? How should I keep it in mind?”

The Blessed One answered, “Mañjuśrī, this is a teaching of definitive meaning establishing the deeds of the tathāgatas. Keep it in mind as The Teaching of Definitive Meaning Establishing the Deeds of the Tathāgatas. As the Blessed One expounded this teaching, seventy-five thousand bodhisattvas obtained the perfect analytical knowledge of the truth body.

After the Blessed One had spoken these words, the prince Mañjuśrī together with the entire retinue of gods, humans, demigods, and gandharvas rejoiced and praised the words of the Blessed One.

The [tenth chapter of the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī] called “The Chapter Establishing the Positive Qualities [of the Tathāgatas]” of [the sūtra of] the Great Vehicle called “Unraveling the Intent” is concluded.

ab.

Abbreviations

Bd	Bardan (Zanskar) canonical collection
C	Choné xylograph Kangyur
Cbeta	Chinese Electronic Buddhist Association, (www.cbeta.org)
Cz	Chizhi Kangyur
D	Degé xylograph Kangyur
Dd	Dodedrak Kangyur
Dk	Dongkarla Kangyur
Do	Dolpo canonical collection
F	Phukdrak manuscript Kangyur
Go	Gondhla (Lahaul) canonical collection
Gt	Gangteng Kangyur
H	Lhasa xylograph Kangyur
He	Hemis I Kangyur
J	’jang sa tham/Lithang xylograph Kangyur
Kʙ	Berlin manuscript Kangyur
Kǫ774	Peking 1737 xylograph Kangyur
L	London (Shelkar) manuscript Kangyur
Lg	Lang mdo Kangyur
Mvyut	Mahāvyutpatti
N	Narthang xylograph Kangyur
Ng	Namgyal Kangyur
Np	Neyphug Kangyur
O	Tawang Kangyur
Pj	Phajoding I Kangyur
Pz	Phajoding II Kangyur
R	Ragya Kangyur
S	Stok manuscript Kangyur
Saṃdh.	Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra
Saṃdh_dh	Dunhuang manuscript: Stein Tib. n°194 (49 folios) and Stein Tib. n°683 (1 folio) (Hakamaya 1984–1987)
T	Tokyo manuscript Kangyur
Taishō 676	解深密經, translated by Xuanzang (596–664 ᴄᴇ)
TrBh	Sthiramati’s Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣyam
U	Urga xylograph Kangyur
V	Ulaanbaatar manuscript Kangyur
VD	Degé; xylograph of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi from the Tengyur
VG	Golden; xylograph of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi from the Tengyur
VP	Peking; xylograph of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi from the Tengyur
VinSg	Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi
X	Basgo manuscript Kangyur
YBht P ’i	Tibetan translation of Acarya Asanga’s Yogācārabhūmi from the Peking Tengyur (n°. 5540, sems-tsam, ’i 143aI-382a5 (vol. I l l : 121-217)
Z	Shey Palace manuscript Kangyur

Notes

n.1

See glossary entry “ultimate.”

n.2

See Brunnhölzl 2018, p. 1590, n. 89 on this point.

n.3

The numbering of paragraphs of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra follows Lamotte’s critical edition.

n.4

See Radich 2007, p. 1257 on the relationship between āśrayaparivṛtti and dauṣṭhulyakāya. Saṃdh. is the only text in the entire Kangyur in which the term dauṣṭhulyakāya is found.

n.5

In bold are textual resources I used to translate the text into English.

n.6

See Powers 2015. Unfortunately, I haven’t been able to consult this reference work at the time of completing this translation.

n.7

Here is a list of the sigla I used to identify the various witnesses of Saṃdh.:

(1) Witnesses of the sūtra found in the available Kangyurs and canonical collections (MsK = manuscript Kangyur, PK = xylograph): Kʙ: Berlin MsK, C: Choné PK, Cz: Chizhi, D: Degé PK, Dd: Dodedrak, Dk: Dongkarla, F: Phukdrag MsK, H: Lhasa PK, Gt: Gangteng, He: Hemis I, J: ’jang sa tham/Lithang PK, L: London (Shelkar) MsK, Lg: Lang mdo, N: Narthang PK, Ng: Namgyal, Np: Neyphug, O: Tawang, Pj: Phajoding I, Pz: Phajoding II, Kǫ: Peking 1737 PK, R: Ragya, S: Stok MsK, T: Tokyo MsK, U: Urga PK, V: Ulaanbaatar MsK, W: Wangli supplement, X: Basgo MsK, Z: Shey Palace MsK. Other canonical collections: Ba: Basgo fragments (Ladakh), Bd: Bardan (Zanskar), Go: Gondhla (Lahaul), Do: Dolpo. Source: http://www.rkts.org (last accessed on July 20, 2020). I am following the typology of Kangyur groups suggested by rKTs (Vienna University). I would like to warmly thank Professor Helmut Tauscher and Bruno Lainé for making available to me the editions I used for this translation project. For a general discussion of some Tibetan sources, see Skilling 1994, p. 775.

(2) Xylographs of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi from the Tengyur: VD Degé, VG Golden, VP Peking. My thanks go to Kojirō Katō for having shared with me the bibliographical detail of these witnesses. The Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī is also available in Chinese under the following title: 瑜伽師地論卷第七十六攝決擇分.

n.8

For the reference of possible additional folios, see Chayet 2005, p. 67 (n°615‍—1 folio, n°590‍—6 folios).

n.34

rin po che sna bdun does not refer to jewels only, as found in Lamotte (1935) and Keenan (2000). I follow here Powers (1995), Cornu (2005), and Cleary (1999).

n.35

The logical subject of ’jig rten gyi khams dpag tu med pa rgyas par ’gengs pa’i ’od zer chen po shin tu mnga’ ba is the palace (khang). Cornu (2005) and Keenan (2000) seem to read this phrase as a qualifier for the seven precious substances.

n.36

The first paragraph of the nidāna is a presentation of the place where the Buddha is dwelling. As already mentioned in the introduction, a succession of compounds, mainly bahuvrīhis, enables the topicalization of the temple (khang). Lamotte’s translation reflects this literary device, contrary to Powers who does not topicalize the palace to the same degree on account of some ambiguities regarding the logical subject of a few clauses describing this palace. To illustrate this point, it seems unclear whether the adjectives “steadfast,” “enduring,” or “free” in Powers’ translation qualify the temple or the beings attending it. Cornu mainly follows Powers here but the grammatical necessity to indicate the gender and number of qualifiers in French limits the risk of confusion, which is obviously not the case in English. Regarding the usage of tenses, Lamotte is the only translator who uses both narrative past and present in this first paragraph. He thus switches from the past tense to the present tense in order to describe the characteristics of the temple, a decision I chose not to follow in the present translation.

n.37

Lamotte, Cornu, and Powers do not translate the anaphoric pronoun de in ’jig rten las ’das pa de’i bla ma’i dge ba’i rtsa ba las byung ba. Powers explains in a footnote (see Power 1995, p. 313, n. 3) that this pronoun refers to gnosis according to Wonch’uk, although his translation does not reflect this interpretation. Since wisdom has not been mentioned earlier in the text and since the pronoun de is anaphoric, I read de as referring to the Buddha. Moreover, the concept of “root of virtue” is usually associated with persons and we have a reference to dbang sgyur ba in the next qualifying phrase.

n.38

The clause dbang sgyur ba’i rnam par rig pa shin tu rnam par rig pa’i mtshan nyid is problematic. Lamotte translates it in the following way: “très pur, il se caractérise par une pensée maîtresse de soi.” Cornu and Powers follow the reading found in D, folio 2.a; S, folio 4.a; Kǫ, folio 1.a; L, folio 3.a; and H, folio 3.a ( dbang sgyur ba’i rnam par rig pa shin tu rnam par rig pa’i mtshan nyid) and render the two occurrences of rnam par rig pa by an apposition: “It was characterized by perfect knowledge, the knowledge of one who has mastery.” (Powers 1995, p. 5). However, in F, folio 4.b we find a variant reading which, I believe, makes more sense: dbang byed pa’i rnam par rig pa shin tu rnam par dag pa’i mtshan nyid. The Tibetan verbal prefix shin tu rnam par is used to render the upasarga su- in Sanskrit, like in suviśuddha. In Mvyut 351, blo shin tu rnam par dag pa thus translates the Sanskrit suviśuddhabuddhiḥ.

n.39

nges par ’byung ba. In Skt. niḥsaraṇa or niryāṇa, which have the meaning of setting forth, issue, exit, departure, escape, a road out of town. The analogy here is not about emancipation or renunciation as Powers and Cornu translated it but rather with the metaphor of the journey. In that sense, what is meant here is the departure to reach the palace. Lamotte (1935), Keenan (2000), and Cleary (1999) follow Xuanzang’s translation: 大念慧行以為游路 (Cbeta, Taishō 676). Interestingly enough, F does not have nges par ’byung ba but just ’byung ba.

n.40

rin po che’i pad ma’i rgyal po chen po yon tan gyi tshogs mtha’ yas pas brgyan pa’i bkod pa la rten pa na bzhugs te. This clause has been translated in various ways depending on how one understands the compound rin po che’i pad ma’i rgyal po chen po yon tan gyi tshogs mtha’ yas pas. Lamotte (1935), Powers (1995), and Cornu (2005) read it as a dvandva: “II est orné de qualités infinies, de joyaux, de lotus et de grands rois” (Lamotte 1935, p. 167); “this pattern was adorned with boundless masses of excellent qualities, and with great kingly jeweled lotuses” (Powers 1995, pp. 5–6); “paré d’infinies qualités et de grands lotus royaux incrustés de pierreries” (Cornu 2005, p. 26). However, it seems to me that it would be better to read this compound as a karmadhāraya. Folio 5.a offers a variant reading that could support this interpretation: yon ten gyi tshogs mtha’ yas pas/ brgyan pa’i rin po che chen po pad mo’i rgyal po’i bkod pa’i gnas na nyan thos kyi dge ’dun tshad med pa dang / thabs gcig tu bzhugs te. In addition to this problem, one should note that Lamotte’s translation of the compound rin po che’i pad ma’i rgyal po chen po as a dvandva is inaccurate here. Powers’ reading of this term is correct.

n.53

brjod du med pa dang / gnyis su med pa’i mtshan nyid. I read this compound as a bahuvrīhi. The full clause [brjod du med pa dang / gnyis su med pa’i mtshan nyid] + [don dam pa] is a karmadhāraya meaning literally “the ultimate that is that whose defining characteristic is inexpressible and absolute.” Powers’ suggestion is also possible here (“the ultimate whose defining characteristic is inexpressible and non-dual”). Lamotte leaves out mtshan nyid. Cornu somewhat mixes qualifiers and qualified terms in his rendering of this clause.

n.65

brtsams pa; ārabhya with the meaning of “referring to/having to do with,” a frequent occurrence in Saṃdh. See Edgerton 1953, p. 102.

n.66

rtog ge thams cad las yang dag par ’das pa; sarvatarkasamatikrānta. Regarding the translation of the term rtog ge (tarka), Powers 1995, p. 25 suggests “argumentation,” but the emphasis in the present context is not on logical reasoning. The term tarka denotes here any kind of assumption, presupposition, representation, or conjecture regarding the absolute that is the product of the intellect (manas).

n.74

I am using the adjective “indistinct” here in the sense of the first definition given in the Oxford English Dictionary: “1. Not distinct or distinguished from each other, or from something else; not kept separate or apart in the mind or perception; not clearly defined or marked off.” Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “indistinct,” accessed July 20, 2020, https://www-oed-com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2443/view/Entry/94602?redirectedFrom=indistinct#eid.

n.75

mos pa; praṇidhāna. See mos pa spyod pa’i sa. See Mvyut 897: mos pa spyod pa’i sa; adhimukticaryābhūmiḥ.

n.76

Schmithausen reads don dam pa’i mtshan nyid (paramārthalakṣaṇa) as “the defining characteristic that is the ultimate” in 3.5 (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 558, §512.3). However, Saṃdh. chapter 3 is about conditioned phenomena in relation to the ultimate when their respective defining characteristics are examined. The question here is not to determine whether the ultimate is the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena. Rather, it is to determine whether the conditioned and the ultimate are different by examining their defining characteristics. Therefore, I read don dam pa’i mtshan nyid as “the defining characteristic of the ultimate,” namely, as a genitive tatpuruṣa and not as a karmadhāraya.

n.77

To render sha stag.

n.90

Lit. “in the world of beings.”

n.91

F reads here shes pa in agreement with D. See F, folio 14.bff.

n.92

dmigs pa; ālambana. I think it is important here to read dmigs pa as meaning “object” because in folio 11.a the Buddha contrasts these various objects (aggregates, sense sources, constituents, truths, etc.) with the “object conducive to purification” (rnam par dag pa’i dmigs pa, *viśuddhyālambana; see Schmithausen 2014, p. 362, §306.5 and n. 1644). Translating dmigs pa here as “observing” would weaken the central opposition between (a) the objects taken as a reference point for their practice by those who have not realized the defining characteristic of the ultimate and (b) the object conducive to purification, which is present within all phenomena. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce this fundamental point.

n.101

ji tsam gyis; kiyant. The complete sentence reads, “In what sense are they skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition?”

n.137

This enumeration follows the structure found in 4.2.

n.308

See translation of VinSg 16 in Sakuma 1990, p. 202: “Der Dharmakāya der Tathāgatas ist dadurch charakterisiert, daß die [ihn konstituierende] ‘Umgestaltung der Grundlage’ daraus hervorgegangen ist, daß man die [Bodhisattva-]Stufen und Vollkommenheiten durch intensive Übung gemeistert hat.”

n.309

mngon par ’du bya ba med pa; anabhisaṃskāraṇa.

n.310

On vimuktikāya, see Radich 2007, p. 1254ff.

n.311

As with the compound in the opening question above, I read sprul pa’i sku’i mtshan nyid (nirmāṇakāyalakṣaṇa) as a bahuvrīhi.

n.312

byin gyis brlabs; adhiṣṭhita.

n.313

F, folio 65.a: bstan pa la.

n.314

dmigs pa la nye bar gtod pa.

n.315

D: sems can gnas pa, but F, folio 65.b reads sems gnas pa, which corresponds to Xuanzang’s translation: 心安住事 (Cbeta, Taishō 676).

n.316

mngon du bya ba; sākṣātkāra.

n.317

gsal ba; paṭu (?). See Mvyut 6695: spyod pa mi gsal ba; apaṭupracāraḥ. Another possibility for gsal ba would be saṃprakhyāna. Edgerton gives as synonym asaṃmoṣa (“absence of confusion”). As an equivalent for saṃprakhyāna, a Tibetan synonym of gsal ba is dran pa. See Edgerton 1953, pp. 83 and 576.

n.318

D: bsgom pa las yongs su skyob pa’i sbyor ba gsal ba. Compare with F, folio 66.a: bsgom pas yongs su skyob pa’i sbyor ba gsal ba.

n.319

pham pa’i gnas lta bu[’i chos]; pārājayikasthānīya[dharmāḥ]. See Edgerton 1953, p. 342.

n.320

bar du gcod pa’i chos; antarāyikadharmāḥ (see Mvyut 9324).

n.321

See 8.20.2.

n.322

D, folio 50.b: gnas pa. F, folio 67.a: rnam par bzhag pa. They are synonyms for vyavasthāna.

n.323

See 8.21, in which the exact same enumeration is found. See D, folio 31.b: mgo gcig tu lan gdab pa dang / rnam par dbye ba dang / dris te lan gdab pa dang / gzhag pa dang / gsang ba dang.

n.324

’thob pa. Usually “obtainment” or “attainment.”

n.325

D: so so’i shes pa; compare with F, folio 67.a: dam bcas for the Sanskrit pratijñā. Yoshimizu opts for “objects that are known” (see Yoshimizu 2010, p. 142), although it is clear that so so’i shes pa is the Literal translation into Tibetan of pratijñā.

n.326

Yoshimizu 2010, p. 142 reads the correlative/relative sentence (yat … tat …; … gang dag yin pa de dag …) as meaning “Whatever is…, that is…” Alternatively, this grammatical construction could be literally translated with the following syntactic structure: “That which is … is…” While Yoshimizu’s translation is technically correct, reading gang dag yin pa in the sense of “whatever” in the present case is unnecessary since this grammatical structure is usually used to give a definition of a technical term. As a consequence, we do not need to mirror the Sanskrit correlative/relative structure in English. The result is a more simple and fluid rendering of the text.

n.327

In this paragraph, I read the compounds ending with lakṣaṇa as bahuvrīhis. Yoshimizu translated these compounds as tatpuruṣas. It seems to me that reading them as bahuvrīhis makes the entire passage much easier to understand.

n.328

de mngon sum du dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid; tatpratyakṣopalabdhilakṣaṇa (see Mvyut 4405).

n.329

de la gnas pa mngon sum du dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid; tadāśritya pratyakṣopalabdhilakṣaṇa/tadāśritya āśritapratyakṣopalabdhilakṣaṇa (see Mvyut 4406). See Yoshimizu 2010, p. 144: “the characteristic of the direct cognition [of something] depending on the [imperceptible object to be inferred].” The definition of this term reads, according to Yoshimizu, “The characteristic of the direct cognition [of something] depending on the [imperceptible object to be inferred consists in] such kinds of direct cognition, through which something directly not [cognizable] is inferred.”

n.330

rang gi rigs kyi dpe nye bar sbyar ba’i mtshan nyid; svajātīyadṛṣṭāntopasaṃhāralakṣaṇa (see Mvyut 4407). The term upasaṃhāra means “establishing,” in the way of the sādhana with respect to the sādhya. It is therefore also translated into Tibetan as nye bar sgrub, a synonym for nye ba sbyar ba, which is used for the Sanskrit sādhana too.

n.331

lung shin tu rnam par dag pa gtan la phab bar bstan pa’i mtshan nyid. See Mvyut 4409: lung shin tu rnam par dag pas gtan la bab par bstan pa’i mtshan nyid/ lung shin tu rnam par dag pas gtan la dbab par bstan pa’i mtshan nyid; suviśuddhāgamopadeśalakṣaṇa.

n.332

For the sake of readability, I inverted the order of the clauses in the sentences explaining the five points mentioned here. If we translate the Tibetan literally, the pattern would be: [example 1, example 2, etc.] are [the logical proof to be defined].

n.333

D: gang gis mngon sum du ma gyur pa la rjes su dpag par bya ba dang / de lta bu dang ’thun pa gang yin pa de ni de la gnas pa mngon sum du dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid yin no. Yoshimizu’s translation of this clause seems incorrect: “The characteristic of the direct cognition [of something] depending on the [imperceptible object to be inferred consists in] such kinds of direct cognition, through which something directly not [cognizable] is inferred, as…” followed by sentences (1), (2), and (3).

n.334

In this explanation of tadāśritya pratyakṣopalabdhilakṣaṇam, I do not understand why Yoshimizu takes elements of sentence (1) into sentence (2), in violation of the Tibetan syntax which is quite clear in the present case. See Yoshimizu 2010, p. 144.

n.335

Yoshimizu adds the concept of vipraṇa to this sentence, which is not found in the Tibetan. See Yoshimizu 2010, p. 145.

n.336

The analogies given as examples seem to be instances of [para]prasiddhānumāṇa ([tha snyad du gzhan la] grags pa’i rjes dpag) in that the perception of the analogy must be renowned (grags pa) in the world (or established from the perspective of the person to be persuaded), thereby offering a certain level of consensus, which is essential for the validity of this kind of logical proof.

n.337

This probably refers to the various kinds of suffering, which includes the suffering inherent to the conditioned phenomena as well as to the twelve factors of conditioned existence.

n.338

rang dbang med pa; asvatantra.

n.339

Yoshimizu segments this passage in a different way (see Yoshimizu 2010, p. 145), as it appears that she did not understand its syntactic structure (or chose not to follow it). The point of these instances in the form of established perceptions for which there is a consensus is to show how one thing (that which must be established) is established from the other (the commonly established perception). The relation here is again of the type sādhya/sādhana, this time through an instance belonging to the same class of phenomena. In these sentences, we have the following construction: X la Y dmigs pa nye bar sbyar ba. In the present case, X (i.e., external and internal conditioned phenomena) is the sādhya, and Y is the sādhana (i.e., clauses 1–2), which makes the svajātīyadṛṣṭāntopasaṃhāralakṣaṇam look like a type of prasiddhānumāṇa.

n.340

These three proofs are (A) a perception that is a direct cognition of the [thing to establish]; (B) a perception that is a direct cognition [of something existing] in dependence on the [thing to establish]; and (C) a demonstration through an instance belonging to the same class.

n.341

See beginning of 10.7.4 above. Yoshimizu translates rigs pa brtag pa yongs su dag pa with “the reasoning to be investigated.” See Yoshimizu 2010, p. 145.

n.342

dge sbyong bzhi for dge sbyong chos bzhi; see Mvyut 8708: dge sbyong du byed pa’i chos bzhi ming la; catvārah śramaṇakārakadharmāḥ.

n.343

This passage is interesting because the five defining characteristics of the principle of reason are reduced to three core ideas. Since pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa merely refers to the definition of correct reasoning with regard to the other four defining characteristics, it is understandable that it is not included in this list. However, it is fascinating to see that svajātīyadṛṣṭāntopasaṃhāralakṣaṇa is also excluded here, which might confirm that this proof was considered to be a form of prasiddhānumāṇa in spite of its seemingly inductive character resulting from the use of instances or examples upon which there is a consensus. However, the “engine” of the proof in the case of this valid cognition is not an induction but the deduction ensuing from facts that are accepted as conventions by virtue of consensus. As a consequence, one could argue that the svajātīyadṛṣṭāntopasaṃhāralakṣaṇa has a monotonic aspect explaining why it is not inductive in spite of its empirical aspect. The analogies used in this kind of reasoning are, in a way, carved in marble, in the sense of well-established principles that cannot be refuted by new information drawn from further experience or perception, which is precisely the reason why these reasonings have the capacity to establish the sādhya. They are by nature a deduction from a universal law or principle. Hence their possible inclusion in the category of anumāṇa as prasiddhānumāṇa since they surely do not correspond only to a direct cognition.

n.344

de las gzhan dang ’thun par dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid. See Mvyut 4410: de las gzhan dang mthun par dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid/ de las gzhan dang mthun par mngon sum du dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid; tadanyasārūpyopalabdhilakṣaṇa.

n.345

de la gzhan dang mi ’thun par dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid. See Mvyut 4411: de las gzhan dang mi mthun pa mngon sum du dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid/ de las gzhan dang mi mthun par dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid/ de las gzhan dang mi mthun par mngon sum du dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid; tadanyavairūpyopalabdhilakṣaṇa.

n.346

thams cad ’thun par dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid. See Mvyut 4412: thams cad mthun par dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid; sarvasārūpyopalabdhilakṣaṇa.

n.347

thams cad mi ’thun par dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid. See Mvyut 4413: thams cad mi mthun par dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid; sarvavairūpyopalabdhilakṣaṇa.

n.348

gzhan gyi rigs kyi dpe nye bar sbyar ba’i mtshan nyid. See Mvyut 4414: gzhan gyi rigs kyi dpe nye bar sbyar ba’i mtshan nyid; anyajātīyadṛṣṭāntopasaṃhāralakṣaṇa.

n.349

This refers to point (IV) above.

n.350

For an examination of similarities between Saṃdh. and Hetuvidyā, see Yoshimizu 2010.

n.351

This refers to point (IV) above.

n.352

This refers to point (I) above.

n.353

This point is not easy to unravel. I understand it in the following way. If the perception [of a logical proof] that does not conform with any[thing] could be used to establish the thesis, it also could be used to establish as well something that is not the thesis. As a consequence, it would be included in the reasons proving that which is not the thesis and would be therefore inconclusive. In other words, the perception of the proof would be present in both the sapakṣa and the vipakṣa. The proof of something that does not conform to anything would be necessarily also found in the perception of that which does not conform with that which must be established. As one proceeds to examine the proof, its absence of conformity with the premise is enough to disqualify it, whether it is conforming with something other than the premise or with nothing else.

n.354

This refers to point (VI) above.

n.355

This refers to point (III) above.

n.356

This refers to point (II) above.

n.357

This point is also not easy to understand. I take it to mean the following: if a perception that conforms with all [things] (i.e., with anything) demonstrates the thesis, it follows that the dharmin/pakṣa (all phenomena) constitutes the entire sapakṣa and there is not even the possibility of having a vipakṣa. The demonstration based on such perceptions is therefore inconclusive because it represents a tautology based on a circular argument that nothing could invalidate in the absence of a sapakṣa and a vipakṣa.

n.358

“Whether tathāgatas…”; see also 4.10 and 7.9. This quote is found in various other canonical scriptures with minor variations.

n.359

F, folio 69.b: ye shes.

n.360

ldem por dgongs pa.

n.361

I read kun nas nyon mongs pa’i chos and rnam par byang ba’i chos as bahuvrīhis.

n.362

The verses might have been corrupted. The prose section (D, folio 53.a) reads, ’jam dpal kun nas nyon mongs pa’i chos gang dag yin pa dang / rnam par byang ba’i chos gang dag yin pa de dag thams cad ni g.yo ba med pa gang zag med pa yin te/ de’i phyir ngas chos rnams rnam pa thams cad du byed pa med par bstan to, which does not match the variant reading found in the verses (D, folio 53.b): kun nas nyon mongs chos dang rnam par byang ba’i chos/ /thams cad byed pa med cing gang zag med pa yin/ /de phyir de dag byed pa med par ngas bshad do.

n.363

10.8 before the gāthās, in which the dhāraṇī is given, could be seen as a mchan ’grel of these verses (i.e., a ‘fill-in commentary’).

n.364

See 5.1–6.

n.365

sprul pa; nirmāṇa. From the Sanskrit point of view, the juxtaposition of anabhisaṃskāra and nirmāṇa must have created a cognitive dissonance as it represents a paradox that can only be solved through the notion of nonduality, the topic of the next paragraph. The term anabhisaṃskāra expresses the notion of something that is uncreated, not brought about, and not the result of any conditioning process‍— something uncontrived, effortless, spontaneous. In contrast, nirmāṇa implies creation, construction, emanation, formation, composition, and transformation. A solution to this quandary that would not invoke nonduality is to understand the term anabhisaṃskāra as stressing primarily the idea of effortlessness as in the example of the dream given by the Buddha below. Another interpretation could be the apparition in a mirror. A reflection may seem real but is actually neither going nor coming anywhere. It is unproduced and nonexistent, not even “a thing.”

n.366

The question is to determine how the arising of anything is possible on the level of the relative truth in the absence of a causal process.

n.367

D: ’jam dpal sems yod pa yang ma yin/ sems med pa yang ma yin te/ sems rang dbang med pa nyid dang / sems kyi dbang nyid yin pa’i phyir ro.

n.368

yul; viṣaya.

n.369

See 8.23.

n.370

Advayalakṣaṇa can be read in various ways: (1) as a genitive tatpuruṣa: “the defining characteristic of the nondual/of nonduality”; (2) as a karmadhāraya: “the nondual defining characteristic”; or (3) as a bahuvrīhi (which occurs frequently with lakṣaṇa as the second member of the compound): “who has the defining characteristic of nonduality/the nondual defining characteristic” or “who is characterized by nonduality.” On the basis of the question and the first part of the answer (D: bcom ldan ’das de bzhin gshegs pa’i mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa gang lags pa dang / chos kyi ’khor lo bskor ba gang lags pa dang / yongs su mya ngan las ’das pa chen po gang lags pa de dag gi mtshan nyid ni/ ji lta bur rig par bgyi lags/ ’jam dpal gnyis su med pa’i mtshan nyid yin te), I would tend to read the compound as a genitive tatpuruṣa: “Mañjuśrī, [you should understand it] as the defining characteristic of nonduality.” However, the following sentences in the answer are built with the verb yin, implying a series of expressions referring to the tathāgatas through the use of nominalized verbal adjectives such as byang chub pa (bodha) or bskor ba; see D, folio 54.a–b: mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa yang ma yin/ mngon par rdzogs par byang ma chub pa yang ma yin/ chos kyi ’khor lo bskor ba yang ma yin/ chos kyi ’khor lo mi bskor ba yang ma yin/ yongs su mya ngan las ’das pa chen po yang ma yin/ yongs su mya ngan las ’das pa chen po med pa yang ma yin te/ chos kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa nyid kyi phyir dang / sprul pa’i sku kun tu ston pa nyid kyi phyir ro. Lamotte translated the passage into French according to the structure defined by “il n’y a pas,” which would correspond to the verb yod in Tibetan, not yin. As a consequence, I chose to translate advayalakṣaṇa as a bahuv rīhi qualifying the tathāgatas.

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Glossary

Types of attestation for names and terms of the corresponding source language

Attested in source text

This term is attested in a manuscript used as a source for this translation.

Attested in other text

This term is attested in other manuscripts with a parallel or similar context.

Attested in dictionary

This term is attested in dictionaries matching Tibetan to the corresponding language.

Approximate attestation

The attestation of this name is approximate. It is based on other names where the relationship between the Tibetan and source language is attested in dictionaries or other manuscripts.

Reconstruction from Tibetan phonetic rendering

This term is a reconstruction based on the Tibetan phonetic rendering of the term.

Reconstruction from Tibetan semantic rendering

This term is a reconstruction based on the semantics of the Tibetan translation.

Source unspecified

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g.1

abiding in phenomena

chos gnas pa nyid

ཆོས་གནས་པ་ཉིད།

dharmasthititā

g.2

absorption

snyoms par ’jug pa

སྙོམས་པར་འཇུག་པ།

samāpatti

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

The Sanskrit literally means “attainment,” and is used to refer specifically to meditative attainment and to particular meditative states. The Tibetan translators interpreted it as sama-āpatti, which suggests the idea of “equal” or “level”; however, they also parsed it as sam-āpatti, in which case it would have the sense of “concentration” or “absorption,” much like samādhi, but with the added sense of “attainment.”

g.3

absorption in the state of cessation

’gog pa la snyoms par zhugs pa

འགོག་པ་ལ་སྙོམས་པར་ཞུགས་པ།

nirodhasamāpatti

g.4

accept

ལེན།

ādadante

g.6

accomplishment of the goal

dgos pa yongs su grub pa

དགོས་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་གྲུབ་པ།

kṛtyānuṣṭhāna

g.10

actual

yongs su grub pa

ཡོངས་སུ་གྲུབ་པ།

pariniṣpanna

g.13

actualization

mngon du bya ba

མངོན་དུ་བྱ་བ།

sākṣātkāra

g.15

affliction

kun nas nyon mongs pa

ཀུན་ནས་ཉོན་མོངས་པ།

saṃkleśa

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

A term meaning defilement, impurity, and pollution, broadly referring to cognitive and emotional factors that disturb and obscure the mind. As the self-perpetuating process of affliction in the minds of beings, it is a synonym for saṃsāra. It is often paired with its opposite, vyavadāna, meaning “purification.”

g.16

aggregate

phung pho

ཕུང་ཕོ།

skandha

g.17

analysis

brtag pa

བརྟག་པ།

parīkṣā

g.18

analytical knowledge

so sor yang dag par rig pa

སོ་སོར་ཡང་དག་པར་རིག་པ།

pratisaṃvid

g.21

analyze

so sor rtog par byed
so sor rtog pa

སོ་སོར་རྟོག་པར་བྱེད།
སོ་སོར་རྟོག་པ།

pratyavekṣaṇa
pratyavekṣa

g.22

anumāṇa

anumāṇa

g.24

appearancelessness

mtshan ma med pa

མཚན་མ་མེད་པ།

animitta

g.25

applications of mindfulness

dran pa nye bar gzhag pa

དྲན་པ་ཉེ་བར་གཞག་པ།

smṛtyupasthāna

g.28

aspiration

smon lam

སྨོན་ལམ།

praṇidhāna

g.30

assumption

mngon par zhen pa

མངོན་པར་ཞེན་པ།

abhiniviśanti

g.33

authoritative scripture

yid ches pa’i lung gi tshad ma

ཡིད་ཆེས་པའི་ལུང་གི་ཚད་མ།

āptāgamapramāṇa

g.34

Avalokiteśvara

spyan ras gzigs
’phags pa spyan ras gzigs dbang phyug

སྤྱན་རས་གཟིགས།
འཕགས་པ་སྤྱན་རས་གཟིགས་དབང་ཕྱུག

avalokiteśvara
āryāvalokiteśvara

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

One of the “eight close sons of the Buddha,” he is also known as the bodhisattva who embodies compassion. In certain tantras, he is also the lord of the three families, where he embodies the compassion of the buddhas. In Tibet, he attained great significance as a special protector of Tibet, and in China, in female form, as Guanyin, the most important bodhisattva in all of East Asia.

In this text:

Also mentioned in this text as Āryāvalokiteśvara, the noble Avalokiteśvara.

g.35

awakening

byang chub

བྱང་ཆུབ།

bodhi

g.36

awakening factors

byang chub kyi phyogs dang ’thun pa’i chos

བྱང་ཆུབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱོགས་དང་འཐུན་པའི་ཆོས།

bodhipakṣyadharma

g.39

bahuvrīhi

bahuvrīhi

g.40

bases of supernatural powers

rdzu ’phrul gyi rkang pa

རྫུ་འཕྲུལ་གྱི་རྐང་པ།

ṛddhipādaḥ

g.43

bichiliocosm

stong gnyis pa bar ma’i ’jig rten gyi khams

སྟོང་གཉིས་པ་བར་མའི་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱི་ཁམས།

dvitīyamadhyama sāhasralokadhātu

g.44

binding

’ching ba

འཆིང་བ།

bandhana

g.45

blessed one

bcom ldan ’das

བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས།

bhagavān
bhagavat

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

In Buddhist literature, this is an epithet applied to buddhas, most often to Śākyamuni. The Sanskrit term generally means “possessing fortune,” but in specifically Buddhist contexts it implies that a buddha is in possession of six auspicious qualities (bhaga) associated with complete awakening. The Tibetan term‍—where bcom is said to refer to “subduing” the four māras, ldan to “possessing” the great qualities of buddhahood, and ’das to “going beyond” saṃsāra and nirvāṇa‍—possibly reflects the commentarial tradition where the Sanskrit bhagavat is interpreted, in addition, as “one who destroys the four māras.” This is achieved either by reading bhagavat as bhagnavat (“one who broke”), or by tracing the word bhaga to the root √bhañj (“to break”).

g.46

body afflicted by corruption

gnas ngan len gyi lus

གནས་ངན་ལེན་གྱི་ལུས།

dauṣṭhulyakāya

g.47

branches of awakening

byang chub kyi yan lag

བྱང་ཆུབ་ཀྱི་ཡན་ལག

bodhyaṅgāni

g.49

buddha field

sangs rgyas kyi zhing

སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ཞིང་།

buddhakṣetra

g.50

buddha realm

sangs rgyas kyi zhing

སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ཞིང་།

buddhakṣetra

g.51

Buddha Stage

sangs rgyas kyi sa

སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ས།

buddhabhūmi

g.53

causal dependence

rang dbang med pa

རང་དབང་མེད་པ།

asvatantra

g.54

cause and effect

rgyu dang ’bras bu

རྒྱུ་དང་འབྲས་བུ།

hetuphala

g.55

changing opinions

blo gros tha dad pa

བློ་གྲོས་ཐ་དད་པ།

matibheda

g.56

characterized by

rab tu phye ba

རབ་ཏུ་ཕྱེ་བ།

prabhāvita

g.58

clear mindfulness

gsal ba

གསལ་བ།

paṭu

g.59

Cloud of Dharma

chos kyi sprin

ཆོས་ཀྱི་སྤྲིན།

dharmameghā

g.60

cognition

rnam par shes pa

རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ།

vijñāna

g.66

comprehension

yongs su shes pa

ཡོངས་སུ་ཤེས་པ།

parijñā

g.68

concentration

ting nge ’dzin

ཏིང་ངེ་འཛིན།

samādhi

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

In a general sense, samādhi can describe a number of different meditative states. In the Mahāyāna literature, in particular in the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras, we find extensive lists of different samādhis, numbering over one hundred.

In a more restricted sense, and when understood as a mental state, samādhi is defined as the one-pointedness of the mind (cittaikāgratā), the ability to remain on the same object over long periods of time. The Drajor Bamponyipa (sgra sbyor bam po gnyis pa) commentary on the Mahāvyutpatti explains the term samādhi as referring to the instrument through which mind and mental states “get collected,” i.e., it is by the force of samādhi that the continuum of mind and mental states becomes collected on a single point of reference without getting distracted.

g.69

conception

’du shes

འདུ་ཤེས།

saṃjñā

g.71

conceptualization

rnam rtog
rnam par rtog pa

རྣམ་རྟོག
རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ།

vikalpa

g.73

conclusive

gcig tu nges pa

གཅིག་ཏུ་ངེས་པ།

aikāntikaḥ

g.74

conditioned

’du byas

འདུ་བྱས།

saṃskṛta

g.75

conditioned phenomena

’du byed

འདུ་བྱེད།

saṃskāra

g.76

conditioning mental factors

’du byed

འདུ་བྱེད།

saṃskāra

g.78

conducive

grogs

གྲོགས།

sahāya

g.80

confusion

’khrul pa

འཁྲུལ་པ།

bhrānta

g.81

consequence

chud mi za ba

ཆུད་མི་ཟ་བ།

avipraṇa

g.83

consisting in

rab tu phye ba

རབ་ཏུ་ཕྱེ་བ།

prabhāvita

g.84

constancy of phenomena

chos gnas pa nyid

ཆོས་གནས་པ་ཉིད།

dharmasthititā

g.85

constant

rnam par gnas pa

རྣམ་པར་གནས་པ།

vyavasthita

g.86

constituent

khams

ཁམས།

dhātu

g.87

constituted

rab tu phye ba

རབ་ཏུ་ཕྱེ་བ།

prabhāvita

g.89

convention

rjes su tha snyad

རྗེས་སུ་ཐ་སྙད།

anuvyavahāra

g.91

correct concentration

yang dag pa’i ting nge ’dzin

ཡང་དག་པའི་ཏིང་ངེ་འཛིན།

samyaksamādhi

g.98

defilement

nyon mongs pa

ཉོན་མོངས་པ།

kleśa

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

The essentially pure nature of mind is obscured and afflicted by various psychological defilements, which destroy the mind’s peace and composure and lead to unwholesome deeds of body, speech, and mind, acting as causes for continued existence in saṃsāra. Included among them are the primary afflictions of desire (rāga), anger (dveṣa), and ignorance (avidyā). It is said that there are eighty-four thousand of these negative mental qualities, for which the eighty-four thousand categories of the Buddha’s teachings serve as the antidote.

Kleśa is also commonly translated as “negative emotions,” “disturbing emotions,” and so on. The Pāli kilesa, Middle Indic kileśa, and Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit kleśa all primarily mean “stain” or “defilement.” The translation “affliction” is a secondary development that derives from the more general (non-Buddhist) classical understanding of √kliś (“to harm,“ “to afflict”). Both meanings are noted by Buddhist commentators.

g.99

defining characteristic

mtshan nyid

མཚན་ཉིད།

svabhāvalakṣaṇa

g.100

defining characteristic

mtshan nyid

མཚན་ཉིད།

lakṣaṇa

g.103

demonstration

bshad pa

བཤད་པ།

deśana

g.104

description

rnam par bsnyad pa

རྣམ་པར་བསྙད་པ།

vyākhyā

g.106

determination

rnam par bzhag pa

རྣམ་པར་བཞག་པ།

vyavasthā

g.107

dhāraṇī

gzungs

གཟུངས།

dhāraṇī

g.108

Dharma discourse

chos kyi rnam grangs

ཆོས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གྲངས།

dharmaparyāya

g.110

Dharmodgata

chos ’phags

ཆོས་འཕགས།

dharmodgata

g.112

diligence

brtson ’grus

བརྩོན་འགྲུས།

viryā

g.113

direct cognition

mngon sum gyi tshad ma

མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་ཚད་མ།

pratyakṣapramāṇa

g.117

discipline

tshul khrims

ཚུལ་ཁྲིམས།

śīla

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

Morally virtuous or disciplined conduct and the abandonment of morally undisciplined conduct of body, speech, and mind. In a general sense, moral discipline is the cause for rebirth in higher, more favorable states, but it is also foundational to Buddhist practice as one of the three trainings (triśikṣā) and one of the six perfections of a bodhisattva. Often rendered as “ethics,” “discipline,” and “morality.”

g.118

discourses teaching Dharma

chos gdags pa rnam par gzhag pa

ཆོས་གདགས་པ་རྣམ་པར་གཞག་པ།

dharmaprajñaptivyavasthā(pa)na

g.120

discrimination of dharmas

chos rab tu rnam par ’byed pa

ཆོས་རབ་ཏུ་རྣམ་པར་འབྱེད་པ།

dharmapravicaya

g.121

distinct

tha dad pa

ཐ་དད་པ།

bheda

g.127

domain of truth

chos kyi dbyings

ཆོས་ཀྱི་དབྱིངས།

dharmadhātu

g.130

dvandva

dvandva

g.131

effortless

lhun gyis grub pa

ལྷུན་གྱིས་གྲུབ་པ།

anābhoga

g.134

emanation

sprul pa

སྤྲུལ་པ།

nirmāṇa

g.135

emanation body

sprul sku

སྤྲུལ་སྐུ།

nirmāṇakāya

g.136

emancipation

nges par ’byung ba

ངེས་པར་འབྱུང་བ།

niḥsaraṇa
niryāṇa

g.137

emptiness

stong pa nyid

སྟོང་པ་ཉིད།

śūnyatā

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

Emptiness denotes the ultimate nature of reality, the total absence of inherent existence and self-identity with respect to all phenomena. According to this view, all things and events are devoid of any independent, intrinsic reality that constitutes their essence. Nothing can be said to exist independent of the complex network of factors that gives rise to its origination, nor are phenomena independent of the cognitive processes and mental constructs that make up the conventional framework within which their identity and existence are posited. When all levels of conceptualization dissolve and when all forms of dichotomizing tendencies are quelled through deliberate meditative deconstruction of conceptual elaborations, the ultimate nature of reality will finally become manifest. It is the first of the three gateways to liberation.

g.141

equanimity

btang snyoms

བཏང་སྙོམས།

upekṣā

g.143

essence

ngo bo nyid

ངོ་བོ་ཉིད།

svabhāva

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

This term denotes the ontological status of phenomena, according to which they are said to possess existence in their own right‍—inherently, in and of themselves, objectively, and independent of any other phenomena such as our conception and labelling. The absence of such an ontological reality is defined as the true nature of reality, emptiness.

g.149

established

rnam par bzhag pa

རྣམ་པར་བཞག་པ།

vyavasthā

g.152

examine

’jal ba

འཇལ་བ།

g.155

Excellent Intelligence

legs pa’i blo gros

ལེགས་པའི་བློ་གྲོས།

sādhumatī

g.161

factors of conditioned existence

srid pa’i yan lag

སྲིད་པའི་ཡན་ལག

bhavāṅga

g.163

faith

dad pa

དད་པ།

śraddhā

g.164

falsity

skyon chags pa

སྐྱོན་ཆགས་པ།

duṣṭatā

g.165

Far Reaching

ring du song ba

རིང་དུ་སོང་བ།

dūraṅgamā

g.167

five faculties

dbang po lnga

དབང་པོ་ལྔ།

pañcendriyāṇi

g.168

five forces

stobs lnga

སྟོབས་ལྔ།

pañcabalāni

g.171

flexibility

shin tu sbyangs pa

ཤིན་ཏུ་སྦྱངས་པ།

praśrabdhi

g.175

formula

gzungs

གཟུངས།

dhāraṇī

g.177

four correct self-restraints

yang dag par spong ba bzhi

ཡང་དག་པར་སྤོང་བ་བཞི།

catvāri prahāṇāni

g.178

four kinds of assurance

mi ’jigs pa bzhi

མི་འཇིགས་པ་བཞི།

catvāri vaiśāradyāni

The four kinds of assurance of a tathāgata are (1) assurance concerning complete awakening (abhisambodhivaiśāradya, thams cad mkhyen pa la mi ’jigs pa ); (2) assurance concerning the destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣayavaiśāradya, zag pa zad pa mkhyen pa la mi ’jigs pa); (3) assurance concerning harmful things (antarāyikadharmavaiśāradya, bar du gcod pa’i chos la mi ’jigs pa); and (4) assurance concerning the path that leads to emancipation (nairyāṇikapratipadvaiśāradya, thob par ’gyur bar nges par ’byung ba’i lam la mi ’jigs pa). See Rahula 2001, p. 230, in which they are called “perfect self-confidence.”

g.179

four kinds of sustenance

zas bzhi

ཟས་བཞི།

catvārāhārāḥ

g.181

four noble truths

’phags pa’i bden pa bzhi

འཕགས་པའི་བདེན་པ་བཞི།

catvāri āryasatyāni

g.185

Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana

don zab dgongs pa nges par ’grel

དོན་ཟབ་དགོངས་པ་ངེས་པར་འགྲེལ།

gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana

g.186

gandharva

dri za

དྲི་ཟ།

gandharva

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

A class of generally benevolent nonhuman beings who inhabit the skies, sometimes said to inhabit fantastic cities in the clouds, and more specifically to dwell on the eastern slopes of Mount Meru, where they are ruled by the Great King Dhṛtarāṣṭra. They are most renowned as celestial musicians who serve the gods. In the Abhidharma, the term is also used to refer to the mental body assumed by sentient beings during the intermediate state between death and rebirth. Gandharvas are said to live on fragrances (gandha) in the desire realm, hence the Tibetan translation dri za, meaning “scent eater.”

g.187

garuḍa

garuḍa

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

In Indian mythology, the garuḍa is an eagle-like bird that is regarded as the king of all birds, normally depicted with a sharp, owl-like beak, often holding a snake, and with large and powerful wings. They are traditionally enemies of the nāgas. In the Vedas, they are said to have brought nectar from the heavens to earth. Garuḍa can also be used as a proper name for a king of such creatures.

g.188

gates of liberation

rnam par thar pa’i sgo

རྣམ་པར་ཐར་པའི་སྒོ།

vimokṣamukha

g.189

gāthā

tshigs su bcad pa

ཚིགས་སུ་བཅད་པ།

gāthā

g.191

gnosis

ye shes

ཡེ་ཤེས།

jñāna

g.193

gone forth

nges par ’byung ba

ངེས་པར་འབྱུང་བ།

niryātaka
parivrājaka

g.195

Guṇākara

yon tan ’byung gnas

ཡོན་ཏན་འབྱུང་གནས།

guṇākara

g.197

Hard to Conquer

shin tu sbyang dka’

ཤིན་ཏུ་སྦྱང་དཀའ།

sudurjayā

g.198

hearer

nyan thos

ཉན་ཐོས།

śrāvaka

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

The Sanskrit term śrāvaka, and the Tibetan nyan thos, both derived from the verb “to hear,” are usually defined as “those who hear the teaching from the Buddha and make it heard to others.” Primarily this refers to those disciples of the Buddha who aspire to attain the state of an arhat seeking their own liberation and nirvāṇa. They are the practitioners of the first turning of the wheel of the Dharma on the four noble truths, who realize the suffering inherent in saṃsāra and focus on understanding that there is no independent self. By conquering afflicted mental states (kleśa), they liberate themselves, attaining first the stage of stream enterers at the path of seeing, followed by the stage of once-returners who will be reborn only one more time, and then the stage of non-returners who will no longer be reborn into the desire realm. The final goal is to become an arhat. These four stages are also known as the “four results of spiritual practice.”

g.200

how

ji tsam du

ཇི་ཙམ་དུ།

tāvatā
tāvat
yāvat

g.202

Illuminating

’od byed pa

འོད་བྱེད་པ།

prabhākarī

g.203

image

gzugs brnyan

གཟུགས་བརྙན།

pratibimba

g.204

imaginary

kun brtags pa

ཀུན་བརྟགས་པ།

parikalpita

g.206

imaginary essence

kun brtags pa’i ngo bo nyid
kun brtags pa’i rang bzhin

ཀུན་བརྟགས་པའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད།
ཀུན་བརྟགས་པའི་རང་བཞིན།

parikalpitasvabhāva

g.208

Immovable

mi g.yo ba

མི་གཡོ་བ།

acalā

g.211

inconclusive

gcig tu ma nges pa

གཅིག་ཏུ་མ་ངེས་པ།

anaikāntikaḥ

g.213

Inexpressible

brjod du med

བརྗོད་དུ་མེད།

anabhilāpya

g.214

inference

rjes su dpag pa’i tshad ma

རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པའི་ཚད་མ།

anumānapramāṇa

g.219

insight

lhag mthong

ལྷག་མཐོང་།

vipaśyanā

g.220

intelligence

blo gros

བློ་གྲོས།

mati

g.221

intention

bsam pa

བསམ་པ།

āśaya

g.223

investigation

dpyod pa

དཔྱོད་པ།

vicāra

g.225

joy

dga’ ba

དགའ་བ།

prīti

g.226

karmadhāraya

karmadhāraya

g.227

keep it in mind

gzung bar bgyi

གཟུང་བར་བགྱི།

dhārayāmi

g.228

keep it in mind

zung shig

ཟུང་ཤིག

dhāraya

g.229

keeping it in mind

gzungs

གཟུངས།

dhāraṇī

g.230

kinnara

kinnara

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

A class of nonhuman beings that resemble humans to the degree that their very name‍—which means “is that human?”‍—suggests some confusion as to their divine status. Kinnaras are mythological beings found in both Buddhist and Brahmanical literature, where they are portrayed as creatures half human, half animal. They are often depicted as highly skilled celestial musicians.

g.231

Kīrtimat

grags pa can

གྲགས་པ་ཅན།

kīrtimat

g.233

lacked certainty

yid gnyis can

ཡིད་གཉིས་ཅན།

vimati

g.234

latent disposition

bag la nyal

བག་ལ་ཉལ།

anuśaya

g.235

liberation

rnam par thar pa

རྣམ་པར་ཐར་པ།

vimokṣa

g.239

mahoraga

mahoraga

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

Literally “great serpents,” mahoragas are supernatural beings depicted as large, subterranean beings with human torsos and heads and the lower bodies of serpents. Their movements are said to cause earthquakes, and they make up a class of subterranean geomantic spirits whose movement through the seasons and months of the year is deemed significant for construction projects.

g.240

Maitreya

byams pa

བྱམས་པ།

maitreya

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

The bodhisattva Maitreya is an important figure in many Buddhist traditions, where he is unanimously regarded as the buddha of the future era. He is said to currently reside in the heaven of Tuṣita, as Śākyamuni’s regent, where he awaits the proper time to take his final rebirth and become the fifth buddha in the Fortunate Eon, reestablishing the Dharma in this world after the teachings of the current buddha have disappeared. Within the Mahāyāna sūtras, Maitreya is elevated to the same status as other central bodhisattvas such as Mañjuśrī and Avalokiteśvara, and his name appears frequently in sūtras, either as the Buddha’s interlocutor or as a teacher of the Dharma. Maitreya literally means “Loving One.” He is also known as Ajita, meaning “Invincible.”

For more information on Maitreya, see, for example, the introduction to Maitreya’s Setting Out (Toh 198).

g.241

Manifest

mngon du gyur pa

མངོན་དུ་གྱུར་པ།

abhimukhī

g.242

Mañjuśrī

’jam dpal

འཇམ་དཔལ།

mañjuśrī

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

Mañjuśrī is one of the “eight close sons of the Buddha” and a bodhisattva who embodies wisdom. He is a major figure in the Mahāyāna sūtras, appearing often as an interlocutor of the Buddha. In his most well-known iconographic form, he is portrayed bearing the sword of wisdom in his right hand and a volume of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in his left. To his name, Mañjuśrī, meaning “Gentle and Glorious One,” is often added the epithet Kumārabhūta, “having a youthful form.” He is also called Mañjughoṣa, Mañjusvara, and Pañcaśikha.

g.243

mātṛkā

ma mo

མ་མོ།

mātṛkā

g.244

meaning of true reality

de kho na’i don

དེ་ཁོ་ནའི་དོན།

tattvārtha

g.245

meditative absorption

bsam gtan

བསམ་གཏན།

dhyāna

g.247

mental elaboration

spros pa

སྤྲོས་པ།

prapañca

g.252

mental stillness

zhi gnas

ཞི་གནས།

śamatha

g.254

mind

sems

སེམས།

citta

g.256

mindfulness

dran pa

དྲན་པ།

smṛti

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

This is the faculty that enables the mind to maintain its attention on a referent object, counteracting the arising of forgetfulness, which is a great obstacle to meditative stability. The root smṛ may mean “to recollect” but also simply “to think of.” Broadly speaking, smṛti, commonly translated as “mindfulness,” means to bring something to mind, not necessarily something experienced in a distant past but also something that is experienced in the present, such as the position of one’s body or the breath.

Together with alertness (samprajāna, shes bzhin), it is one of the two indispensable factors for the development of calm abiding (śamatha, zhi gnas).

g.257

nāga

ཀླུ།

nāga

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

A class of nonhuman beings who live in subterranean aquatic environments, where they guard wealth and sometimes also teachings. Nāgas are associated with serpents and have a snakelike appearance. In Buddhist art and in written accounts, they are regularly portrayed as half human and half snake, and they are also said to have the ability to change into human form. Some nāgas are Dharma protectors, but they can also bring retribution if they are disturbed. They may likewise fight one another, wage war, and destroy the lands of others by causing lightning, hail, and flooding.

g.259

nature of phenomena

chos nyid

ཆོས་ཉིད།

dharmatā

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

The real nature, true quality, or condition of things. Throughout Buddhist discourse this term is used in two distinct ways. In one, it designates the relative nature that is either the essential characteristic of a specific phenomenon, such as the heat of fire and the moisture of water, or the defining feature of a specific term or category. The other very important and widespread way it is used is to designate the ultimate nature of all phenomena, which cannot be conveyed in conceptual, dualistic terms and is often synonymous with emptiness or the absence of intrinsic existence.

g.263

next life

’jig rten pha rol

འཇིག་རྟེན་ཕ་རོལ།

paraloka

g.264

nidāna

gleng gzhi

གླེང་གཞི།

nidāna

g.265

nirvāṇa

mya ngan las ’das pa

མྱ་ངན་ལས་འདས་པ།

nirvāṇa

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

In Sanskrit, the term nirvāṇa literally means “extinguishment” and the Tibetan mya ngan las ’das pa literally means “gone beyond sorrow.” As a general term, it refers to the cessation of all suffering, afflicted mental states (kleśa), and causal processes (karman) that lead to rebirth and suffering in cyclic existence, as well as to the state in which all such rebirth and suffering has permanently ceased.

More specifically, three main types of nirvāṇa are identified. (1) The first type of nirvāṇa, called nirvāṇa with remainder (sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa), is the state in which arhats or buddhas have attained awakening but are still dependent on the conditioned aggregates until their lifespan is exhausted. (2) At the end of life, given that there are no more causes for rebirth, these aggregates cease and no new aggregates arise. What occurs then is called nirvāṇa without remainder ( anupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa), which refers to the unconditioned element (dhātu) of nirvāṇa in which there is no remainder of the aggregates. (3) The Mahāyāna teachings distinguish the final nirvāṇa of buddhas from that of arhats, the nirvāṇa of arhats not being considered ultimate. The buddhas attain what is called nonabiding nirvāṇa (apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa), which transcends the extremes of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, i.e., existence and peace. This is the nirvāṇa that is the goal of the Mahāyāna path.

g.268

non-Buddhist

mu stegs pa

མུ་སྟེགས་པ།

tīrthika

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

Those of other religious or philosophical orders, contemporary with the early Buddhist order, including Jains, Jaṭilas, Ājīvikas, and Cārvākas. Tīrthika (“forder”) literally translates as “one belonging to or associated with (possessive suffix –ika) stairs for landing or for descent into a river,” or “a bathing place,” or “a place of pilgrimage on the banks of sacred streams” (Monier-Williams). The term may have originally referred to temple priests at river crossings or fords where travelers propitiated a deity before crossing. The Sanskrit term seems to have undergone metonymic transfer in referring to those able to ford the turbulent river of saṃsāra (as in the Jain tīrthaṅkaras, “ford makers”), and it came to be used in Buddhist sources to refer to teachers of rival religious traditions. The Sanskrit term is closely rendered by the Tibetan mu stegs pa: “those on the steps (stegs pa) at the edge (mu).”

g.269

nonduality

gnyis su med pa

གཉིས་སུ་མེད་པ།

advaya

g.270

object

dngos po
yul

དངོས་པོ།
ཡུལ།

vastu

g.271

object conducive to purification

rnam par dag pa’i dmigs pa

རྣམ་པར་དག་པའི་དམིགས་པ།

*viśuddhyālambana

g.272

object of experience

spyod yul

སྤྱོད་ཡུལ།

gocara

g.275

obstacle

gegs

གེགས།

vibandha

g.277

of a single nature

ro gcig pa

རོ་གཅིག་པ།

ekarasa

g.279

ordinary being

so so’i skye bo

སོ་སོའི་སྐྱེ་བོ།

pṛthagjana

g.283

Paramārthasamudgata

don dam yang dag ’phags

དོན་དམ་ཡང་དག་འཕགས།

paramārthasamudgata

g.284

parinirvāṇa

yongs su mya ngan las ’das pa

ཡོངས་སུ་མྱ་ངན་ལས་འདས་པ།

parinirvāṇa

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

This refers to what occurs at the end of an arhat’s or a buddha’s life. When nirvāṇa is attained at awakening, whether as an arhat or buddha, all suffering, afflicted mental states (kleśa), and causal processes (karman) that lead to rebirth and suffering in cyclic existence have ceased, but due to previously accumulated karma, the aggregates of that life remain and must still exhaust themselves. It is only at the end of life that these cease, and since no new aggregates arise, the arhat or buddha is said to attain parinirvāṇa, meaning “complete” or “final” nirvāṇa. This is synonymous with the attainment of nirvāṇa without remainder (anupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa).

According to the Mahāyāna view of a single vehicle (ekayāna), the arhat’s parinirvāṇa at death, despite being so called, is not final. The arhat must still enter the bodhisattva path and reach buddhahood (see Unraveling the Intent, Toh 106, 7.14.) On the other hand, the parinirvāṇa of a buddha, ultimately speaking, should be understood as a display manifested for the benefit of beings; see The Teaching on the Extraordinary Transformation That Is the Miracle of Attaining the Buddha’s Powers (Toh 186), 1.32.

The term parinirvāṇa is also associated specifically with the passing away of the Buddha Śākyamuni, in Kuśinagara, in northern India.

g.285

pathway

nges par ’byung ba

ངེས་པར་འབྱུང་བ།

niḥsaraṇa
niryāṇa

g.288

perfection

pha rol tu phyin pa

ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པ།

pāramitā

g.290

perfectly pure cognition

blo shin tu rnam par dag pa

བློ་ཤིན་ཏུ་རྣམ་པར་དག་པ།

suviśuddhabuddhiḥ

g.292

phenomenal appearance

mtshan ma

མཚན་མ།

nimitta

g.294

point where phenomena end

dngos po’i mtha’

དངོས་པོའི་མཐའ།

vastvanta

g.296

posited

rnam par bzhag pa

རྣམ་པར་བཞག་པ།

vyavasthā

g.298

prasiddhānumāṇa

prasiddhānumāṇa

g.299

prātimokṣa

so sor thar pa

སོ་སོར་ཐར་པ།

prātimokṣa

“Prātimokṣa” is the name given to the code of conduct binding on monks and nuns. The term can be used to refer both to the disciplinary rules themselves and to the texts from the Vinaya that contain them. There are multiple recensions of the Prātimokṣa, each transmitted by a different monastic fraternity in ancient and medieval India. Three remain living traditions, one of them the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya of Tibetan Buddhism. Though the numbers of rules vary across the different recensions, they are all organized according to the same principles and with the same disciplinary categories. It is customary for monastics to recite the Prātimokṣa Sūtra fortnightly. According to some Mahāyana sūtras, a separate set of prātimokṣa rules exists for bodhisattvas, which are based on bodhisattva conduct as taught in that vehicle.

g.300

predisposition

bag la nyal

བག་ལ་ཉལ།

anuśaya

g.301

primordially in the state of peace

gzod ma nas zhib

གཟོད་མ་ནས་ཞིབ།

ādiśānta

g.302

prince

gzhon nur gyur pa

གཞོན་ནུར་གྱུར་པ།

kumārabhūta

g.303

principle of reason

rigs pa

རིགས་པ།

yukti

The four principles of reason (yukti) are : (1) the principle of reason based on dependence (apekṣāyukti), (2) the principle of reason based on cause and effect (kāryakāraṇayukti), (3) the principle of reason based on logical proof (upapattisādhanayukti), and (4) the principle of reason based on the nature of phenomena itself (dharmatāyukti).

On “principle of reason” as a translation for yukti, see Kapstein 1988, p. 152ff. See also Lin 2010 for an overview of yukti in Saṃdh.

g.304

principle of reason based on cause and effect

bya ba byed pa’i rigs pa

བྱ་བ་བྱེད་པའི་རིགས་པ།

kāryakāraṇayukti

g.305

principle of reason based on dependence

de la ltos pa’i rigs pa

དེ་ལ་ལྟོས་པའི་རིགས་པ།

apekṣāyukti

g.306

principle of reason based on logical proof

’thad pas sgrub pa’i rigs pa

འཐད་པས་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རིགས་པ།

upapattisādhanayukti

g.307

principle of reason based on the nature of phenomena itself

chos nyid kyi rigs pa

ཆོས་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པ།

dharmatāyukti

g.309

purification

rnam par dag pa

རྣམ་པར་དག་པ།

viśuddhi

g.311

quality

chos

ཆོས།

dharma

g.312

Radiant

’od ’phro ba can

འོད་འཕྲོ་བ་ཅན།

arciṣmatī

g.313

reason

rtags

རྟགས།

hetu

g.316

referential object

dmigs pa

དམིགས་པ།

ālambana

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

dmigs (pa) translates a number of Sanskrit terms, including ālambana, upalabdhi, and ālambate. These terms commonly refer to the apprehending of a subject, an object, and the relationships that exist between them. The term may also be translated as “referentiality,” meaning a system based on the existence of referent objects, referent subjects, and the referential relationships that exist between them. As part of their doctrine of “threefold nonapprehending/nonreferentiality” (’khor gsum mi dmigs pa), Mahāyāna Buddhists famously assert that all three categories of apprehending lack substantiality.

g.317

reflection

gzugs brnyan

གཟུགས་བརྙན།

pratibimba

g.319

room

gnas

གནས།

sthāna

g.321

sapakṣa

sapakṣa

g.324

sense domain

skye mched

སྐྱེ་མཆེད།

āyatana

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

These can be listed as twelve or as six sense sources (sometimes also called sense fields, bases of cognition, or simply āyatanas).

In the context of epistemology, it is one way of describing experience and the world in terms of twelve sense sources, which can be divided into inner and outer sense sources, namely: (1–2) eye and form, (3–4) ear and sound, (5–6) nose and odor, (7–8) tongue and taste, (9–10) body and touch, (11–12) mind and mental phenomena.

In the context of the twelve links of dependent origination, only six sense sources are mentioned, and they are the inner sense sources (identical to the six faculties) of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind.

g.325

sentient being

sems can

སེམས་ཅན།

sattva

g.327

seven precious substances

rin po che sna bdun

རིན་པོ་ཆེ་སྣ་བདུན།

saptaratna

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

The set of seven precious materials or substances includes a range of precious metals and gems, but their exact list varies. The set often consists of gold, silver, beryl, crystal, red pearls, emeralds, and white coral, but may also contain lapis lazuli, ruby, sapphire, chrysoberyl, diamonds, etc. The term is frequently used in the sūtras to exemplify preciousness, wealth, and beauty, and can describe treasures, offering materials, or the features of architectural structures such as stūpas, palaces, thrones, etc. The set is also used to describe the beauty and prosperity of buddha realms and the realms of the gods.

In other contexts, the term saptaratna can also refer to the seven precious possessions of a cakravartin or to a set of seven precious moral qualities.

g.329

shift in one’s basis of existence

gnas gyur pa

གནས་གྱུར་པ།

āśrayaparivṛtti

g.330

Single Vehicle

theg pa gcig pa

ཐེག་པ་གཅིག་པ།

ekayāna

g.332

slow-witted

blo gros ngan pa

བློ་གྲོས་ངན་པ།

kumati

g.333

solitary realizer

rang sangs rgyas

རང་སངས་རྒྱས།

pratyekabuddha

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

Literally, “buddha for oneself” or “solitary realizer.” Someone who, in his or her last life, attains awakening entirely through their own contemplation, without relying on a teacher. Unlike the awakening of a fully realized buddha (samyaksambuddha), the accomplishment of a pratyekabuddha is not regarded as final or ultimate. They attain realization of the nature of dependent origination, the selflessness of the person, and a partial realization of the selflessness of phenomena, by observing the suchness of all that arises through interdependence. This is the result of progress in previous lives but, unlike a buddha, they do not have the necessary merit, compassion or motivation to teach others. They are named as “rhinoceros-like” (khaḍgaviṣāṇakalpa) for their preference for staying in solitude or as “congregators” (vargacārin) when their preference is to stay among peers.

g.334

sovereign power

byin gyi rlabs

བྱིན་གྱི་རླབས།

adhiṣṭhāna
adhiṣṭhita

This term is usually translated into English with “blessings.” However, as explained in Edgerton 1953, p. 15; Eckel 1994, pp. 90–93; Gómez 2011, pp. 539 and 541; and Fiordalis 2012, pp. 104 and 118, adhiṣṭhāna conveys the notions of control (of one’s environment as a result of meditative absorption), authority, or protection (see Abhidharmakośa VII.51, cf. La Vallée Poussin 1925, p. 119ff.). Adhiṣṭhāna is also used to convey the idea of transformation through exerting one’s control over objects, people, and places. The term “sovereign power” seems to cover all these shades of meaning as well as the various usages of the Sanskrit term, for example satyādhiṣṭhāna “the sovereign power of truth” and adhiṣṭhānādhiṣṭita “empowered by the sovereign power (of the Tathāgata).”

g.335

space

nam mkha’

ནམ་མཁའ།

ākāśa

g.336

specific defining characteristic

rang gi mtshan nyid

རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

svalakṣaṇa

g.337

sphere of activity

spyod yul

སྤྱོད་ཡུལ།

gocara

g.339

stage

ས།

bhūmi

g.340

stage of engagement through aspiration

mos pa spyod pa’i sa

མོས་པ་སྤྱོད་པའི་ས།

adhimukticaryābhūmiḥ

g.342

Stainless

dri ma med pa

དྲི་མ་མེད་པ།

vimalā

g.343

Subhūti

rab ’byor

རབ་འབྱོར།

subhūti

g.353

Suviśuddhamati

blo gros shin tu rnam dag

བློ་གྲོས་ཤིན་ཏུ་རྣམ་དག

suviśuddhamati

g.354

tathāgata

de bzhin gshegs pa

དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ།

tathāgata

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

A frequently used synonym for buddha. According to different explanations, it can be read as tathā-gata, literally meaning “one who has thus gone,” or as tathā-āgata, “one who has thus come.” Gata, though literally meaning “gone,” is a past passive participle used to describe a state or condition of existence. Tatha(tā), often rendered as “suchness” or “thusness,” is the quality or condition of things as they really are, which cannot be conveyed in conceptual, dualistic terms. Therefore, this epithet is interpreted in different ways, but in general it implies one who has departed in the wake of the buddhas of the past, or one who has manifested the supreme awakening dependent on the reality that does not abide in the two extremes of existence and quiescence. It is also often used as a specific epithet of the Buddha Śākyamuni.

g.355

tatpuruṣa

tatpuruṣa

g.356

teachings on the basis of serious downfalls

pham pa’i gnas lta bu’i chos
pham pa’i gnas lta bu

ཕམ་པའི་གནས་ལྟ་བུའི་ཆོས།
ཕམ་པའི་གནས་ལྟ་བུ།

pārājayikasthānīyadharmāḥ
pārājayikasthānīya

g.357

teachings on the basis of transgressions

ltung ba’i gnas lta bu’i chos

ལྟུང་བའི་གནས་ལྟ་བུའི་ཆོས།

mananāpatti sthānīya[dharmāḥ]

g.358

teachings on the ceremony of taking [the vows of the bodhisattva discipline]

[byang chub sems dpa’i tshul khrims kyi sdom pa] yang dag par blang ba

byang chub sems dpa'i tshul khrims kyi sdom pa་ཡང་དག་པར་བླང་བ།

[bodhisattvaśīlasaṃvara]samādāna

g.359

ten powers

stobs bcu

སྟོབས་བཅུ།

daśabala

The ten powers (daśabala, stobs bcu) of the Tathāgata are (1) the power of knowledge of what is possible and what is not possible (sthānāsthānajñānabala, gnas dang gnas ma yin pa mkhyen pa’i stobs); (2) the power of knowledge of the individual results of actions (karmasvakajñānabala, las kyi rnam smin mkhyen pa’i stobs); (3) the power of knowledge of different practices leading to various destinies (sarvatragāminīpratipajjñānabala, thams cad du ’gro ba’i lam mkhyen pa’i stobs); (4) the power of knowledge of the different dispositions and tendencies of different beings (anekadhātunānādhātujñānabala, khams sna tshogs mkhyen pa’i stobs); (5) the power of knowledge of the different aspirations of beings (nānādhimuktijñānabala, mos pa sna tshogs mkhyen pa’i stobs); (6) the power of knowledge of the different degrees of development of the faculties and inclinations of beings (indriyaparāparyajñānabala, dbang po mchog dang mchog ma yin pa mkhyen pa’i stobs); (7) the power of knowledge of the absorptions, deliverances, concentrations, and attainments (dhyānavimokṣasamādhisamāpattijñānabala, bsam gtan dang rnam thar dang ting nge ’dzin dang snyoms par ’jug pa thams cad mkhyen pa’i stobs); (8) the power of knowledge of previous lives (pūrvanivāsajñānabala, sngon gyi gnas rjes su dran pa mkhyen pa’i stobs); (9) the power of knowledge of the deaths and births of beings according to their actions (cyutyupapādajñānabala, ’chi ’pho bo dang skye ba mkhyen pa’i stobs); and (10) the power of knowledge of the destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣayajñānabala, zag pa zad pa mkhyen pa’i stobs). (Rahula 2001: 229–230, n118).

g.360

that which must be established

grub par bya ba

གྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བ།

sādhya

g.362

thesis

so so’i shes pa
dam bcas

སོ་སོའི་ཤེས་པ།
དམ་བཅས།

pratijñā

g.363

thing

dngos po
ngo bo

དངོས་པོ།
ངོ་བོ།

bhāva

g.365

those not following you

slad rol pa

སླད་རོལ་པ།

tīrthika

g.366

thought

ཡིད།

manas

g.368

three worlds

khams gsum

ཁམས་གསུམ།

tridhātu
traidhātuka

g.371

trichiliocosm

stong gsum gyi stong chen po’i ’jig rten gyi khams

སྟོང་གསུམ་གྱི་སྟོང་ཆེན་པོའི་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱི་ཁམས།

trisāhasra mahāssāhasralokadhātu

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

The largest universe described in Buddhist cosmology. This term, in Abhidharma cosmology, refers to 1,000^³ world systems, i.e., 1,000 “dichiliocosms” or “two thousand great thousand world realms” (dvisāhasramahāsāhasralokadhātu), which are in turn made up of 1,000 first-order world systems, each with its own Mount Sumeru, continents, sun and moon, etc.

g.373

true reality

de bzhin nyid
de kho na
de nyid

དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད།
དེ་ཁོ་ན།
དེ་ཉིད།

tathatā
tattva

g.374

truly

ji tsam du

ཇི་ཙམ་དུ།

yāvat
tāvatā
tāvat

g.375

truth

bden pa

བདེན་པ།

satya

g.376

truth body

chos kyi sku

ཆོས་ཀྱི་སྐུ།

dharmakāya

g.377

two truths

bden pa gnyis

བདེན་པ་གཉིས།

satyadvaya

g.378

ultimate

don dam pa
don dam

དོན་དམ་པ།
དོན་དམ།

paramārtha

g.382

unborn

ma skyes pa

མ་སྐྱེས་པ།

anutpanna

g.383

unconditioned

’du ma byas

འདུ་མ་བྱས།

asaṃskṛta

g.387

universe of a thousand worlds

stong gi ’jig rten gyi khams

སྟོང་གི་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱི་ཁམས།

sāhasracūḍikalokadhātu

g.388

unproduced by intentional action

mngon par ’du bya ba med pa

མངོན་པར་འདུ་བྱ་བ་མེད་པ།

anabhisaṃskāraṇa
anabhisaṃskāra

g.391

useful

gces spras byed pa

གཅེས་སྤྲས་བྱེད་པ།

bahukara

g.392

Utmost Joy

rab tu dga’ ba

རབ་ཏུ་དགའ་བ།

pramuditā

g.394

valid

yongs su dag pa

ཡོངས་སུ་དག་པ།

pariśuddha

g.395

valid cognition

tshad ma

ཚད་མ།

pramāṇa

g.397

Vidhivatparipṛcchaka

tshul bzhin kun ’dri

ཚུལ་བཞིན་ཀུན་འདྲི།

vidhivatparipṛcchaka

g.398

vigor

brtson ’grus

བརྩོན་འགྲུས།

vīrya

g.399

vipakṣa

vipakṣa

g.400

Viśālakīrti

viśālakīrti

g.401

Viśālamati

blo gros yangs pa

བློ་གྲོས་ཡངས་པ།

viśālamati

g.402

vow

sdom pa

སྡོམ་པ།

saṃvara

g.405

whose defining characteristic is beyond all speculation

rtog ge thams cad las yang dag par ’das pa

རྟོག་གེ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལས་ཡང་དག་པར་འདས་པ།

sarvatarkasamatikrānta

g.407

wisdom

shes rab

ཤེས་རབ།

prajñā

g.408

wishlessness

smon pa med pa

སྨོན་པ་མེད་པ།

apraṇihita

g.410

without a person

zag med

ཟག་མེད།

anāsrava

g.412

wrongly conceive

mngon par zhen

མངོན་པར་ཞེན།

abhiniviśanti

g.413

yakṣa

yakṣa

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

A class of nonhuman beings who inhabit forests, mountainous areas, and other natural spaces, or serve as guardians of villages and towns, and may be propitiated for health, wealth, protection, and other boons, or controlled through magic. According to tradition, their homeland is in the north, where they live under the rule of the Great King Vaiśravaṇa.

Several members of this class have been deified as gods of wealth (these include the just-mentioned Vaiśravaṇa) or as bodhisattva generals of yakṣa armies, and have entered the Buddhist pantheon in a variety of forms, including, in tantric Buddhism, those of wrathful deities.

g.414

yoga

sbyor ba

སྦྱོར་བ།

yoga

Unraveling the Intent Chapter 10

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Unraveling the Intent
Chapter 10