Distinctly Ascertaining the Meanings

A formless state, either a meditative state or its resultant realm of existence, i.e., a class of deities of the formless realm.

A formless state, either a meditative state or its resultant realm of existence, i.e., a class of deities of the formless realm.

Teacher, sometimes more specifically the deputy or substitute of the upādhyāya.

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

The essentially pure nature of mind is obscured and afflicted by various psychological defilements, which destroy the mind’s peace and composure and lead to unwholesome deeds of body, speech, and mind, acting as causes for continued existence in saṃsāra. Included among them are the primary afflictions of desire (rāga), anger (dveṣa), and ignorance (avidyā). It is said that there are eighty-four thousand of these negative mental qualities, for which the eighty-four thousand categories of the Buddha’s teachings serve as the antidote.

Kleśa is also commonly translated as “negative emotions,” “disturbing emotions,” and so on. The Pāli kilesa, Middle Indic kileśa, and Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit kleśa all primarily mean “stain” or “defilement.” The translation “affliction” is a secondary development that derives from the more general (non-Buddhist) classical understanding of √kliś (“to harm,“ “to afflict”). Both meanings are noted by Buddhist commentators.

A mental factor understood either as “the subtlety of the mind” or as the cause for such subtlety. More elaborate definitions explain it as a type of “mental murmur” (manojalpa) that is searching (paryeṣaka) and can be either based on intention (cetanā) or on wisdom (prajñā). See also “deliberation” (vitarka).

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

According to Buddhist tradition, one who is worthy of worship (pūjām arhati), or one who has conquered the enemies, the mental afflictions (kleśa-ari-hata-vat), and reached liberation from the cycle of rebirth and suffering. It is the fourth and highest of the four fruits attainable by śrāvakas. Also used as an epithet of the Buddha.

Yathā means “in accordance”/“just as,” and bhūta is a participle from the root bhū, which can mean “to exist” or “to come into existence.” The term yathābhūta is a key term in Buddhist texts, indicating the way things are, the nature of things, etc. It is usually used adverbially, indicating the way in which someone cognizes.

In its broadest sense, the term saṁskāra includes all impermanent entities when understood as causes. The prefix sam is here understood as indicating “coming together” or “assembling,” while the root kṛ means “to produce,” “to create.”

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

A type of nonhuman being whose precise status is subject to different views, but is included as one of the six classes of beings in the sixfold classification of realms of rebirth. In the Buddhist context, asuras are powerful beings said to be dominated by envy, ambition, and hostility. They are also known in the pre-Buddhist and pre-Vedic mythologies of India and Iran, and feature prominently in Vedic and post-Vedic Brahmanical mythology, as well as in the Buddhist tradition. In these traditions, asuras are often described as being engaged in interminable conflict with the devas (gods).

One of the three basic mental afflictions (together with aversion and confusion) within which all other mental afflictions can be subsumed. The term rāga comes from the root rañj, which can also have the sense of “to color,” thus making it possible to create significant double-meanings in Sanskrit (rakta can thus mean “impassioned,” but also “red” or “blood”). Liberated beings are often described as vītarāga, “free from attraction.”

The term jñāna is formed by the root jñā, meaning “to know,” “to know of,” “to understand,” “to be aware of,” with the addition of the pratyaya lyuṭ, which can be interpreted as having different values (the instrument of awareness, its agent, or the action of awareness). We have chosen “awareness” as it was the only that seemed to fit for two important (and not unrelated) contexts wherein jñāna is used: awareness of something, and nonobjective, nonconceptual awareness. In Tibetan the two senses are sometimes distinguished by using shes pa and ye shes, respectively, but the distinction in the usage of these two terms is not clearly marked in works that are translations from the Sanskrit, and hence it is less relevant for the Kangyur than it may be for indigenous Tibetan works. The nature of jñāna and its relationship with “wisdom” (prajñā) is the topic of one of the chapters of the Abhidharmakośa and is also thematized in a number of Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras.

Epithet of a buddha; “one who has fortune” (explained as having six features) or “one who has vanquished (Māra).”

The term bhikṣu, which is often translated as “monk,” refers to the highest type among the eight types of prātimokṣa vows that make one part of the Buddhist assembly. The term is explained as having at least three possible meanings: (1) someone who begs; (2) someone who has taken the highest level of Buddhist ordination; and (3) someone who has destroyed mental afflictions.

Someone who practices according to the vehicle of the bodhisattvas, those who aim at complete buddhahood; the term is explained as “awakening hero,” “one who has a wish for awakening,” or also “one who awakens sentient beings.”

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

A high-ranking deity presiding over a divine world; he is also considered to be the lord of the Sahā world (our universe). Though not considered a creator god in Buddhism, Brahmā occupies an important place as one of two gods (the other being Indra/Śakra) said to have first exhorted the Buddha Śākyamuni to teach the Dharma. The particular heavens found in the form realm over which Brahmā rules are often some of the most sought-after realms of higher rebirth in Buddhist literature. Since there are many universes or world systems, there are also multiple Brahmās presiding over them. His most frequent epithets are “Lord of the Sahā World” (sahāṃpati) and Great Brahmā (mahābrahman).

Here the sense is “the supreme wheel” or perhaps “the wheel of what is supreme.” See brahmacakkaṃ pavattetīti ettha brahmanti seṭṭhaṃ uttamaṃ visiṭṭhaṃ | Mahāsīhanādasutta-Aṭṭhakathā, Mūlapaṇṇāsa, Majjhimanikāya.

Brahman is a Sanskrit term referring to what is highest (parama) and most important (pradhāna); the Nibandhana commentary explains brahman as meaning here nirvāṇa, and thus the brahman conduct is the “conduct toward brahman,” the conduct that leads to the highest liberation, i.e., nirvāṇa. This is explained as “the path without outflows,” which is the “truth of the path” among the four truths of the noble ones. Other explanations (found in the Pāli tradition) take “brahman conduct” to mean the “best conduct,” and also the “conduct of the best,” i.e., the buddhas. In some contexts, “brahman conduct” refers more specifically to celibacy, but the specific referents of this expression are many.

The translation is meant to somehow echo the etymology of prati + bhāna (“forth” + “shine”), and the term does mean something like “intelligence,” “inspiration,” or “eloquence,” often referring to the intelligent presence of mind that allows one to speak in the most appropriate way, even for very long stretches of time.

The term upādāna figures in at least two prominent contexts within basic Buddhist classifications. Firstly, the five aggregates are also called “aggregates of clinging” when they refer to a nonliberated person. According to the Nibandhana commentary on Distinctly Ascertaining the Meanings, they are called “aggregates of clinging” for different reasons: they are “born from the clingings” because the aggregates arise due to the three mental afflictions of attraction, aversion, and confusion, which can also be called “clingings”; or, they are so called because the aggregates are under the control of the “clingings,” in the sense that it is due to the three mental afflictions that the aggregates remerge, after death, in a new realm of existence (Samtani 1971, pp. 87–88; the explanation in the Nibandhana partly follows Abhidharma­kośa­bhāṣya on kārikā 1.8; see Pradhan 1967, p. 5).

Another important context of the term upādāna is as the ninth of the “twelve parts of dependent arising.” Here upādāna arises with craving (tṛṣṇā) as its condition. The difference between “craving” and “clinging” is explained by Vasubandhu as follows: it is “craving” when one strongly wants enjoyments but has not yet started searching for those objects of enjoyments (yāvan na tadviṣaya­paryeṣṭim āpadyate); it is “clinging” once one starts seeking ways to obtain those objects of enjoyments and thus runs in all directions (viṣaya­prāptaye paryeṣṭim āpannaḥ sarvato dhāvati). See Pradhan 1967, p. 132.

The term vijñāna is formed by the prefix vi plus a formation from the root jñā, which means “to know,” “to understand,” “to know of,” “to be aware of.” (This is reproduced in the Tibetan as rnam par + shes pa.) “Consciousness” has a specific meaning in Buddhist texts and refers to awareness of an object, point of reference, or support. This meaning is occasionally obtained by understanding the vi as standing for viṣaya, which means a domain of activity and, in this case, the object of perception. The standard list of consciousness types is six, corresponding to the five sense faculties plus the “thought consciousness.” This refers to a type of mental perception that arises taking as its basis not a sense faculty but a prior moment of consciousness itself; this type of consciousness is unrestricted as per its possible range of objects, both in terms of their location in time (past, present, or future) and in terms of their type (visual, audible, etc., including entities that are not within the range of any of the five senses).

This can mean either, more literally, “touch,” or coming into contact; in the context of the twelve parts of dependent arising, “contact” refers more specifically to the coming together of the object, faculty, and consciousness. According to some abhidharma masters, this coming together gives rise to a specific entity called “contact,” while others consider “contact” to simply describe a specific state of those three entities, i.e., when object, faculty, and consciousness are “together” and thus able to give rise to notion. It is also worth noticing that the root spṛś is used far more often in Sanskrit than either “to touch” or “to come in contact with” is used in English, and can often mean something like “to obtain” etc.

The highest level of the desire realm.

This refers to the habit of copulation, called a dharma perhaps as it is a property/feature that belongs to those who copulate, or in the sense of something that is one’s course of behavior.

The eighth of the twelve parts of dependent arising.

A class of deities, the first, i.e., lowest, in the form realm.

A mental factor understood either as “the coarseness of the mind” or as the cause for such coarseness. More elaborate definitions explain it as a type of “mental murmur” (manojalpa) that is searching (paryeṣaka) and can be either based on intention (cetanā) or on wisdom (prajñā). See also “analysis” (vicāra).

A key term for Buddhist philosophy that represents the basic Buddhist understanding of causal processes.

In pratītya-samutpāda, a compound of two terms, samutpāda means “arisin” or “coming into existence” and poses little interpretive difficulty. The preverb sam- is sometimes understood as meaning “together” (samavāyena), referring to the doctrine that no entity whatsoever arises on its own‍—ultimately existent bits of materiality always arise with other bits, and moments of mind are always accompanied by mental states. The sgra sbyor bam po gnyis pa commentary on the Mahāvyutpatti, however, clarifies that the Tibetan translation has ’brel par in the sense of “connection,” a rendering of sambandha resulting from an interpretation of the sam- as indicating connection (sam ni sambandha stes ’brel pa la bya).

The first part of the compound, pratītya, can be explained in two very different ways, which have occasioned lengthy debates at the crossroads of philosophy and grammar. According to one explanation, it would mean “things that are each bound to go, to vanish,” hence the whole expression would mean something like “the arising of things that are each bound to vanish,” i.e., the arising of impermanent things. This explanation is favored, for example, by Bhāviveka, and Candrakīrti criticizes him for it (see Macdonald 2015, pp. 121–32). It is also the one opted for by Vīryaśrīdatta in the Nibandhana commentary on Distinctly Ascertaining the Meanings (see Samtani 1971, p. 98).

The other interpretation takes pratītya as meaning “having obtained” or “having depended upon,” more flexibly also “depending,” i.e., without necessarily implying temporal succession of two activities by the same entity, which is problematic, as the entity cannot be easily expected to do something (even “depending”) before it has come into existence (unless one is a Vaibhāṣika who accepts existence of future entities). In this interpretation, the sense of the whole expression is expanded as “arising in dependence upon an assemblage of causes and conditions.” This interpretation seems to be prevalent, and hence it has been followed in the translation (it is also the basis for the Tibetan rendering as rten cing ’brel par ’byung ba). It has the distinct advantage of matching the only possible sense of pratītya when it appears outside of a compound in sūtra passages where the dependent arising of, say, eye consciousness is described. A long discussion of the proper sense and the two interpretations of the term pratītya­samutpāda can be found in chapter 3 of the Abhidharma­kośa­bhāṣya (Pradhan 1967, p. 138).

We find numerous different explanations of dependent arising in the Buddhist texts, but three of them are most prominent: a short general definition of contingent coming into existence, as “A being there, B exists; from the arising of A, B arises”; the example of the arising of a single momentary entity, as “depending upon visible form and the eye faculty, eye consciousness arises”; and lastly the process of causality known as “dependent arising with twelve parts,” which describes the birth, complete life cycle, death, and rebirth of a sentient being in the desire realm (the part of the universe where we live and where several classes of sentient beings are born from a womb).

The twelve parts of dependent arising are often distributed into three lifetimes: ignorance and assembled factors belong to the previous lifetime; consciousness, name-and-form, the six entrances, contact, feeling, craving, clinging, and existence belong to the present lifetime; and birth and decay-and-death belong to the future lifetime (see Abhidharma­kośa­bhāṣya 3.25, Pradhan 1967, pp. 133–34). This explanation allows one to make good sense of the frequent sequence, found in the sūtras, where first dependent arising is explained, and then it is said to vanquish all views regarding past, present, or future lives (this progression is also found in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā; see Salvini 2011).

See “dependent arising.” These are the twelve causal links that perpetuate life in cyclic existence, starting with ignorance and ending with death.

Literally “born from Manu,” considered the first ancestor of all humans.

Among its many meanings, this term can refer to the teachings of the Buddha (when capitalized in this translation); positive actions that accord with it; an entity, which has (dhṛ) certain features through which it may be cognized (also the relevant sense in which it is used when dharmas are listed as the objects of thought); and a property or a quality (such as when discussing the Buddhadharmas, i.e., the dharmas of the Buddha, meaning his special qualities or properties).

The Nibandhana commentary explains the term arthaviniścaya twice. It first states, “ ‘Distinctly ascertaining the meanings’ means classifying/analyzing the dharmas” (arthānāṁ viniścayo dharmāṇāṁ pravicayaḥ, Samtani 1971, p. 73). This interpretation equates arthaviniścaya with the key term dharma­pravicaya (“classifying the dharmas”), a synonym of “higher cognition” (prajñā), “special insight” (vipaśyanā), and, importantly, abhidharma.

The second explanation is slightly more elaborate: “For sentient beings, by listening to this, there is an ascertainment of the meaning/purpose in manifold ways; thus, this is a name wherein the meaning corresponds” (arthasya vividhākāreṇa niścayo bhavaty etat-śravaṇāt sattvānām ity anugatārthā saṁjñā, Samtani 1971, p. 83).

Samtani (1971, p. 57ff.) argues against taking the word artha to here signify “meaning(s),” and suggests instead that it should be understood as “topic,” “subject matter,” or “category”; thus, while Ferrari’s previous rendering would translate into English as “the determination of the meaning” (“la determinazione del significato,” Ferrari 1944, p. 588) and match our own preference, his own translation of arthaviniścaya is “compendium of categories” (Samtani 2002, p. 3). Bhikkhu Ānandajoti prefers “analysis of the topics” (Ānandajoti 2016, front cover), which also matches Norman’s preference (“analysis of the (Buddhist) topics,” Norman 1973, p. 677).

While we do not think that translating as either “category” or “topic” is, per se, wrong (for, one could say, the two senses of artha as “topic” and artha as “meaning” are somewhat overlapping), the arguments offered by Samtani do not entirely convince us. One of his arguments is that dharma = “category,” and therefore, since the commentary tells us that artha = dharma, it follows that artha is a category; here our difficulty is with the premise, since we believe that here dharma means “entity” rather “category,” and indeed dharmas as entities are meanings/referents as opposed to words (śabda). Another argument adduced by Samtani is based on his interpretation of a quote from Yaśomitra, where artha is equated with viṣaya, which in turn Samtani explains as “subject matter.” However, we think that the context of that passage (Wogihara 1989, p. 23) rather strongly suggests that it is not explaining the word artha as meaning “subject matter” but rather as “object,” i.e., viṣaya as “domain,” here in the sense of the domain of sensory activity of one of the five sense faculties. Yaśomitra is here explaining the term artha appearing in the expression “objects of the sense faculties” (indriyārthāḥ, Abhidharma­kośa­kārikā 1.9).

Furthermore, we are not entirely sure that the sense of artha in the two explanations offered by the Nibandhana is exactly the same; we think that in the second explanation it is quite possible that artha (in the singular, unlike in the first interpretation) also, or maybe even primarily, carries the sense of “purpose” or “goal” (one could say “what is meaningful,” with a bit of a stretch). It is also quite likely that different nuances of the sense of artha are implied in the commentary, which is a virtue rather than a defect in Sanskrit writing (as we understand it).

We opted for “meaning” for the following reasons: it has a somewhat more vague/less specified feel (to us; “ascertaining the topics” could well mean ascertaining which topics are there (rather than, in fact, ascertaining their meanings); and, also taking into account other passages where the term arthaviniścaya occurs, we think it desirable to retain at least a suggestion of the opposition between “word” versus “meaning” (śabda vs. artha), which is of crucial importance in the Buddhist tradition (“relying on the meaning rather than on the words” is one of the four reliances (pratiśaraṇa); “relying on the topics” or “on the categories” may not sound too far from “relying on the words,” let alone be its opposite. Thus, “meaning/meaningful/purpose/what has purpose” is the range of meanings that we primarily read in the artha appearing in the expression arthaviniścaya.

The following passages use the term arthaviniścaya in contexts that are different from our sūtra, and thus we do not claim that any of them, or even all of them taken together, should lead to a conclusive ascertainment of the meaning of artha. However, we think they may clarify our purpose in using “meaning”:

“The awareness of all sounds of speech; the awareness of the etymological explanations; the awareness of the distinct ascertainment of the meaning/what is meaningful/what is of benefit; the avoidance of what is not of benefit/what is meaningless” (sarva­ruta­jñānaṃ | nirukti­vyavasthāna­jñānaṃ | artha­viniścaya­jñānaṃ | anartha­vivarjanaṁ, Samādhi­rāja­sūtra 37.27; Dutt 1941, p. 18).

“He sets aside the incoherent meaning/unconnected purpose; he is very certain in respect to the distinct ascertainment of the meanings/purposes” (asaṃsaktam artham uddharati suviniścito bhavati artha­viniścaye, Śayanāsana­vastu, Gnoli 1978b, p. 45).

“This is a negation of the word-meaning; the real thing is not set aside. In this way, the distinct ascertainment of the meaning should also be understood in respect to other sentences” (śabdārtha­pratiṣedho 'yaṃ na vastu vinivāryate | evam anyeṣv api jñeyo vākyeṣv artha­viniścayaḥ, Prajñā­pāramitā­piṇḍārthaḥ of Dignāga, Tucci 1947, p. 58; Tucci here translates artha­viniścayaḥ as “determination of the things,” p. 65).

“What is the distinct ascertainment of the meaning? It is where there is a distinct ascertainment in respect to six meanings. Which six meanings? The meaning of own-being, the meaning of cause, the meaning of result, the meaning of karma, the meaning of yoga, and the meaning of occurrence” (artha­viniścayaḥ katamaḥ| yatra ṣaḍ­arthān ārabhya viniścayo bhavati || katame ṣaḍ arthāḥ | svabhāvārthaḥ hetvarthaḥ phalārthaḥ karmārthaḥ yogārthaḥ vṛttyarthaś ca, Abhidharma­samuccaya, Hayashima 2003, p. 858).

See “four pairs of persons.”

Eighteen collections of similar dharmas under which all coproduced and unproduced dharmas may be included: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and thought, plus their objects‍—visible forms, sounds, smells, flavors, tangibles, and dharmas‍—plus the consciousnesses corresponding to each of the first six. The eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and thought are the basis for the arising of consciousness, though here there is the technical sense of a prior moment in any of the six consciousnesses. The first five consciousnesses depend on the five sense faculties as their basis, while the basis for the thought consciousness can be any of the six consciousnesses but not a sense faculty. Hence thought is classified among the dhātus (“elements”) in the section meant to offer a complete list of the possible bases of consciousness, i.e., what is most frequently listed as the second set of six elements.

The term dhātu is explained as having the sense of an ore (gotra), like a mineral ore, hence a point of origin (ākara). The bases are the points of origin for the arising of similar dharmas. The Nibandhana commentary on Distinctly Ascertaining the Meanings explains that the order of enumeration of the eighteen bases can be explained in terms of the specific way in which different sense faculties operate within their domains or in terms of the placement (from higher to lower) of the eye faculty, the ear faculty, and so forth. The Abhidharmakośa explains that the teaching of the bases is for those who are of weaker abilities, since it is very detailed; it is for those who prefer special insight meditation (vipaśyanā), because it contains extensive analysis; and it counteracts a delusion of “self” that is evenly distributed between sentient and nonsentient elements, since the eighteen bases offer an analysis both of form and of mind and mental derivatives.

This refers to eighteen properties/qualities that are unique to buddhas, “property” being one of the possible meanings of the term dharma.

The set of eighty physical marks that identify both a buddha and a universal monarch (cakravartin); in the case of the former they indicate the perfection of the awakened state of buddhahood.

The list of dhātus in the sense of “elements” comprises the four great elements (see “great elements”) of earth, water, heat, and wind, plus space and consciousness, and is a list specifically designed to describe the assemblage of conditions that makes it possible for a new moment of consciousness to arise after the last moment of consciousness at death, i.e., it is meant to explain the process of rebirth.

The Nibandhana explains this as a metaphor of the eye and the feet, which, operating together, allow one to move; knowledge, interpreted as either “right view” or as “the training in wisdom,” is like the eye, while the other seven parts of the noble eightfold path, or the two other trainings in discipline and samādhi, function as the “feet.” This explanation is also found in the sgra sbyor bam po gnyis pa commentary on the Mahāvyutpatti, which further clarifies that zhabs is here simply the honorific term for “foot” (caraṇa ni rkang pa). Thus, although it is not uncommon to translate caraṇa here with “conduct,” this loses the significance of the metaphor.

The Nibandhana explains this as “the fatigue that is preceded by grief and lamentation” (śoka­parideva­pūrvaka­śramaḥ, Samtani 1971, p. 102).

The first level of realization that transforms an ordinary person into a “noble one,” someone who has directly seen the nature of reality and has a sufficiently stable level of realization to be already bound toward liberation from saṃsāra.

The tenth of the twelve parts of dependent arising.

The lowest of the three planes of existence, where coarse desires for all the sense objects are present.

The middling type among the three planes of existence, where desire for coarse food or copulation is absent.

The Nibandhana explains that this refers to a standard list of eight assembled factors: zest (chanda), effort (vyāyāma), faith (śraddhā), mindfulness (smṛti), discerning awareness (saṁprajanya), intention (cetanā), and equanimity (upekṣā) (Samtani 1971, p. 221).

“Faculties” is a translation meant to represent the preferred etymologization of indriya in Buddhist texts as indanti, meaning “they have power,” which is also reflected in the Tibetan translation as dbang po. Different lists of indriyas exist within the Buddhist texts, their common trait being that they have “power” over a specific domain of activity. For example, the five sense faculties have causal power with respect to seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching.

Here “faith” is not used so much in the sense of “religious faith,” but rather as when one says, “I have faith in you” or “I have faith in your good qualities.” It is often explained as “a good disposition of the mind” (cetasaḥ prasādaḥ) toward something and is occasionally divided into three types: faith as the conviction that something exists, faith as the conviction that something has good qualities, and faith as the conviction that something with good qualities can be obtained.

The second of the five aggregates and the seventh of the twelve parts of dependent arising.

Five collections of similar dharmas under which all dependently arisen dharmas may be included: form (materiality), feeling, notion, assembled factors, and consciousness.

The five aggregates of form, feeling, notion, assembled factors, and consciousness. They are referred to as the bases for clinging insofar as all conceptual grasping arises based on these aggregates.

The faculties of faith, heroism, mindfulness, samādhi, and wisdom. They are the same as the five strengths, only at a lesser stage of development.

The strengths of faith, heroism, mindfulness, samādhi, and wisdom. They are the same as the five faculties, only at a greater stage of development.

See the “five faculties.”

Most of the explanations of the term āsrava derive it from the root sru (“to flow,” “to ooze”) and understand the preverb ā- variously either as “flowing in,” “flowing out from,” or simply emphasizing the action of flowing. The Tibetan translation also translates the sense of the root but does not explicitly render the preverb; zag pa is attested as a translation of several other Sanskrit terms that mean “to flow,” “to ooze,” etc. (sravaḥ, srāvaṇam, syandī, etc.; see Negi vol. 12, p. 5353). The derivation from ā + sru follows clear grammatical principles (vyākaraṇa); furthermore, there is another derivation from the root ās (“to sit,” “to remain”), which is in accordance with etymology by sound association (nirukti).

Vasubandhu offers two alternatives: “They cause beings to remain (āsayanti) within saṃsāra” and “They flow from the Summit of Existence down to the Unwavering, out of the six wounds that are the entrances” (āsayanti saṃsāre āsravanti bhavāgrādyāvadavīciṃ ṣaḍbhir āyatana­vraṇair ityāsravāḥ, Abhidharma­kośa­bhāṣya on 5.40, Pradhan 1967, p. 308). The “Summit of Existence” is the highest point within saṃsāra, while the hell called “Unwavering” is the lowest; the six entrances here refer to the five sense faculties plus the mind, i.e., the six internal entrances in the scheme of twelve entrances.

The Pāli tradition offers similar derivations. For example, the commentary on The Sutta on All the Āsavas explains the term āsava in the following ways:

“They flow (āsavanti), thus they are āsavas: even from the eye, up to even from thought, they ooze, they come about‍—this is what is being said here” (āsavantīti āsavā, cakkhutopi … pe … manatopi sandanti pavattantīti vuttaṃ hoti, Aṭṭhakathā on the Sabbāsavasutta.) (This explanation matches quite closely the second one in the Abhidharma­kośa­bhāṣya.) The “up to” here reproduces the pe, an abbreviation meant to convey an incomplete list. The complete list would be “even from the eye, even from the ear, even from the nose, even from the tongue, even from the body, even from thought”‍—i.e., the list of the six internal entrances.

“Alternatively, from the dhammas to the gotrabhū, from space to the Summit of Existence, they flow, thus they are āsavas. Entering inside these dhammas and this space, they come about‍—this is the sense; for this ā- has the sense of ‘entering inside’ ” (dhammato yāva gotrabhuṃ okāsato yāva bhavaggaṃ savantīti vā āsavā | ete dhamme etañ ca okāsaṃ anto karitvā pavattantīti attho. antokaraṇattho hi ayaṃ ākāro || Aṭṭhakathā on the Sabbāsavasutta).

“ ‘Liquor and so forth are āsavas’ in the sense that they stay in one place for a long time; since they are ‘like the āsavas,’ these are ‘āsavas.’ For, in this world, liquor and so forth that stay in one place for a long time are called āsavas. And if they are āsavas in the sense that they stay in one place for a long time, these indeed are worthy of being so. For, it has been said, ‘A prior limit, bhikkhus, is not found for ignorance, wherein one could say that “before this there was no ignorance,” and so forth’ ” (cirapārivāsiyaṭṭhena madirādayo āsavā | āsavā viyātipi āsavā. lokasmiñ hi cirapārivāsikā madirādayo āsavāti vuccanti || yadi ca cirapārivāsiyaṭṭhena āsavā | eteyeva bhavitum arahanti | vuttañ hetaṃ purimā bhikkhave koṭi na paññāyati avijjāya ito pubbe avijjā nāhosītiādi || Aṭṭhakathā on the Sabbāsavasutta A.Ni.10.61).

“Alternatively, they ooze, they ooze forth, future suffering of saṃsāra‍—thus they are āsavas” (āyataṃ vā saṃsāradukkhaṃ savanti pasavantītipi āsavā, Aṭṭhakathā on the Sabbāsavasutta).

From all this, we conclude that (1) the derivation from the root sru (“to flow” etc.) is in some ways primary, and it follows principles of grammar (vyākaraṇa) rather than those of etymology by sound association (nirukti), as Yaśomitra clarifies is the case for the etymology from ās (“to sit” etc.); (2) the value of the preverb ā- was understood variously (“from,” “out of,” or as an intensifier), thus it is impossible to decide whether to render it as “in,” “out,” etc.; (3) translators who chose zag pa to render āsrava were most likely aware of both the above points.

Considering all the above, we have opted for “fluxes” rather than “influences” or “outflows.”

The first of the five aggregates.

The highest type among the three planes of existence, where form/materiality is either absent or, according to some, present only in its subtlest aspects.

Friendliness, compassion, rejoicing, and equanimity are called “Brahma abodes,” according to the commentarial traditions, because one abides with a mind like that of the deity Brahmā and because they are a cause to be born in the world of Brahmā. It is important to point out, though, that the original Sanskrit compound brahma-vihāra does not specify the gender of the term brahman, which could therefore either refer to Brahmā as a deity or to brahman, meaning more generally “what is most exalted,” as is sometimes simply used in the sense of “sublime” etc. We have therefore attempted to retain the ambiguity by using neither “Brahmā” (which is by common convention used only for the deity) nor “brahman” (which is by common convention used only for “what is most exalted” etc.), but rather “Brahma.”

Four confidences of a tathāgata in proclaiming that they have (1) completely awakened, (2) taught the obstacles to awakening, (3) shown the way to liberation, and (4) destroyed the fluxes.

Listed here as the course that is painful and that is slow in superior cognition, the course that is painful and that is quick in superior cognition, the course that is pleasant and that is slow in superior cognition, and the course that is pleasant and that is quick in superior cognition.

Listed here as the cultivation of samādhi that brings about the destruction of attraction, the cultivation of samādhi that brings about a pleasant abiding in this very life, the cultivation of samādhi that brings about the obtainment of the vision of awareness, and the cultivation of samādhi that brings about the obtainment of wisdom.

Extraordinary abilities that arise due to success in meditation. They are the footings of success based on isolation, based on nonattraction, based on cessation, and matured by relinquishment.

Listed here as the aggregates of feeling, notion, assembled factors, and consciousness.

A standard classification of four increasingly refined meditative states found in Buddhist texts.

This refers stream enterers, once-returners, non-returners, and arhats, along with those practicing to attain the realizations of those states.

Described as four attributes of śrāvakas: they are well disposed toward the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha, and they are endowed with the types of discipline that are highly valued by the noble ones.

Mindfulness of the body, mindfulness of feelings, mindfulness of the mind, and mindfulness of dharmas, the last understood variously as either all dharmas or a specific list of dharmas.

Four correct ways in which to strive, sometimes also employed to explain “right effort” in the context of the noble path with eight parts. They are abandoning nonvirtuous dharmas that have not yet arisen and those that have already arisen, generating virtuous dharmas that have yet to arise, and maintaining virtuous dharmas that have already arisen.

A list of special cognitive abilities that characterize realized beings. They are the special knowledges of meaning, of dharmas, of explanations, and of brilliancy.

A paradigmatic set of teachings traditionally believed to have been taught in the Buddha’s very first sermon. They are the truths of suffering, the arising of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path that leads to the cessation of suffering.

De Jong points out that “the word sbyaṅ is recorded in Sumatiratna’s Tibetan-Mongolian Dictionary, II, (Ulanbator, 1959), p. 357: rtsva daṅ ‘bru-la sogs-pa ’jog-pa’i gnas-te sgo daṅ skar-khuṅ med-pa/yaṅ baṅ-ba ’am rdzaṅ yaṅ źes-pa sbyaṅ “a place without doors and windows where herbs and grains are stored; also a store-room or a box” (De Jong 1975, p. 117). (We thank James Gentry for pointing out the sense of “granary.”)

The term sbyang, if it may indeed be understood as something akin to a “box,” could rather match the term mutoḍī (see Edgerton 1993, p. 436), reported by Samtani as the reading of ANe Comy (the manuscript of the Nibandhana commentary), and also appearing (as mūtoḍī) in the relevant Śikṣāsamuccaya parallel (see Samtani 1971, p. 24, n. 2), rather than the term koṣṭhāgāra in the printed edition. The term mutoḍī matches the Pāli putoỊī/mūtoỊī/mutoli found in Pāli passages parallel to this and explained as follows:

“A putoḷi is a circular container made by tying together clothes and so forth in the shape of a sack” (vatthādīhi pasibbakākārena bandhitvā kataṃ āvāṭanaṃ putoḷi, ṭīkā on the Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta, Mahāvagga, Dīghanikāya; vatthādīhi pasibbakākārena bandhitvā kataṃ āvaṭanaṃ putoḷi, ṭīka on the Mahāsatipaṭṭānasutta, Mūlapaṇṇāsa, Majjhima­nikāya; here we take it that āvāṭanam/āvaṭanam = āvaṭṭanam).

The four great elements of earth, water, heat, and wind do not refer to the coarse entities by the same name, but rather to minimal entities characterized by specific features (such as “hardness” for the earth element) and specific functions (such as “supporting” for the earth element). These elements are usually believed to be in principle invisible; all primary rūpa (“form/materiality”) is in principle invisible, while visibility is a type of secondary rūpa, which depends on the four great elements but is not to be confused with them.

The term vīrya is related to, and often derived from, vīra, which is related to the Latin vir, from which both “virility” and “virtue” are derived. Vīrya brings to mind heroism, valor, virility, courage, and strength. Although vīrya is often translated as “diligence,” we have here chosen to render it “heroism.”

This may refer to either literal, bodily isolation, i.e., seclusion, or to the isolation of the mind from certain (usually undesirable) mental factors. The two senses are related, and as the relationship between the two senses is both implicitly and explicitly thematized in Buddhist texts, a single translation for both the more “outer” and the more “inner” forms of isolation is here meant to respect a clearly intended suggestion found throughout Buddhist literature. The term can also refer to conceptual isolation, i.e., discernment.

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

Jinamitra was invited to Tibet during the reign of King Tri Songdetsen (khri srong lde btsan, r. 742–98 ᴄᴇ) and was involved with the translation of nearly two hundred texts, continuing into the reign of King Ralpachen (ral pa can, r. 815–38 ᴄᴇ). He was one of the small group of paṇḍitas responsible for the Mahāvyutpatti Sanskrit–Tibetan dictionary.

A legendary bird whose voice is believed to be extremely beautiful. It is often depicted as having a human head.

Intention or what follows an intention. Intention is mental karma; what follows an intention is verbal and bodily karma.

The highest level of the form realm.

A powerful deity of the desire realm, more commonly known as Viṣṇu.

The root smṛ may mean to “recollect,” but also simply to “think of” something. “Mindfulness” means, broadly speaking, bringing something to mind, not necessarily something experienced in a distant past but also something just experienced, such as the position of one’s body.

A method of meditation that requires the practitioner to be aware of different aspects of the breath and what accompanies it.

The name of a rich man.

This is the nickname of an upāsikā (female lay practitioner), actually called Viśākhā, who is sometimes considered the most prominent among female lay followers of the Buddha. She had married the son of a man called Mṛgāra, who was originally a Jaina but went to meet the Buddha and even became a stream enterer thanks to her. Feeling indebted to her, he said that she was like his mother, which is the origin of the nickname.

The term nāma ordinarily means “name,” but in the context of “name-and-form” it refers more specifically to everything that makes up sentience, i.e., the mind and mental factors. In that context, the term is sometimes etymologized from the root nam in the sense of “bending,” either toward an object (perceiving an object), or toward a new birth.

The fourth of the twelve parts of dependent arising.

A special symbol sometimes resembling a W.

When referring to a person, it is someone who has entered the “path of seeing”‍—someone who has a direct and stable realization of the four truths of the noble ones and who thus ceases to be an “ordinary person,” becoming a “noble one.”

Right view, right thinking, right speech, right activity, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right samādhi.

One who has achieved the third of the four levels of attainment on the śrāvaka path and who will not be reborn in saṃsāra.

The opposite of “virtuous.”

The third of the five aggregates.

Edgerton favors the theory according to which poṣa/posa should be derived from puruṣa; however, the Tibetan translation reflects a different etymologization of the term that must have been current at the time of the Tibetan translations of Sanskrit texts. Pāli etymologies also suggest a link to the idea of “nourishing” (attabhāvassa posanato poso), and therefore we have preferred to follow traditional etymologies that better reflect how the South Asian and Tibetan masters understood the term.

One who has achieved the second of the four levels of attainment on the śrāvaka path and who will only take one more rebirth before attaining liberation.

See “seven parts of awakening.”

Somewhat akin to what in English is expressed by the term “pleasance” (also in its etymology), an ārāma is a pleasant garden, a green habitable space. The Buddha and his disciples are often found to dwell in such ārāmas, and the term is even found in contemporary usage in names of Thai monasteries.

A Bengali paṇḍita resident in Tibet during the late 8th and early 9th centuries. Arriving in Tibet on an invitation from the Tibetan king, he assisted in the translation of numerous canonical scriptures. He is also the author of a few philosophical commentaries contained in the Tibetan Tengyur (bstan ’gyur) collection.

The Nibandhana explains nyāya as follows: “Nyāya refers to the dharma of nirvāṇa, for it has been said that āya means a path, and that an “eternal path” (nityam āyaḥ) is called nyāya.”

The Nibandhana explains that “rejoicing” refers to a happy, joyful mind (saumanasya).

Some readers may be familiar with the term samadhi, written without diacritics as it would appear in English dictionaries, where it is usually explained as referring to meditation or meditative states.

In a more restricted sense, and when understood as a mental state, samādhi is defined as the one-pointedness of the mind (cittaikāgratā), the ability to remain on the same object over long periods of time. In Vaibhāṣika abhidharma, samādhi is a mental state that accompanies each and every moment of mind; the practice of meditation and the like is for the purpose of making samādhi more powerful (samādhiś cittasyaikagrateti | agram ālambanam ity eko 'rthaḥ | yadyogāc cittaṃ prabandhena ekatrālambane vartate | sa samādhiḥ | yadi samādhiḥ sarva­cetasi bhavati | kim arthaṃ dhyāneṣu yatnaḥ kriyate | balavatsamādhiniṣpādanārthaṃ, Abhidharma­kośa­vyākhyā 2.24, Wogihara 1989, p. 128). Some forms of abhidharma (Yogācāra, for example) do not consider samādhi as a mental factor that accompanies every moment of mind.

In a slightly less technical sense, samādhi can describe a number of different meditative states, including the highest such as the “samādhi that is like a diamond” (vajropamasamādhi).

If we understand the term samādhi as derived from sam + ā + dhā, the sense is something like to “place together” or “collect.” In the Tibetan rendering of this term, the ’dzin represents, we think, the root dhā and matches one of the senses of this root, “to hold” (dhāraṇa). The possible etymology of ting nge is debated and possibly a complex matter; if we accept the hypothesis that ting nge is related to gting, then the sense is probably akin to “profound” or “deep,” which may indicate taking sam + ā more or less as intensifiers.

The sgra sbyor bam po gnyis pa commentary on the Mahāvyutpatti explains the term samādhi as referring to the instrument through which mind and mental states “get collected,” i.e., it is by the force of samādhi that the continuum of mind and mental states becomes collected on a single point of reference without getting distracted (samādhi zhes pa samādhiyante anena zhes bya ste | ting nge ’dzin gyi mthus sems dang sems las byung ba’i rgyud dmigs pa gcig la sdud cing mi g.yo bar ting nge ’dzin ’jog pas na ting nge ’dzin zhes bya).

Explained as a “cohesive assembly,” saṅgha refers ultimately to those who have realized the nature of reality in accordance with the Buddhist path or, in a more conventional sense, with an assembly of monastics.

This refers to seven convex surfaces on different parts of the Buddha’s body.

A standard list of seven factors that arise at a certain point on the path toward awakening and facilitate it. They are the parts of awakening of mindfulness, classifying the dharmas, heroism, joy, ease, samādhi, and equanimity.

This refers to the six “internal entrances,” i.e., the five sense faculties plus thought.

Six sets of similar dharmas under which all compounded and uncompounded dharmas may be included: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind, and their objects‍—visible forms, sounds, smells, flavors, tangibles, and dharmas. The fifth of the twelve parts of dependent arising. Another name for the “twelve entrances.”

The Nibandhana explains this as a change in one’s mnemonic abilities, such as forgetting quickly and not remembering clearly, i.e., a kind of mental slowness.

The word śramaṇa refers to ascetics/religious practitioners who are often distinguished from brāhmaṇa (brahmins). It seems that a common characteristic of śramaṇas was to have “gone forth” (pravrajita), i.e., to not be householders, or at least this is how the Buddhist commentarial tradition understands the term. At some point, the term also became an established way to distinguish non-Vedic ascetics from those who followed the Vedas; renunciates, not just Buddhists, could be called śramaṇa if they were not within the Vedic/brahminical fold. Thus, the term has several layers of meaning, and it was such a key term in Buddhist texts that the result of practice came also to be known as “the fruit of being a śramaṇa” (Skt. śrāmaṇyaphala, Pāli sāmaññaphala); the Buddha himself is epitomized as “the great śramaṇa” (mahāśramaṇa) in one of the most famous Buddhist verses (the ye dharmā stanza, found in colophons and epigraphy throughout the Buddhist world).

The term śramaṇa is formed from the root śram, most likely in the sense of “to exert oneself” (tapasi). This is reflected in the second element of its Tibetan translation (sbyong, which is sometimes used as a translation of abhyāsa); thus, śramaṇas are‍—as per the Tibetan rendering‍—those who exert themselves (sbyong) toward virtue (dge). The reference to virtue may be connected to an etymology found in the Sanskrit Udānavarga and Pāli Dhammapada, according to which one is a śramaṇa if one has pacified sins (śamitatvāt tu pāpānāṁ śramaṇo hi nirucyate, Udānavarga 11.14, Berhard 1965, p. 190; sdig pa zhi ba de dag ni/ dge sbyong nyid ces brjod par bya, Udānavarga Tib. 11.15; Zongtse 1990, p. 127; samitattā hi pāpānaṃ samaṇo ti pavuccati | Dhammapada verse 265). Commentarial literature occasionally distinguishes between this as the higher sense of śramaṇa vs. the more ordinary sense of being a śramaṇa/samaṇa “only due to having gone forth” (pabbajjāmattasamaṇo); this distinction appears in contexts where the word is together with “brahmins,” as it often happens in sūtras/suttas (yaṃ no payirupāsato cittaṃ pasīdeyyāti vuttattā samaṇaṃ vā brāhmaṇaṃ vāti ettha paramatthasamaṇo ca paramatthabrāhmaṇo ca adhippeto na pabbajjāmattasamaṇo na jātimattabrāhmaṇo cāti āha samitapāpatāya samaṇaṃ | bāhitapāpatāya brāhmaṇanti | Ṭīkā on the Sāmaññaphalasutta, Sīlakkhandavagga, Dīghanikāya).

The Kāśyapa­parivarta­sūtra lists four types of śramaṇa: one who is so only in outer appearance (varṇa­rūpa­liṅga­saṃsthāna­śramaṇa), one who is hypocritical and hides their real conduct (ācāra­gupti­kuhaka­śramaṇa), one who does everything for the sake of fame (kīrti­śabda­śloka­śramaṇa), and one who practices genuinely (bhūta­pratipatti­śramaṇa). (See Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya 2002, pp. 41–44).

Someone who practices according to the vehicle of the hearers (those who hear the teachings from others) or someone who has heard the Dharma from the Buddha.

A city of ancient India, in what is now Uttar Pradesh. The name Śrāvastī is explained as being derived from the name of a sage, Śravasta, who used to live in that area (this explanation is found in the commentary Nibandhana, Samtani 1971, p. 77, and is also found in the ṭīkā on Distinctly Ascertaining the Meanings found in the Tengyur, where, however, the name of the sage is transliterated as Śravasti). Pāli sources offer three explanations for the term: one is the one just mentioned, that Sāvatthī is derived from Savattha, just like other city names (Kākandī, Mākandī, Kosambī); alternatively, it is so called because “everything is there” in terms of possible objects of enjoyment for humans; and lastly the name refers to the reply, “there is everything,” that the Buddha offered when asked about what kind of shops were there (sāvatthīti savatthassa isino nivāsaṭṭhānabhūtā nagarī yathā kākandī mākandī kosambīti evaṃ tāva akkharacintakā | aṭṭhakathācariyā pana bhaṇanti yaṃkiñci manussānaṃ upabhogaparibhogaṃ sabbamettha atthīti sāvatthī | satthasamāyoge ca kiṃ bhaṇḍam atthīti pucchite sabbamatthīti vacanam upādāya sāvatthī | Aṭṭhakathā on the Sabbāsava­sutta of the Majjhima­nikāya, Mūlapaṇṇāsa). The Tibetan translation as mnyan yod seems to derive the first part of the name from the root śru (“to hear”) and the second part as “there is” (asti); this derivation seems to be implied in one of the explanations of the Artha­viniścaya­ṭīkā.

A special symbol, often represented as an endless knot in the Tibetan tradition.

The term sugata is formed by the preverb su- (“well,” “good,” “completely”) and the participle gata, from the root gam (“to go” but also “to understand”). A recurrent explanation offers three different meanings for su- that are meant to show the special qualities of accomplishment of one’s own purpose (svārthasampat) for a complete buddha. Thus, the Sugata is “well” gone, as in the expression su-rūpa (“having a good form”); he is gone “in a way that he shall not come back,” as in the expression su-naṣṭa-jvara (“a fever that has utterly gone”); he has gone “without any remainder” as in the expression su-pūrṇa-ghaṭa (“a pot that is completely full”). These three senses of su- distinguish the Buddha from non-Buddhist practitioners who are free of desirous attraction (bāhya-vītarāga), from Buddhist practitioners who are still in need of training (śaikṣa), i.e., are not liberated, and from Buddhist practitioners who have no more need of training (aśaikṣa), i.e., are liberated but have not obtained complete buddhahood (svārtha­sampat sugatatvena trividham artham upādāya praśastatvārthaṃ surūpavat apunarāvṛttyarthaṃ sunaṣṭajvaravat niḥśeṣārthaṃ supūrṇaghaṭavat arthatrayaṃ caitad bāhyavītarāga­śaikṣāśaikṣebhyaḥ svārtha­sampadviśeṣaṇārtham, Dignāga, Pramāṇa­samuccaya 1.1, Steinkellner 2005, p. 1; see also Prajñākaramati’s Pañjikā on Bodhi­caryāvatāra 1.1, de La Vallée Poussin 1901–14, pp. 2–3; and Artha­viniścaya­sūtra­nibandhana, Samtani 1971, p. 244).

The sgra sbyor bam po gnyis pa commentary on the Mahāvyutpatti, apart from the three explanations above, contains an additional interpretation of the preverb su-, as meaning “happiness/bliss/pleasure” (sukha), attributed to the Dharmaskandha (one of the abhidharma treatises of the Sarvāstivāda tradition); thus su-gata is understood as “one who has reached happiness” (su[khaṁ]gata): “The Bhagavat has happiness; he has heavenly happiness, since he is endowed with the untroubled dharma” (dharmmaskandha las ’byung ba sugata iti sukhito bhagavān | svargita avyathitadharmmasamanvāgata | tad ucyate sugata ces ’byung ste). The commentary further explains that the Tibetan rendering bde bar gshegs pa is in fact in accordance with the Dharmaskandha interpretation of the term (dharmaskandha las ’byung ba dang sbyar te bde bar gshegs pa zhes btags), which explains why the Tibetan rendering does not seem to match the more recurrent interpretations of sugata in Sanskrit treatises. The connection with sukham can also be found in lexicographical literature (see for example Subhūticandra’s Kavikāmadhenu commentary on the Amarakośa, Deokar 2014, p. 121; and also the Pāli Abhidhānappadīpikāṭīkā, Saggakaṇḍavaṇṇanā, which seems to be a shortened version of the Kavikāmadhenu gloss on sugata).

The Pāli tradition offers a slightly different explanation, in four parts: “his way of going is good,” “he has gone to a beautiful place,” “he has gone in the right manner,” and, deriving gata not from gam but from gad (“to speak,” “to say”), “he speaks in the right manner” (sobhanagamanattā sundaraṃ ṭhānaṃ gatattā sammā gatattā sammā ca gadattā sugato | Visuddhimagga, 1.134).

A type of cognition that is beyond the range of ordinary people, sometimes referring to a specific list of superknowledges.

A special symbol, considered auspicious in many South Asian traditions, whose name is derived from the word svasti, which is often used as a greeting.

The term tathāgata is formed by the indeclinable tathā (“thus,” “in that manner”) and gata, a participle from the root gam (“to go,” but also, like all Sanskrit roots indicating going or reaching, “to understand”). According to the sgra sbyor bam po gnyis pa commentary on the Mahāvyutpatti, the Tathāgata is one who has “gone in the same way that all the past buddhas have gone” (sngon gyi sangs rgyas rnams ji ltar gshegs zhing phyin pa) and also “someone who has understood the nature, i.e., the tathatā, of all the dharmas, as it is” (chos thams cad gyi rang bzhin de bzhin nyid ji lta ba mkhyen).

The Nibandhana commentary on Distinctly Ascertaining the Meanings derives tathāgata from the root gad (“to speak,” “to say”) and interprets it as meaning that “he teaches the Dharma just as it is, without distortion” (tathaivāviparīta­dharmaṁ gadatīti, Samtani 1971, p. 242).

Another explanation of the term tathāgata can be found in The Diamond Cutter Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra: “Tathāgata, Subhūti, is explained as not gone anywhere, not arrived from anywhere; in this sense he is called the tathāgata, the arhat, the perfect, complete Buddha.” (tathāgata iti subhūte ucyate na kvacidgato na kutaścidāgataḥ | tenocyate tathāgato 'rhan samyak­saṃbuddha iti, Vaidya 1961, p. 88).

Distinctive qualities of a tathāgata: (1) cognizing what is and is not the case, (2) cognizing the maturation of karma, (3) cognizing the various inclinations of sentient beings, (4) cognizing various natures of the world, (5) cognizing the higher and lower faculties of beings, (6) cognizing the paths that reach everywhere, (7) cognizing the condition of either defilement or purification in other sentient beings’ faculties, strengths, parts of awakening, meditations, liberations, samādhis, and attainments, (8) cognizing previous lives, (9) cognizing the birth and death of all beings, and (10) cognizing the mind’s liberation without fluxes.

The set of thirty-two physical marks that identify both a buddha and a universal monarch (cakravartin); in the case of the former they indicate the perfection of the awakened state of buddhahood.

Twelve collections of similar dharmas under which all compounded and uncompounded dharmas may be included: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind, and their objects‍—visible forms, sounds, smells, flavors, tangibles, and dharmas.

Listed here as the eye faculty, the ear faculty, the nose faculty, the tongue faculty, the body faculty, the thought faculty, the male faculty, the female faculty, the life faculty, the suffering faculty, the pleasure faculty, the mental well-being faculty, the mental anguish faculty, the neutrality faculty, the faith faculty, the heroism faculty, the mindfulness faculty, the samādhi faculty, the wisdom faculty, the “I will completely know what I don’t yet know” faculty, the complete-knowledge faculty, and the “I have completely known” faculty.

The lowest hell; the eighth of the eight hot hells.

Teacher, (monastic) preceptor; “having approached him, one studies from him” (upetyādhīyate asmāt | Dādhimatha 1995: 252).

A single coiled and very long hair on the Buddha’s forehead. One of the thirty-two marks of a great person.

A protuberance on the top of the Buddha’s head. One of the thirty-two marks of a great person.

The term can refer to both a diamond and a thunderbolt.

The term kuśala can function both as a qualifier or as a noun in its own right, which makes it difficult to resort to a single translation (I have resorted to “virtue” and “virtuous”). It refers to something beneficial or virtuous and is sometimes etymologized as something that keeps badness in check (kutsitaṁ śalate); when the sense of kuśala is more akin to “skillful” or even “virtuoso,” the etymology is that it is “someone who can cut the kuśa grass” (kuśān lāti), a type of grass that is very sharp and thus requires remarkable skill to cut it without being cut in turn.

The Nibandhana explains that awareness itself is vision, as it functions as direct perception.

From the root sīd (to “sit” or “settle”), this term is connected to a metaphor of water settling down and becoming clear, and thus prasāda can often mean “clarity” in the physical sense. This is contrasted with kaluṣa (“turbidity”), which is also used in a metaphorical sense, in this case of looking unfavorably upon someone/something. When we translate it as “good disposition,” or “being well disposed,” it is in contexts where the term has meanings akin to faith and devotion, or generally looking upon someone/something else in a positive light.

The term prajñā is formed by adding the prefix pra, usually understood as meaning “excellent,” to the root jñā, meaning “to know,” “to know of,” “to understand,” “to cognize,” “to be aware of,” etc. Prajñā is used in more mundane contexts as referring to something very akin to “wisdom,” while in a Buddhist context it is often defined as dharma-pravicaya, the classification or analysis of entities, predicated upon a recognition of their specific nature. It is thus also a synonym of abhidharma and of “insight” or “clear sight” (vipaśyanā).

Definition from the 84000 Glossary of Terms:

Yeshé Dé (late eighth to early ninth century) was the most prolific translator of sūtras into Tibetan. Altogether he is credited with the translation of more than one hundred sixty sūtra translations and more than one hundred additional translations, mostly on tantric topics. In spite of Yeshé Dé’s great importance for the propagation of Buddhism in Tibet during the imperial era, only a few biographical details about this figure are known. Later sources describe him as a student of the Indian teacher Padmasambhava, and he is also credited with teaching both sūtra and tantra widely to students of his own. He was also known as Nanam Yeshé Dé, from the Nanam (sna nam) clan.